Voting Activities

This proposal presents conflicting information because the Tally description requests a $20 000 grant, yet the forum discussion describes it as an application for the Builder Rewards program. Approving a measure whose funding pathway is unclear would erode transparency and make post vote accountability impossible. We ask the team to resubmit a clean proposal that explicitly matches one category and its evaluation criteria so delegates can assess it properly. For these reasons we oppose the proposal in its current form.

This proposal lacks several key elements that are necessary for us to confidently support a grant at this stage. Clear and measurable milestones, especially for Wave 1, have not been articulated. Additionally, the project has yet to present a video pitch or demonstrate concrete value for the Rootstock ecosystem, and there is little evidence of public presence or early traction. We believe the team should first deliver on these outputs before funding is approved.

Deploying VLR on BSC aligns closely with Project Miro's roadmap and efficiently utilizes resources previously allocated, thus avoiding additional financial burdens on the DAO. The team's openness to employing active liquidity management solutions provides confidence that impermanent loss, will be minimized. Additionally, targeted marketing strategies and the introduction of staking and cross-chain voting via Delta offer robust mechanisms for driving adoption on BSC.

This proposal builds on DVT, which has proven record of raised uptime and efficiency, so broadening its use is the logical next step. We have also utilized DVT and appreciated the impact it made for our operation. The revised incentive split rewards both node teams and depositors, giving every party a stake in faster adoption. We expect this combination of proven tech and balanced economics to lift overall network performance with minimal added risk.

Vote: Rotate Kyber Network to Caliber Rationale: We believe this proposal will preserve existing expertise because the engineers and infrastructure supporting Kyber’s oracle service are expected to migrate, at least in part, to Caliber. Therefore, we do not anticipate any significant decline in performance or uptime. Onboarding an entirely new team would raise costs and coordination risks without offering clear advantages, so we prefer this seamless transition.

This proposal is a necessary response to the expansion of staking modules; it keeps the rule set current with the ecosystem’s evolution. We are confident that the required amendments and perspectives have been properly captured, leaving no critical gaps. By locking these updates into a single standard, the DAO can maintain clarity for operators and protect network security.

This proposal effectively eliminates an outdated structure, significantly reduces unnecessary costs (~$5k/month), and enhances the DAO’s decentralization and operational efficiency. By leveraging automated processes and empowering active delegates, it streamlines governance decisions while maintaining essential security through a thoughtfully redesigned multisig signer system. Overall, the shift ensures robust, transparent, and agile governance aligned with the DAO’s long-term goals.

Our opinion has not changed from the Snapshot vote. No material issues emerged in review, and registering Sky’s gateway is routine operational work that shouldn’t require extensive DAO deliberation.

Vote: Adopt only Holiday break Rationale: This proposal’s standardized voting schedule introduces more drawbacks than benefits, mainly due to the loss of flexibility and slower decision-making. To address these challenges, we believe we should consider solutions like an optimistic approval process that maintains safety while allowing for faster action. While we do not see the holiday break itself as something that strictly requires a governance vote, we support its introduction for convenience.

This adjustment replaces snapshot-style metrics with criteria that track sustained utilization, directing rewards toward curators who actively grow the ecosystem. The sharper alignment between effort and impact makes the incentive program both fair and strategically sound.

This adjustment tightens incentive cost control by steering rewards exclusively toward pools that convert them into borrowing, lifting efficiency without extra spend.

This proposal ends an outdated subsidy by letting Nova fees reflect real L1 costs, which is now only about 2x lower than Arbitrum One. We agree that expending more treasury to chase marginal savings no longer drives adoption because teams that need ultra-cheap capacity are moving to Orbit chains. Redirecting those funds to higher-impact initiatives will improve overall capital efficiency while users still enjoy low absolute gas fees.

We favor this consolidation because running parallel initiatives for the same goal has proven inefficient and confusing. Combining those tracks into one council focuses governance on outcomes, not committee scheduling, and lets Entropy Advisors integrate treasury moves with broader growth initiatives. While we still have several minor questions on execution mechanics, placing Entropy Advisors at the center should align every allocation with the DAO’s strategic roadmap rather than siloed objectives. The built-in three-of-five OAT check and Snapshot claw-back keep power balanced, so we are comfortable supporting the change.

We vote for this proposal, keeping our stance from the snapshot vote. We see and agree with this as a temporary solution, and believe the need for more fundamental solution for higher and broader voter participation.

This proposal represents a efficient use of DAO funds, since the majority of the $4M budget is strictly performance-based and directly tied to the growth of USDS and sUSDS on Unichain. The expansion of USDS is an important driver for Unichain’s ecosystem, and rewarding real, on-chain results with matched incentives makes sense both strategically and operationally. Looking forward, we believe that decisions around similar incentive programs should be more closely coordinated with the Uniswap Foundation to maximize alignment and impact.

We acknowledge the efforts made to adjust the proposal from a $200k two-year commitment down to $60k for one year, which indeed appears more reasonable. However, our fundamental concern remains unchanged regarding whether the proposed features (voting power tags, live votes, email notifications) genuinely deliver sufficient value relative to the cost. To reiterate clearly, we don’t dispute the appropriateness of the proposed costs in terms of hosting and technical execution per se, but we are unconvinced about the overall benefit to governance participation. Furthermore, echoing the @Arbitrum 's critical observation, it seems essential to approach these enhancements from a broader, strategic perspective of desired governance UX and functionality, rather than as isolated improvements. Without a clear, long-term vision and alignment on the ideal user experience for governance, we risk investing in incremental solutions that might not substantially contribute to that vision. If these features indeed form a foundational part of a strategic, long-term UX plan, the investment could be justified. However, if these improvements merely represent piecemeal enhancements, alternative, cost-effective approaches might be preferable.

The proposal pinpoints a real bottleneck. Delegates have watched promising ideas wither while each step—draft, OAT review, Snapshot, on-chain execution—grinds forward, so letting OpCo co-design solutions with service providers before a formal DAO vote could shrink timelines, surface realistic budgets sooner, and keep momentum alive. We share that goal, and we agree that some discretionary spend is essential to avoid bureaucratic gridlock. Where we part ways is on scope and safeguards. The charter already lets OpCo draw up to $500k a month with no vote, climbing to an OAT or DAO check above that. After covering the exemplary $5.2 M annual budgeting, about $436k per month, roughly $64k in “excess” cash would still be available every month. Under the amendment, that surplus could finance external work without pre-defined limits or public sign-off, effectively repurposing the treasury while the community learns only in hindsight. Agility does not require a blank cheque. A practical compromise would: - create a “discovery pool” capped at, say, $10k per engagement and $30k per quarter; - require unanimous OAT sign-off for each draw and publish the contract summary in the next monthly report; These guardrails keep the spirit of fast, iterative vendor collaboration while ensuring that material sums still pass through the DAO’s accountability mechanisms. Until such parameters are built into the text, we would vote against and invite the authors to return with a tighter, budget-bounded revision.

Balancer already underpins CoWAMMs, so acquiring veBAL strengthens an essential partnership and lets the DAO steer liquidity incentives. The roughly $220k spend is modest relative to the governance leverage we gain. Locking both sides for two years secures long-term alignment while we complete a clear CoWAMM growth roadmap.

Symbiosis's established cross-chain liquidity protocol, with over $4.3 billion in transaction volume, will significantly expand Rootstock’s interoperability. Its activation aligns closely with Rootstock’s goal to onboard new users from multiple blockchain ecosystems.

This proposal ties a modest $65k budget to clear deposit milestones, ensuring we spend only when real liquidity materializes. Leveraging Lemon’s 4 M-user base positions Morpho strongly in a rapidly growing Latin American market while avoiding the high burn of on-chain incentive programs. The milestone structure, with partial vesting, safeguards the treasury against temporary spikes and aligns Lemon with long-term vault growth.

LayerBank brings an established team and robust cross-chain infrastructure, enriching Rootstock's DeFi ecosystem through omnichain and cross-chain utility. Approving LayerBank as an Activated Builder provides an essential entry point for attracting new users from diverse blockchain ecosystems, particularly via its omnichain stablecoin ($LBUSD) and seamless liquidity hub. By creating pathways that introduce external users to Rootstock, LayerBank’s integration serves as a foundational step for sustained growth, ecosystem diversification, and deeper cross-chain collaboration.

This proposal implements the routine gas-refund distribution for Epoch 31; the configuration matches the parameters the DAO has already approved, and we see no issues with execution, so we support its enactment.

This proposal involves operational details and configurations that appear correct and consistent with the previously approved direction. Since the broader strategy has already been validated, we see no issues with moving forward with this execution.

This proposal creates a costly advisory layer even though only two of the twenty-nine on-chain items since January 2024 were technically complex. Existing bodies—the UAC for deployments and the Foundation for partnerships—already cover the rare code changes, so a 39 k UNI budget and a 2.5 M UNI delegation add bureaucracy without closing a real gap. Pre-selecting six members also removes the community’s ability to choose its own experts and risks inactive participants drawing equal pay. The DAO can obtain ad-hoc audits far more cheaply whenever a genuine upgrade appears.

We are convinced that an early‑stage grant, once sized appropriately, will accelerate the development and let the team grow. The requested milestones are clear, the technical scope is already in testnet, and the potential gain outweigh the budget risk.

The team’s successful 2024 Rootstock hackathon and enterprise credentials work with Nestlé and the World Bank demonstrate an ability to translate new tooling into concrete adoption. Allowing Vottun to join the program should lead to enriching ecosystem, ultimately widenining the builder funnel, increase transaction flow, and recycle value back to backers.

This proposal represents a reasonable tradeoff between convenience and security. While distributing rewards directly on destination chains might enhance UX for some solvers, the professional nature of these participants justifies a more cautious approach. Centralizing reward distribution on Ethereum mainnet reduces potential security risks associated with bridging and market fragmentation, making this choice prudent and aligned with the DAO’s risk management objectives.

This proposal leverages the strategic value of Katana Network, which we believe holds significant potential as an emerging DeFi platform. By structuring mutual incentives, Morpho can effectively attract liquidity and expand use cases without substantial risks or concerns identified. We see this coincentives arrangement as a prudent, collaborative effort that strengthens Morpho’s position within the broader DeFi ecosystem while aligning closely with long-term growth objectives.

This proposal delegates execution to specialized operators who can recalibrate incentives far faster than a full DAO process, a prerequisite for keeping rewards aligned with real-time market conditions. Our stance has not changed since the Snapshot vote.

This is the most straightforward way to resume earnings without additional overhead / risk. Redirecting the idle $3.5M USDC into STEP 2’s yield strategy seamlessly restores the treasury’s income stream after Mountain Protocol’s shutdown. The move preserves the assets’ original yield-seeking mandate, adds no new counterparty or market risk after STEP 2 is already approved by the DAO.

As a current S7 M&M council member, we abstain from this vote.

Our support for this proposal reflects a consistent stance demonstrated through the previous Snapshot vote and the prior on-chain vote. Utilizing external providers for diverse frontend interfaces and multi-chain expansions has repeatedly proven efficient, significantly reducing the workload for Labs and core development teams. We view this practice as highly beneficial, effectively optimizing resource allocation, we believe that GFX Labs is the right team to take the role after all the contributions in the past.

This effectively addresses the critical issue of the MSS funding shortfall by transitioning multisig responsibilities to the Arbitrum Foundation, leveraging its existing compliance and execution capabilities. Consolidating these functions under a single entity not only reduces operational expenses but also mitigates the complexities of coordination between separate entities. We recognize the concerns around centralization but view this transfer as an essential interim solution until OpCo can fully assume multisig management. The Foundation’s commitment to transparency, through separate wallets and periodic updates, offers sufficient accountability to mitigate risks in the transition.

We vote for B - Reduce delegation to 100K. Our primary rationale for supporting this proposal is straightforward: Initially, the delegation of 7M ARB to Event Horizon had a defined purpose, to empower undercapitalized community members to meaningfully participate in governance. However, the significant pivot toward agentic governance represents a departure from the original mandate, making the reduction of delegated ARB a logical and necessary adjustment. While our first inclination was to reduce the delegation to 0 ARB, we agree with Sinkas's rationale for maintaining a minimal delegation: “Ultimately, we decided to propose a specific amount, which we believe adequately reflects the experimental nature of Event Horizon’s AGI, granting them meaningful voting power but not enough to impact the DAO significantly. On one hand, this amount is in the range of some of the active delegates, so EventHorizon participants can get some feeling of meaningfully participating in the DAO, but at the same time, it does not pose a significant risk to the outcomes if the agentic governance experiment experiences some unexpected issues.” This balanced view aligns well with our perspective that innovative governance experiments deserve measured support. A delegation of 100k ARB strikes an appropriate balance between fostering innovation and managing potential risks to DAO governance processes. Regarding quorum concerns expressed by some community members, we recognize this issue’s importance but believe it should be handled separately. Decisions about delegation sizes for specific experiments like Event Horizon should not be influenced solely by quorum considerations. Should quorum attainment become challenging, the DAO can explore solutions like broader treasury delegation or adjusting quorum thresholds. Maintaining a disproportionately large delegation to any single entity solely to address quorum concerns may not reflect best governance practices. In summary, we support reducing Event Horizon’s delegation to 100k ARB to encourage continued innovation while responsibly managing governance risks.

This proposal merits approval due to its targeted approach in incentivizing Spark’s USDC deposits in Coinbase-integrated markets amid rapidly growing borrow demand. The strategic reduction from 50% to 25% for larger deposit volumes reflects careful management of Morpho’s rewards budget, limiting potential distortion of market-wide liquidity. Additionally, the explicit 6-month term ensures transparency and timely review.

This proposal strategically positions Morpho to benefit early from Uniswap v4’s innovative protocol design and the promising capabilities of Unichain, notably its Rollup-Boost architecture, high transaction throughput, and strong MEV resistance. Given Uniswap’s proven brand strength, solid financial backing, and robust technical foundation, aligning incentives on Unichain significantly enhances Morpho’s competitive positioning within a potentially major DeFi ecosystem. By securing our presence at this early stage, we expect long-term strategic advantages and increased exposure to growth opportunities.

Vote #188 is a redo of Vote #187 after the latter vote failed to reach quorum, and we voted the same as Vote #187.

This proposal keeps oversight of Auxiliary Proposer Mechanisms in the hands of seasoned security and risk specialists, similar to the effective Relay Maintenance Committee model. Their expert scrutiny and rapid update cycle give Lido the flexibility to respond as this markets evolve. The mandatory seven-day public review preserves community accountability by letting any DAO participant raise concerns.

This proposal strengthens the CSM’s community-staking vision by making participation financially viable for individual validators and small collectives, rather than favoring large professional operators. The new fee curve delivers market-leading returns to modestly bonded stakers and keeps the capital multiplier attractive.

This proposal delivers a concrete solution to the long-standing principal-agent problem in Lido governance by giving stETH holders a credible, actionable exit signal that disciplines DAO agents. The mechanism embeds hard accountability, forcing every actor to weigh direct onchain economic consequences before any contentious action can take effect. Coupled with independent oversight committees, it sharply lowers the risk of governance capture and aligns incentives between token holders and operators.

While we fundamentally agree that quorum thresholds are an important friction in democratic processes, ensuring proposals only pass with genuine and substantial support, we also recognize the pragmatic need for adaptability, given Arbitrum's current governance landscape. Lowering quorum thresholds carries inherent risks, including increasing vulnerability to governance attacks or allowing insufficiently supported proposals to pass. We analyzed the potential risk of lowering quorum in the perspective of unintended DAO treasury leakage, and for constitutional proposals, we believe we should take more conservative approach as some protocol vulerbility or malicous upgrade could cost Arbitrum's TVL. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-constitutional-quorum-threshold-reduction/29145/9 However, considering Arbitrum’s current developmental phase as an evolving project rather than a matured governance system, maintaining an high quorum threshold could impede progress. Temporarily adjusting the threshold is acceptable as an interim measure to mitigate immediate governance gridlock, particularly when factoring in the safety net provided by the Security Council. Nonetheless, this approach should be seen explicitly as a temporary solution. Moving forward, we strongly encourage the DAO to address the root issues, such as low voter participation and engagement, rather than repeatedly adjusting quorum thresholds. Alternative approaches like treasury delegation and targeted incentives to boost voter participation should be explored in greater depth to ensure the long-term integrity and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance structure.

We support the general direction of introduction to the delegate compensation and experimental DRS integration. However, similarly to other delegates point out, the software development cost shouldn’t be covered as this feature is an asset to Tally and likely be used for other DAOs in the future. We suggest Tally to apply for a future retro grant once it’s used by the DAO.

Our Vote: • Doo Wan Nam: 25% • Cole Schendl: 25% • Sov: 25% • Takeshi Ohishi: 25% Rationale: We chose candidates based on their demonstrated commitment to transparency, governance expertise, and consistent advocacy within the Uniswap community. Given that Takeshi from our organization participated as a candidate, we strictly adhered to the election’s voting guidelines, ensuring balanced representation and fair distribution among qualified nominees. This approach reinforces accountability standards, ensuring effective oversight within the committee.

This proposal executes the four proposals already approved in prior Snapshot votes without any material change. All the necessary security measures are in place including secruity audits. Because we supported each Snapshot votes and see no new risks, we vote Yes on this vote. • Ensuring Compatibility with Ethereum’s Pectra Upgrade • MEV-Boost Relay Allowed List management via Easy Tra • CSM: stakeShareLimit and keyRemovalCharge parameters adjustment • Increasing LOL Easy Track Limits to align with Grant Requests

We voted for the measure at the Snapshot vote and continue to support it because EIP-7702 account abstraction and the new BLS12-381 precompiles will materially improve developer flexibility and end-user experience. Timely alignment with Ethereum avoids fragmentation, preserves shared security assumptions, and ensures applications can rely on consistent functionality across layers.

We vote for this proposal, keeping the same opinion as our Snapshot vote. This proposal offers a low-cost safeguard that can return multiples of its 400k ARB budget by preventing or clawing back misused funds. We value the clear incentive alignment, because it mobilises independent investigators without the overhead of a permanent audit team. Privacy protections through GlobaLeaks and a three-member committee with conflict-of-interest rules mitigate retaliation risk while keeping oversight accountable to the DAO. The six-month pilot and mandatory retrospective report give tokenholders concrete data to refine or retire the program, making support a prudent, risk-controlled choice for long-term value creation.

Delegating execution to expert operators is essential because incentive programs need fast adjustments that the full DAO cannot coordinate efficiently. We would still prefer an explicit upper limit on vendor fees, but the clawback authority and transparent reporting create a practical hedge against potential overspend on those fees.

The action aligns with the DAO’s standing refund policy, introduces no technical or economic risk, and benefits active participants by offsetting network costs. Finding no grounds for opposition, we support its passage.

This proposal formalizes Laita Labs as a service provider after years of reliably steering Velora’s growth, and we see no reason to question their receipt of funds. The requested $300k upfront plus $60k each epoch for 12 months is modest for a protocol of this scale and appears entirely appropriate.

This proposal performs a standard Epoch 30 rewards distribution, and we found no material issues in its execution plan or safeguards. Because such actions are strictly operational, we suggest investigating lower-overhead approaches, such as delegating routine transfers to a small reporting committee or adopting an optimistic execution module like Lido’s Easy Track, to free DAO governance participants for higher-impact governance while retaining on-chain transparency through Merkle proofs and public verification tools.

We supported this direction during the Snapshot vote, and our stance remains unchanged because ongoing Oku maintenance will keep the ecosystem’s primary user gateway robust while accelerating V4 adoption. The request is proportionate to the operational burden of keeping cross-chain infrastructure up to date and aligns with the DAO’s mandate to ensure key interfaces remain accessible and community-owned.

This proposal to rotate the compromised oracle key is crucial for maintaining Lido protocol security, and we fully support this necessary action. While the oracle's 5/9 design mitigates immediate systemic risk from a single key compromise, allowing for a measured response, we stress the importance of a thorough post-incident report. We anticipate updates on the root cause and future preventative measures to continually enhance security practices and prevent similar incidents from recurring.

It is clear that the upgrade brings a genuinely large improvement. Although some factors were necessarily excluded from the simulations, the evidence still shows the chosen design offers the best balance between better execution and solver workload. We expect the higher core throughput to meet growing demand and to handle heavier transaction volume, and we hope to see the rollout completed safely and without issues.

We vote for PGov and citizen42. The committee needs high-skill members who are also free from outside incentives, and these two meet both tests. PGov brings rigorous KPI oversight across multiple blue-chip DAOs, and citizen42 contributed directly to PIP-63 design; neither holds paid roles with 1inch, CoW, or other intent-based DEX competitors. Their independence and complementary strengths will drive reliable growth delivery.

This proposal has had our support since the Snapshot; we keep supporting it because extending the UAC keeps core DAO work running smoothly. Raising the commitment to 10 hours a week and funding $370 k in UNI fairly matches the larger workload and removes the need for extra funding votes. Stable funding and clear roles protect the DAO’s day-to-day reliability.

This tops up the affected wallets with $280,142 in UNI, introduces no new spending, and makes no material changes to the original allocations. We supported it at the snapshot stage for precisely these reasons and continue to do so, as the adjustment poses no significant concerns and simply preserves existing commitments.

This proposal gives us a unified lens to compare incentive campaigns across chains and pools with identical metrics, letting us judge which designs truly sustain TVL, volume, and user retention. Side-by-side benchmarking will cut iteration time; it turns scattered reports into actionable evidence that guides smarter sizing and timing of future incentives. While further work is required to connect these insights to future liquidity-allocation strategies, we view this analysis as an essential step toward a full feedback loop and therefore support the requested funding.

Vote for: - Mantle - ZKsync - Sei - Polygon zkEVM We selected the four chains mainly based on the current TVL and the team's experience of ecosystem growth, while also considering other factors. This is because chains with those profiles tend to obtain deeper liquidity and larger user bases at some point, and thus should be prioritised in this case.

Although Morpho’s broad coverage of long-tail assets is an important differentiator, establishing an unassailable position in the highest-demand markets is the necessary step for expanding influence across the protocol. We believe this focus will maximize incentive efficiency to strengthen Morpho’s standing in the lending landscape.

We believe the purpose of the board and initial selection of its members are great.

This proposal supports a team that has consistently contributed to Uniswap’s multichain growth and delivers practical infrastructure. The $340K request appears reasonable given the scope, particularly for the V4 integration, which requires new development distinct from previous V3 work. Early and proactive support for V4 infrastructure is both necessary and strategically important to ensure smooth adoption across ecosystems.

This proposal consolidates the treasury’s short-term liquidity strategy by allocating the remaining ARB to three regulated tokenized money-market vehicles that we believe offer an attractive risk-adjusted yield. We believe that the committee ran a broad, competitive process and selected credible issuers, so the chosen split is acceptable given current market conditions. Nonetheless, continued reliance on United States government exposure concentrates macroeconomic and geopolitical risk; at some point, the DAO should begin evaluating on-chain access to other high-grade real-world assets such as EU sovereign bills, real-estate-backed notes, or diversified equity and crypto ETF products. We therefore approve the allocation today while urging the treasury working group to start exploring options for multi-jurisdiction and multi-asset diversification.

We voted for “Yes to both”. We believe we should fund the Hackathon Continuation Program because the DAO has already endorsed it, and the current funding shortfall now threatens to erode our credibility. Additionally, although unused Domain Allocator capital would normally return to the DAO treasury to keep purposes crystal clear, the Treasury Management Committee is yet to convert its 15M ARB allocation and presently lacks stablecoins, so allowing the remaining to seed the committee offers a practical bridge that turns idle funds into an immediate reserve.

This proposal is designed as a temporary measure necessary to maintain efficient DAO decision-making, incorporating several adjustments based on feedback from various delegates.To remain neutral as the author of the proposal, we are voting to abstain on this proposal as stated in the proposal’s discloure section.

This proposal provides a structured process for multi-chain v4 deployments, accelerating rollout and adoption. We supported it at the snapshot stage and remain in favor for the on-chain vote because this approach is an effective practice for driving v4 adoption across multiple chains.

This proposal effectively leverages a community-driven approach to growth initiatives, as demonstrated by several successful examples. A structured review after the initial 6-month trial is essential to ensure proper execution. Given the moderate scale of the proposed budget for a 6-month period, we see no significant concerns regarding expenditure.

This proposal represents a straightforward rebalance of previously approved budgets. It does not introduce new spending beyond existing commitments, nor does it involve substantial changes to the original allocations. Thus, there are no significant concerns or issues with this adjustment.

This proposal effectively extends UAC's operations and appropriately expands its capacity to manage growing DAO responsibilities. The requested budget is justified by the detailed accounting of their expanded workload and essential multisig security responsibilities. No substantial operational changes are introduced, thus maintaining continuity and stability in DAO functions.

We support this proposal because we believe Twyne delivers a innovative credit‑delegation primitive and has the technical depth to execute it. The market it addresses is still largely untapped yet has substantial growth potential, so bringing Twyne into the Lido Alliance will accelerate stETH adoption and open more capital‑efficient strategies across DeFi.

This proposal addresses the incremental tuning required to keep CSM a viable engine of Ethereum decentralization, raising the stakeShareLimit removes the growth ceiling for some 50 queued operators, while trimming the keyRemovalCharge re‑aligns safety costs with current gas levels. The change is prudent rather than drastic, unlocking broader community staking today and paving the way for future upgrades such as refinements to the bonding mechanism.

This is a straightforward housekeeping step rather than a strategic shift, so we see no substantive controversy. The higher cap removes an administrative choke‑point and lets the team execute its mandate without fragmented top‑ups, while the core security logic of Easy Track remains intact. That said, each increase in the withdrawal limit should be matched by a proportional upgrade in transparency; regular public statements of cash‑on‑hand, burn‑rate, and milestone progress would give tokenholders clear sight of how the grant flows into measurable outcomes. We therefore look forward to the Foundation publishing a recurring financial report for better accountability.

Lowering the entry bar to 1M LDO is a reasonable refinement made this time, as it brings dozens of mid‑sized wallets into scope and helps the delegate set mirror actual token distribution. Additionally, we encourage the Oversight Committee to release a guideline for the retroactive grants, with examples of eligible work, so contributors who fall outside the main incentive track can plan and execute meaningful contributions that will qualify for future retroactive funding.

This proposal involves a few necessary updates to ensure compatibility with Ethereum’s upcoming Pectra fork, and our verification of the referenced contract addresses found no issues. Additionally, the contracts themselves have been audited and deemed secure by reputable entities. Given these confirmations, we see no problems and support this proposal.

This proposal releases additional MORPHO only after the Plume market demonstrates sustained loan growth, so treasury spending is gated by clear performance and the downside is minimal. Pairing Plume’s RWA‑centric user base with Morpho’s permissionless markets should expand collateral diversity and deepen liquidity, giving the DAO measurable exposure to the fastest‑growing RWA venue.

This proposal represents a measured increase in contributor incentives that aligns with Morpho’s accelerated development pace. The payout appears proportional to current needs, and we see no credible downside; sustaining these rewards should keep the team focused on advancing Morpho as a core DeFi primitive.

This proposal implements a straightforward public rewards distribution using transparent, automated mechanisms that reduce manual overhead and risk of error. We reviewed the details and found no issues, supporting its approval.

We continue to support this proposal consistent with the Snapshot vote, believing that BOB has significant importance after it being the 3rd largest by TVL in the Superchain and 5th among Uniswap deployments. This shows a great potential for Uniswap to grow, and the amount requested is reasonable considering BOB’s $500k commitment.

As we saw the success of Lido’s GOOSE framework and other DAOs like Arbitrum follow the similar path to align the stakeholders for the platform/protocol, we believe it’s a great start to define and aligned on the goals that we ratify as a collective.

We voted for - Bartek.eth (L2BEAT) - Fred (Arbitrum Contributor) - Michael Lewellen (BlockAid) - Yoav.eth (Ethereum Foundation) Rationale: Our decision-making process focused primarily on three key criteria, with geographic diversity as a secondary consideration: Deep Security Expertise: This was paramount. The Security Council needs members capable of implementing rapid upgrades and fixes when vulnerabilities arise, requiring significant technical expertise. We highly valued not just general technical understanding, but specific knowledge of security practices – identifying vulnerabilities and knowing effective mitigation strategies, areas where auditors and security researchers often excel. Profound Understanding of the Arbitrum Protocol: A deep comprehension of Arbitrum's specific design and mechanics is crucial for effective security governance. Fred, in particular, stands out due to his role as a Tech Lead and deep involvement with the protocol's intricacies, making his continued presence on the council highly valuable. Proven Track Record in Security Council Participation: While relying solely on past participation risks stagnation, practical experience in handling emergency situations ("war room" scenarios) is critical. This goes beyond theoretical security knowledge to include demonstrated ability to act effectively under pressure, informed by protocol understanding. Several candidates have direct experience from the first cohort, and Michael Lewellen has extensive experience in similar roles across other DAOs. Geographic Diversity (Supplementary): Given the pool of candidates primarily from the US, Europe, and the Middle East, we aimed for a reasonable distribution across these regions. However, we note a significant gap in coverage for the Asian time zone. This remains a concern, and initiatives to encourage qualified individuals from this region to participate in future elections might be beneficial. Overall, these four candidates represent a strong combination of deep technical security skills, specific Arbitrum knowledge, and practical experience in handling critical security responsibilities, balanced with reasonable geographic distribution among the available nominees.

We support this proposal as it increases the options available to solvers; Integrating the Flash-Loan Router improves accessibility to flash-loans while helping solvers avoid unnecessary complexity and reducing security risks associated with their individual implementations.

We believe that the solver compensation is the core part of CoW Protocol, and this is a fundamental problem that requires an immediate solution. The proposed approach, which adjusts the definition of surplus from being based on limit sell amount to being based on the actual executed buy amount, would address the issue of inflated reward for solvers. There may be still ways to intentionally increase the gap between limit buy amount and executed buy amount, but that would not lead to higher scoring or rewards under the new scroing mechanism.

Given SEEDGov's significant existing role within Velora governance, expanding their responsibilities represents a logical progression. The demanding scope outlined in the proposal, covering vital governance functions and strategy, requires dedicated expertise and resources, which would require a decent amount of compensation. Also, aligning incentives with the overall success of the protocol is crucial, particularly as the role's scope includes activities focused on driving growth.

Considering BOB's already significant presence as the 3rd largest by TVL in the Superchain and 5th among Uniswap deployments, combined with the anticipated long-term growth of Bitcoin and its DeFi ecosystem (BTCfi), the requested contribution appears to be a reasonable investment.

Rapid multi-chain deployment is crucial for accelerating the adoption of v4. This approach of establishing a clear licensing process is well-suited for effectively leveraging external partners in the expansion of Uniswap v4.

Recent votes consistently show participation far exceeding the current quorum, often around 200M PSP, indicating the proposed threshold is readily achievable. Furthermore, raising the quorum enhances DAO security by making governance attacks more difficult and expensive, which is crucial for protecting the protocol.

The introduction of EVM emulation and the Fflonk verifier presents a significant opportunity for ZKsync to enhance its compatibility with Ethereum, ultimately improving the developer experience and reducing costs.

We are familiar with the Pectra changes as a node operator and those changes to OP make sense. Other changes including the Operator Fee related one and L2 Withdrawals Root related one seem reasonable.

We believe the outlined upgrades are necessary for the Optimism protocols.

Given Gitcoin’s current financial situation, pursuing additional yield through the outlined treasury management strategy is both prudent and justified. The risks you’ve explained appear acceptable and manageable within reasonable control measures.

We voted **for** the proposal. Regarding the Community Rounds and the GTC Utility experiment, as per our previous comments, we see no outstanding issues. For the OSS Quadratic Funding rounds, we acknowledge that appropriate modification has been made on the dApps & Apps category, specifically limiting the matching cap to 5%. Concerning the Retroactive Funding metrics, we recognize that important ecosystem indicators are covered to a reasonable extent. However, we believe it would be beneficial to measure aspects closer to actual outcomes in the future – for example, (purely as an illustration) considering metrics like GitHub repository stars for the tooling category. We are keen to contribute to developing these aspects further.

We acknowledge the technical audits by Zellic and QuillAudits. However, we have significant concerns regarding the coordination with the Network Expansion Committee and the handling of the past incident, issues highlighted during the discussion. While we lack direct insight into the actual communications, the comments from @Jenya_K and @TheDZhon suggest that the level of trust and operational alignment required for official DAO endorsement is currently insufficient.

We proposed this initiative because we recognize the importance of evolving the Treasury Delegation program for the DAO’s health. To remain neutral as the author of the proposal, we are voting to abstain on this proposal as stated in the proposal’s discloure section.

Extending the collaboration with simplified leveraged positions and a liquidity migrator from Aave seems highly beneficial. Although we have reservations about the potential impact compared to the $340M TVL on Aave’s Polygon market (which constitutes 37.9% of Polygon’s $896M TVL) and Morpho’s $4.8B overall, a $60k allocation is reasonable in light of expected leverage-driven gains.

We believe in the approach to uphold acting in the best interest of the Solana network and JitoSOL token holders.

We strongly support the updated policy’s security enhancements, especially requiring use of hardware wallets and the prohibition of using signer wallets for other purposes for certain types of signers. Given recent Safe incidents, we believe prioritizing wallet security is essential, and these changes are a vital step.There is a more detailed multisig security policy, which we comply with for the multisig operation in Optimism (details). As it has more specific guidelines such as which specific hardware wallets to use, how to prepare the backup wallets, and how to travel with signing keys, this might be useful as a reference in the future policy updates.

We have also been utilizing SSV for our node operation and see great potential in it. The automation of validator assignments and cluster management using dedicated oracles represents a significant improvement in terms of scalability and reducing the risk of human error in protocol operations. This would be a substantial step forward for the protocol.

This strikes a good balance between operational efficiency and strong DAO governance through the well-structured implementation of Easy Track. We do not have any outstanding concerns with the Relay Maintenance Committee's performance, and believe this transition will be beneficial overall.

This presents a well-rounded approach to addressing Lido's key priorities, appropriately focusing on the responsibilities of the Lido Labs Foundation after its restructuring. We are particularly pleased with the combination of clearly defined objectives, measurable KPIs, and the stated intention to enhance transparency within the foundation's operations. This comprehensive approach is essential for Lido's continued success.

We are in favor of this proposal. Similar to the Labs' proposal, this covers initiatives that should be undertaken on an ongoing basis. Also, we believe that exploring protocol-owned liquidity (POL) is a significant new endeavor, as it has the potential to be more sustainable than traditional liquidity incentives.

We generally support this proposal, recognizing that these changes are necessary for the continued operation of the Lido protocol. It is crucial that the updates proceed safely, and we will be paying close attention to the upcoming audit reports to ensure a secure implementation.

We strongly support this proposal, which includes changes to the on-chain voting duration we initially put forward. This aligns with our ongoing commitment to lowering barriers to Lido DAO governance participation and enhancing DAO security. We have also consistently supported the establishment of the two BORG Foundations since the Snapshot vote (Lido Labs / Lido Ecosystem), and our position remains unchanged. The Easy Track setups are essential for the operational functionality of these two entities.

The opportunity to tap into the TON ecosystem through a Telegram Mini App offers significant potential for reaching a large retail user base, and we assess the requested funding as appropriate for the scope of work. The potential for increased user adoption through Telegram's extensive reach is indeed a key factor in our support for this proposal.

We continue to support this proposal, consistent with our Snapshot vote, recognizing these liquidity incentive programs as necessary expenditures to secure the competitive growth of Uniswap v4 and Unichain in the current highly competitive environment. This ultimately leads to maximizing long-term value for UNI token holders.

Our position remains largely unchanged from the Temp Check. We support this proposal because Uniswap v4 represents critical innovation in DeFi, and substantial investment in hook development and user onboarding remains essential.Although we recognize ongoing concerns about UF’s transparency and future grant management, we continue to see these as addressable challenges.

We recognize Saga’s unique approach and acknowledge its potential to become a meaningful market for Uniswap in the future. However, at this point, we haven’t yet seen sufficient traction or growth metrics that justify a $250k investment. We’d prefer a more conditional incentive program, possibly tied directly to measurable TVL growth, or alternatively, revisiting this discussion once initial growth and performance become clearer and easier to evaluate.

The design goal of establishing clear legal structures to mitigate regulatory uncertainty, while maintaining high organizational decentralization, appears reasonable. We voted for this proposal as this approach is sensible at this stage, though it is obvious that ongoing evaluation and future adjustments to the structure will be necessary to respond effectively to evolving regulatory landscapes.

It’s a no-brainer decision to unlock OBOL token for people who have contributed to the protocol.

We believe it’s a critical experiment that we should try to see if the governance staking is going to make good impact on the DAO governance as a whole.

We support this proposal because granting the Morpho Association the authority to adjust reward rates makes sense operationally. That said, we also believe it’s essential to clearly establish mechanisms ensuring accountability and transparency. In particular, we advocate for providing explicit veto rights to token holders as a robust governance safeguard, Lido’s Easy Track governance model for instance.

We have no major issues with the selection process, given Gauntlet’s track record and Aera’s qualifications. While concerns about the sustainability of the incentive's impact exist, focusing on failures isn’t productive. That said, we call for more transparency in the future selection process. We support the overall approach of the incentive program, but emphasize the need for ongoing monitoring. Gauntlet’s focus on high-volume core pairs seems valid. We agree to proceed but suggest adapting if necessary and reviewing progress regularly.

We support the proposal as Uniswap v4 is a key innovation in DeFi, and significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is critical at this stage. Regarding Unichain, we believe using UNI token stakeing to recover investment is feasible. Treasury sustainability is critical for both the DAO and UNI holders. Despite the large expenditure, the investment is manageable given Uniswap's market position. We acknowledge concerns about UF’s transparency and future grant allocations but believe they can be addressed moving forward. This proposal is essential for strengthening Uniswap's position and increasing UNI token value, so we support it.

We continue to uphold our snapshot vote perspective. Our view remains unchanged, as the updated criteria, including the new tie-breaker mechanism and the integration of timely rationale submissions as part of the delegate requirements, clearly demonstrate improvements.

We support the updated criteria, as the updates such as the new tie-breaker mechanism demonstrates clear improvements. Over the long term, we also believe that the timely submission of rationales and forum participation should be integrated into the delegate selection scoring, even though objectively measuring the quality of discussion contributions remains challenging.

While the potential competitive relationship between Compound and Morpho was noted in the original proposal, we don’t see it as a problem. Or at least, Morpho receives a clear growth benefit from this collaboration. Morpho’s share of the funding seems reasonable as well, considering the benefit Morpho will have and what Compound and Polygon will be investing to this collaboration. Above all, having an open-source frontend is a major advantage, as it will make it easier for curators and others to build their own UIs in the future.

We support this proposal because it makes sense to reduce excessive incentives and reallocate funds toward more strategic investments. While Morpho’s growth has calmed somewhat under current market conditions, that slowdown isn’t a major concern given the broader stagnation in the lending sector. Now that rewards have moved closer to a proper level, a more careful, incremental approach will be needed to maintain healthy, long-term growth.

We previously supported Berachain’s use of the Morpho license in the prior proposal. While it is not ideal for the Association to receive the funds instead of the DAO, we view it as a practical approach to avoid potential tax issues. Considering the Association’s track record so far, we do not see this as a major concern.

The Service Provider Program is a crucial mechanism for rewarding ecosystem contributors who currently lack alternative funding channels. We believe this initiative drives sustainable growth for the ENS ecosystem while fostering innovation at the protocol level. Expanding financial resources allows more builders to focus full-time on ENS infrastructure development, creating long-term value for all token holders. For these reasons, we're supporting the Budget Increase option, which aligns with our commitment to decentralized infrastructure development and community-driven governance.

After careful review, we only cast votes for the grant proposals mentioned in Part1 and Part2 You can find the full details on the forum post.

We voted for the application of Twyne 50k MORPHO, based on our criteria such as significance of proposed solution, uniqueness, and team backgrounds. You can find the full details on the forum post.

We voted for the 4 applications below, based on our criteria such as significance of proposed solution, uniqueness, and team backgrounds. - Bleu Builders (Hook) 25k MORPHO - Stake DAO 25k MORPHO - Ojo 5k MORPHO - Unicord 15k MORPHO You can find the full details on the forum post.

We see this upgrade is critical and necessary

We believe this change is aligned with what the Collective is aiming to achieve in this season and going forward.

We believe it makes sense to execute a sweep stored by the Nova transactions as discussed in the previous proposal that we already supported. We also believe bundling the Timeboost change and this proposal should make sense for their onchain voting.

We recognize that this measure is necessary to secure the fund for the ENS community activities.

We voted in favor of this proposal as we agree with the direction of establishing a structured framework to support grant delivery and ensuring appropriate compensation for those efforts. However, we believe there are significant areas for improvement in the reward structure and role distribution, as we outlined in our comment. Given our experience in grant operations at Tané, we are eager to actively contribute to this area, including potential participation in the committee.

Properly pursuing investment returns is essential for CoW DAO’s long-term sustainability, and allocating these resources to the Core Treasury team aligns with that objective. We trust karpatkey’s proven track record to responsibly manage the treasury and drive meaningful value back to the DAO.

We vote for the critical players in the Optimism ecosystem and rely on the vital operations to secure the chains.

We vote for the candidates that have relevant experience and context for the role.

We acknowledge the points outlined below and cast our vote in favor of this proposal. The ultimate goal of ENS is to provide services in a long-term sustainable manner. Securing self-sufficient funding sources is crucial for ENS's continued operation. Moving forward, we hope to see the management pursue higher revenue performance.

We support this proposal as it enhances governance flexibility. It is expected to enable adjustments such as lowering the COMP requirement to encourage small holders' participation, raising the quorum to strengthen security, and modifying voting delay and period for faster decision-making and greater fairness. These improvements make governance more adaptable and inclusive.

Introducing the AssetListFactory removes contract size constraints, allowing flexible collateral additions for mainnet’s principal markets (USDC, USDT, USDS). This expansion is expected to boost liquidity and strengthen competitiveness, with OpenZeppelin’s audit concerns already addressed. Given strong community support and manageable risks, I believe the benefits outweigh any potential downsides. Thus, a favorable vote is justified.

1. CSM: Enable Permissionless Phase, Increase the Share Limit and Increase the Priority Exit Threshold We reaffirm our support for this proposal, consistent with our previous stance on Snapshot. We believe that fully opening CSM to the public will significantly enhance both Lido’s and Ethereum’s decentralization. 2. NO Acquisitions: Bridgetower is now part of Solstice Staking We continue to support this proposal, just as we did during the snapshot. We see no negative impact on operational quality or on Lido’s geographical dispersion, given that the operational structure will remain the same.

Establishing the Ecosystem BORG Foundation clarifies accountability by consolidating decisions around external partnerships, cross-chain integrations, and institutional outreach within a single entity. This separation from protocol-focused tasks makes it easier to trace responsibility for strategic ecosystem decisions, benefiting both Lido DAO and external partners through greater transparency.

We see a clear advantage in establishing a dedicated entity for managing protocol development and governance, as it creates a single, accountable structure for critical activities. We believe this will foster transparent decision-making and reduce operational risks for contributors and the community.

The proposed changes do not appear to introduce any concerns regarding operational quality or compromise the network’s geographical diversity. Consequently, there is no compelling reason to oppose Attestant’s continued participation under the new ownership structure.

We see no reason for concern regarding this transition, given that the on-premise setup and the core team appear to stay exactly the same, indicating no decline in operational quality nor negative impact on Lido’s geographical decentralization.

We agree with the proposal to replace Tim Beiko with Eric Siu and to allow the council to make such personnel changes without requiring DAO approval, as long as the process is transparent. We believe it is important for the DAO to retain the authority to exercise personnel rights over the council. The introduction of a notice period is meaningful and helps ensure proper transitions. As noted by @Alex_L, this notice period is expected to be properly implemented. However, one concern is that this was not explicitly stated in the Snapshot proposal. We hope that future proposals will clearly specify such details to maintain transparency and clarity.

Morpho’s current TVL growth rate has been outpacing that of other major protocols, even after some reward reduction. We believe that lowering costs at this stage will not hinder Morpho’s overall trajectory and will free resources for future investment.

We support the proposal to implement Safe Harbor because it improves the protocol’s emergency response by enabling swift action from whitehat hackers. This helps reduce the risk of fund losses during blackhat attacks. Additionally, since this implementation does not require additional costs, it is a beneficial upgrade to the existing bug bounty program without imposing financial burdens.

Based on our first-hand experience in the Lido DAO, implementing the GOOSE (Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise) for the DAO to be aligned on what the DAO should focus on, we believe this is the right approach to make the DAO move into its execution mode after setting the MVP. We also appreciate the carefully structured process and an additional consideration to incorporate partial recommendations utilizing the appropriate tool (which was our concern in the GOOSE process) As it’s discussed by @404DAO, and its trade-off is recognized by others, incentivizing the submissions from a variety of delegates/contributors would be the key to receiving as many great proposals as possible, otherwise the objective setting process feels “centralized” in the end. It would be interesting to consider what non-financial benefits can be awarded for the submitters of the competitive SOSs.

We appreciate the ongoing efforts of the ArbitrumHub team. While we see the value in a centralized and regularly updated portal for Arbitrum DAO-related information, relying on a third-party team for its maintenance presents significant challenges and unnecessary costs. A more effective approach would be to align with existing initiatives like GRC and its dashboard or contribute to the Foundation’s team managing the main Arbitrum site. Otherwise, long-term discoverability and maintainability could become problematic.

CoW Protocol has already shown steady growth and needs a sustainable revenue structure. We believe that balancing user benefits with the protocol's financial health is the right move for fostering ongoing innovation and resilience.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 7 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

In these assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, which may be insufficient to meet demand. From a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps appears necessary.

We think creating a bounty program is the best way to tackle fund misuse in the DAO. It’s a practical approach that empowers the DAO to help keep things accountable. We appreciate Entropy to step up to take the initiative. All the key concerns raised have been addressed clearly, and the trial phase gives room for improvements. This is a solid step toward stronger transparency and trust in the ecosystem.

We believe that both Pablo and Guillaume have ample experience and expertise through their work on DeFi projects like Angle and Merkl, making them well-qualified to serve as multisig signers.

We believe curators are a key factor in Morpho’s competitiveness and must be appropriately incentivized, so we support the proposal’s move to exclude those who fail to meet a relative threshold that reflects Morpho’s growth. We also believe that both the minimum threshold and the overall reward mechanism, including the amount of incentives, should be regularly evaluated and optimized over the long term.

First, this integration itself is a significant initiative to enhance DeFi accessibility, and it makes sense to increase incentives to boost deposits in preparation for rising borrowing demand. Since increased borrowing demand can also lead to greater deposit demand, setting the incentive at 50% of the usual rate seems reasonable.

Described in the note

We maintain the support made at its Snapshot phase and continuously support the technical advancement in the Arbitrum ecosystem. Same goes to the Infura Nova validator whitelisting.

Considering the governance efficiencies introduced by SEP 49, the shift aligns well with the DAO's evolving needs. Additionally, given that each Sprint spans four weeks, which is a relatively long cycle, allowing all proposal types to be addressed in every Sprint significantly enhances Safe DAO's responsiveness to time-sensitive topics.

We have already supported this proposal in the snapshot vote and did the same in this onchain vote. We believe that clarifying various rules like these will make the Uniswap DAO more transparent and open.

As stated for the previous snapshot vote, we believe this proposal is essential for enhancing Uniswap’s security and ensuring effective responses during critical situations.

We appreciate Devan and the committee members for their diligent executions and reporting in the initial STEP. The estimated annual yield, $875k from the $30 million endowment isn’t particularly impressive, but it should have played a good role in the Arbitrum RWA ecosystem. On condition that this is the last term of the STEP, considering other treasury diversification programs are planned, we support the continuation of the program with a great selection of the established actors in the committee and a reasonable budget.

We believe it's beneficial to start from research and understand what builders want for the ecosystem by learning from other ecosystems.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 6 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

This proposal aims to enhance liquidity and capital efficiency by increasing supply caps for key assets and adjusting interest rate curves for Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets. While we support these changes as they address growing demand and align with market conditions, we recommend providing additional data, such as utilization trends, to validate the necessity of these adjustments.

We keep supporting this proposal for the same reasons as its Snapshot vote, and we are looking to see the growth driven by this combined incentive program.

Same as its Snapshot vote, we believe the amount requested seems reasonable considering the TVL and the expected growth of the Celo ecosystem.

We believe a sudden, one-shot reward reduction could unexpectedly trigger a steep TVL decline, so a phased approach lets us monitor and respond quickly if TVL decreases beyond expectations. While the estimated $600k cost for this multi-stage method based on our calculation is a concern, we view it as a reasonable trade-off compared to the risk of losing a significant portion of our accumulated TVL at once.

This proposal improves capital efficiency by increasing supply caps and aligns interest rate curves with market demand. These changes enhance liquidity, promote competitiveness, and support the protocol’s adaptability in a dynamic market.

We support this proposal because Sonic demonstrates significant growth potential and offers a dynamic environment suitable for a $250k incentive. Furthermore, its robust infrastructure, high throughput, and continued developer-focused efforts position Sonic as an emerging ecosystem where Uniswap can expand its market share. With these points in mind, we cast our vote in favor of this proposal.

We have voted in favor of this proposal, as we believe it enhances Uniswap DAO’s capital efficiency and ensures we do not miss opportunities to grow the DAO’s market share. We also look forward to the continued activities of the Uniswap Growth Program.

We oppose this proposal. Compared to other chains that have received incentives in the past, Metal’s TVL is still small, and we feel that granting 250k in incentives is not appropriate. While it is indeed important for Uniswap to build market share across various chains, we believe incentives should align with each chain’s growth stage. From that perspective, Metal has not yet reached a point where allocating 250k in incentives to gain market share is justified, and thus we have voted against this proposal.

We support this proposal. Considering Celo’s TVL and its track record of collaboration with Uniswap, a $250k incentive alongside a $105k deployment cost appears to be a reasonable budget. Additionally, matching incentives from Celo itself is a welcome move. We look forward to seeing this proposal drive greater Uniswap share and activity on the Celo network.

Preparation for CoW protocol's expansion to other chains in the coming years is essential. While it would have been ideal to maintain the same address without changes, given the technical constraints, this proposal represents a necessary and practical step forward.

As highlighted in CIP-58, expansion remains a critical theme. This proposal constitutes a core component of that strategy. We found no significant objections or concerns to address in this proposal.

The decision to pursue various forms of expansion next year is highly reasonable, given the current state of the products and their position in the market. Considering this, the proposed budget size is also appropriate, and budget management has been handled properly.

The US-based ENS service provider, eth.limo requests a reimbursement of its ongoing legal fees. They have already spent over 24k USD to correspond to US federal requests. We recognize this proposal as the necessary cost for Limo, a service provider headquartered in the US, to continue providing services to ENS.

It allows Morpho’s core team to focus on protocol deployment while Oku provides a valuable initiative on the frontend. Although $400k is a significant amount, we believe it will be justified through user onboarding and incentive programs to be realized that attract users on L2 and alt-L1 ecosystems. For future proposals of this nature, whether submitted by GFXlabs or other contributors, it would be beneficial to design a compensation scheme that aligns the incentives of the proposer with those of the Morpho DAO as Leuts suggested. Ideally, the compensation for contributors like GFXlabs should be more directly tied to measurable performance outcomes, such as the growth in TVL driven by the Oku frontend initiative.

This allows the core team to focus solely on the deployment of the core protocol, significantly reducing their workload related to crosschain deployments. Additionally, by encouraging external developers to create independent frontends on specific chains, the framework fosters flexible user experiences and facilitates the addition of unique features tailored to individual ecosystems.

The proposed changes appear to maintain a sufficiently competitive yield compared to key competitors, ensuring user attraction while optimizing costs. With more detailed data expected early next year, we look forward to contributing to future discussions on incentive design that are grounded in robust data analysis.

Supporting the liquidity of the MORPHO token contributes to the stable growth of the project. Combined with Uni v3, which is already whitelisted on Base, we expect this to improve the overall liquidity of the MORPHO token across Base.

This proposal optimizes interest rate curves for select Comets and adjusts COMP rewards to align with market needs. By refining borrowing and supply incentives, it ensures efficient liquidity provision while curbing excessive spending. This targeted approach supports sustainability and competitiveness across chains.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

We support this proposal because it is critical for strengthening Uniswap’s security and provides the necessary budget and guidelines to achieve that goal. By protecting whitehat hackers and offering them proper incentives, we believe this approach will safeguard Uniswap’s customer assets.

We support the initiative to unify the Mission, Vision, and Purpose of the Arbitrum DAO. This foundational step will enable the DAO to craft and execute appropriate strategies, aligned with a to-be-determined Strategic Objective Setting, ensuring that stakeholders work cohesively toward shared goals. Drawing inspiration from successful implementations like Lido’s MVP and GOOSE initiatives, this proposal has the potential to align contributors and DAO participants effectively. We appreciate the Purpose statement for its clarity in defining why the DAO exists—it is well-articulated and resonates strongly. While the Mission provides a direction for what the DAO should do in the mid-term, its reference to “the best onchain world” could benefit from more specificity. Similarly, the Vision is thought-provoking but somewhat ambiguous, as the term “the universal shift” might need further clarification. Additionally, the emphasis on “onchain” in both the Mission and Vision could unintentionally exclude projects that bridge “offchain” and “onchain” ecosystems. However, we recognize that clear focus is crucial for defining the DAO’s trajectory. If these statements are widely agreed upon by the DAO participants, settling on them and executing aligned strategies is a meaningful and necessary step forward.

We support the overall direction of the initiative and greatly appreciate the effort, as well as the articulate and well-thought-out proposal by @Entropy. We recognize the value of an OpCo or its equivalent, as highlighted by @WintermuteGovernance. Our experience with dYdX governance reinforces our belief that such structures are critical and practical solutions for maturing DAOs with a broad base of stakeholders and delegates, like Arbitrum. However, we also have concerns regarding the size and budget of The OAT. While the OAT has hiring as its important task in the beginning, its key mandate should focus on observing and overseeing OpCo’s activities. In this context, having five members seems excessive. Additionally, bonus compensation should be outcome-based rather than granted simply for remaining in their positions.

We maintain our vote and reasoning at the Snapshot stage and continue to support the initiative while being a little skeptical about the success of the projects itself. Regarding the details of the capital commitment, we believe they could have been clarified and communicated better, but we appreciate the fact that the RnDAO team has committed their effort to the success of the builders for the Arbitrum ecosystem and consider it acceptable. We hope the team learnt from the failure of the previous experiment described in the Entropy’s rationale and will support the selected teams to further grow within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

We believe this proposal enhances Uniswap’s security and operational resilience, while the agreement’s bounty structure is both reasonable and beneficial for users.

We appreciate @ostanescu.eth for the proposal first. We look forward to the presence from Arbitrum at ETH Bucharest! However, we can’t justify the funding as we echo @BlockworksResearch 's opinion on “the DAO Events budget should remain for Arbitrum-specific events” in addition to other concerns from delegates on the budgets and use of the Questbook grants and wouldn’t support this proposal as it stands.

This is the resubmission of the ZIP-001 that we already supported and voted for.

We support the defense mechanism to protect the liquidity of the JitoSol while wondering if there is any other way to prevent this from happening rather than putting on fees on those “toxic” flows.

We maintain the voting and rationale made at the Snapshot stage and also look forward to OpCo being in charge of the initiative going forward. We also echo @pedrob 's points on “being very difficult for THE DAO to reject recommendations from the selected council members” and would still like to see a more automated solution for the treasury management with a clarified and articulated IPS being agreed on by the DAO.

1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address.

We believe that the requested amount is reasonable compared to previous grants and it aligns with Lido's goals. Delivering dual governance and permissionless CSM is essential, and we look forward to seeing these milestones achieved and the next initiatives proposed.

This is a significant step towards improving decentralization for both Lido and the broader Ethereum ecosystem. Allowing CSM to become fully permissionless while carefully managing risks is a sensible and desirable approach to expand its scale and impact.

This appropriately aligns the Standard Node Operator Protocol (SNOP) with the evolving landscape of new Staking Modules, ensuring policies remain relevant, particularly regarding exit processes. Clarifying the recovery process for Node Operators (NOs) to return to in good standing should reduce participation barriers and encourages broader engagement.

This proposal aligns with GOOSE-2 vision of diversifying product lines to expand stETH adoption, leveraging external resources through the Lido Alliance. Projects like Mellow Protocol already demonstrate strong growth potential, and the budget appears reasonable.

As Tané, we are pleased to contribute to the Lido DAO through making this proposal with Lido DAO Ops. By extending the voting duration, as outlined, we believe it will reduce the burden on participants, enabling safer and more efficient governance.

We are excited to observe this experimental initiative managed by Butter and Uniswap Foundation and look forward to seeing the details of the project in coming months.

It’s critical to hyper-focus on the important metric with other parties aligned. Less budget allocated makes sense as the superchain grants are out of scope from this season.

We support the Security Council requests and owns its budget from the governance, and operate for the governance. The appropriate compensation balance between the lead and the members can be revisited in the next season.

The existence of the council has been discussed since the last season and it makes sense for us to dissolve it as the Foundation suggests it will be independent from the power dynamics of the Token House.

We support the transition of the M&M to an own council to operate under its own budget. The scope of the work is reasonable and Jun from PGov is a great lead to manage the council.

We support the budget request and changes to the scope of the DAB as the DAB has been critical in the operations of the Grants Council and contributions to the Collective.

We support the audacious changes to the structure of the council based on the careful considerations on the feedback and learnings in the Season 6. We continue to support the contributions from the Grants Council and other structures in the Collective.

Maintaining a high level of solver competition is essential to preserving CoW’s competitive edge. With the right incentives, the protocol can continue providing optimal services to its users.

We believe the Collective still needs this structure to keep the health of the governance.

We believe hyper-focus on an important north star metric is critical for all the parties involved for the Superchain growth.

All the proposed changes that are the chain derivation changes, the EIP-1559 elasticity parameter change and the MIPS related changes look reasonable and make sense, to be staged for the future major upgrades. The failure mode analysis provided for these changes is well-thought-out while these changes are not audited according to the Audit Framework.

Great to see this function to be live soon with diligent testings

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

This proposal also addresses the need to adjust COMP rewards to better align with market dynamics. By reducing borrow-side COMP rewards, it aims to curb excessive spending and promote a more sustainable incentive structure. Meanwhile, maintaining robust supply-side rewards ensures continued liquidity provision and supports the protocol’s competitiveness in attracting suppliers. This balanced approach reflects the evolving needs of the market while preserving the protocol's long-term stability.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for Limes, an experienced Steward with high time commitment, Slobo, another experienced Steward, and cap, whose knowledge and experience as a Dapps Builder is expected to be valuable in future Namechain and other L2 platforms. Although these three have significantly different backgrounds, we expect that this diversity will promote new ideas in the ENS Ecosystem.

To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for the two current experienced Stewards and sovereignsignal, who excel in Grant management. We expect that with current Stewards and experienced new members, new improvement ideas for ENS Public Goods will be promoted.

We will abstain from voting for one of the candidates. However, if we were to select two candidates other than ourselves, we would recommend the two experienced Stewards.

We believe it is reasonable to make the decisive judgment to discontinue this feature, understanding that it is expected to be short-lived for v2.

Both of the security service providers are very strong candidates without doubt and qualified for the role. Slightly favored in OpenZeppelin because of the competitive hourly fee and experience as the V1 contributions and context around the vision and challenges.

With the top-class researchers and experiences in the blockchain industry, @Nethermind stands out as a key candidate for the Risk role. They have been involved in the Arbitrum as a member of the STEP committee and surely provide the critical contributions to the ARDC V2.

With the ongoing involvement for the Arbitrum research projects and contributions, we chose @BlockworksResearch and @CastleCapital (with Llama Research). Having @Messari as a prominent crypto research institution (and complementary marketing support) is definitely a plus for the Arbitrum DAO.

While we haven’t received a clear answer to the compensation structure in our comment below, we agree with the general direction of the concept and this proposal should go for an onchain vote. We also believe the DAO should pay governance analysts and program contributors, but there should be a compensation structure that is aligned with what the program can achieve with clear goal that comes with the KPIs. While being challenging to set the right KPIs to monitor the ongoing impact from the governance fellows, it’s critical to design the program to dare to address the ultimate issues that the DAO has. [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp Proposals

We vote for Renew with 5 domains (adding Orbit) . With a good structure and system, Questbook to target the right audience to provide the grants for the Arbitrum ecosystem. the Arbitrum D.A.O. (while we don’t necessarily like the naming of it as it’s confusing with DAO) should continue with the new addition for the important offering of the Arbitrum ecosystem, Orbit. We appreciate @maxlomu 's contribution to the Orbit domain grants as well.

Operations: Entropy + Tamara we are grateful to see Entropy being involved with the operations, and working with a promising DAO operator, Tamara. Communications: Frisson and JuanRah + Alex Lumley. @Frisson has been a critical delegate and representative of Tally which is a vital tool for the Arbitrum DAO with great communication and coordination skills. We are impressed with the background and involvement with the Arbitrum DAO from @Juanrah and believe a great addition to the council with @AlexLumley involvement.

Having transaction simulations available at the time of Snapshot submission, which can be verified, contributes to enhanced governance security. The other proposed changes also appear to be generally reasonable.

We recognize the clear risks of relying on external protocols that are not immutable for the Optimizer. While the current TVL is approximately $500M, we believe this decision is essential to safeguard the growth of Morpho Blue and maintain the Morpho brand accordingly.

We support this proposal as it enables Morpho to secure a low 7-figure fee, even though the exact amount is undisclosed. Additionally, it does not place an excessive burden on the contributors’ resources.

We believe that Ethereum’s rollup-centric roadmap makes it strategically important to secure a significant position in the largest rollup ecosystem over the medium to long term. Therefore, incentives on Base should be actively increased. While this proposal represents a gradual increase, we remain open to considering more assertive approaches if deemed necessary in the future.

The introduction of a grant program is a vital step in expanding the ecosystem. Running it as a pilot program will likely reveal various challenges, and we aim to contribute meaningfully to address them.

Contributors should be fairly compensated for their efforts, and the amount proposed is reasonable and well within acceptable parameters. Importantly, the allocation process appears both transparent and proper.

The change makes sense to improve the user experience with the Security Council oversight in place.

We believe that rules enhancing the transparency and public nature of the Uniswap DAO, and making DAO governance by delegates fairer, are important for the DAO. We agree with these principles, which can improve the health of the Uniswap DAO by garnering support from more delegates.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

We vote for Arbitrum and two others. We support the general direction of the initiative; it’s vital to understand what customers think about the product and ecosystem via user research. While the ARDC could cover this in an ideal world, we think it’s acceptable for another initiative like this to cover the important initiative. Eventually, the DAO should have its continuous system to work on efforts around this user research area. Without compared ecosystems to research against, the research outcome will be less valuable, thus we choose the option including two others. They should not necessarily be Solana and OP Mainnet, but can be Solana and Base, or even Solana ecosystem and Superchain ecosystem, which would be more valuable. Articulated criteria on how to choose builders for the research is critical to answer but can be further reported in the ongoing meetings (e.g. GRC) Forming a “council” does make sense but we consider it more like a review group with different stakeholders, rather than “council” that has been more operating roles within the Arbitrum DAO, to our knowledge (e.g. LTIPP council) On metagovernance topics like “why this proposal was rushed onto Snapshot?”, we should create a certain social rule on how long a proposal should be discussed before going into its Snapshot rather than arbitrarily pointing it out as it’s too short for the Snapshot phase, etc.

We acknowledge that this version of the proposal will be updated with another proposal in the near future.

While it is unfortunate for CoW DAO that the solver operations will cease, even if only temporarily, this situation is unavoidable and should be addressed appropriately.　The necessary steps outlined in the thread have been properly followed prior to moving to the CIP phase, and we see no grounds for objection.

The bonding pool has been reimbursed, the root cause of the bug addressed, and the final procedures after the incident seem ready to be concluded. That said, we believe it is essential to establish more robust preventive measures against this kind of incident as shared here.

Protocol governance requires expertise, making it challenging to delegate responsibilities entirely to the community. Establishing roles like recognized delegates effectively involves experts and trusted participants, strengthening the governance system.

Testing for the treasury transfer from the onchain voting

We believe that the proposal to introduce Compound Sandbox has the potential to realize governance efficiency, which is currently a key focus for the protocol. By allowing anyone to freely create and test markets, it decentralizes the experimentation process for new markets and reduces the overall burden on the protocol. Additionally, the process of promoting only successful markets to the main protocol simplifies the traditional steps of "proposal → discussion → voting → execution," accelerating the protocol’s overall growth.

Continuous risk monitoring is essential as Mantle pursues its strategy to expand its ecosystem through collaboration with Compound. By strengthening the connection between Compound and Mantle Network, this proposal aims to activate capital flows between the two, potentially enhancing the value of Compound itself.

This proposal is deemed appropriate as a mechanism to significantly reduce the frequency of voting and alleviate the burden on participants. It achieves a balance between efficiency and security through the introduction of timelocks and guardian roles. However, it is considered necessary to establish rules for notification to ensure transparency and implement features for referencing change histories. These measures would make it easier for participants to understand the details of changes and enhance the overall reliability of the system.

Critical protocol updates for gas optimization and maintainability with the audit done by OpenZeppelin.

Compound is experiencing growing demand in various markets, and maintaining competitiveness requires offering attractive incentives for borrowers. While high interest rates are already appealing, enhancing incentives remains a reasonable step to encourage broader protocol adoption. With appropriate adjustments, replenishing the rewards contracts is a justified appraoch.

By adding wUSDM as a new collateral asset, users can leverage arbitrage opportunities utilizing its 5% annual yield, enabling efficient asset management even in low borrow rate environments. Furthermore, as a stable collateral asset with minimal price volatility, wUSDM allows users to manage their positions efficiently while reducing risks.

Clear guidelines ensures solvers conduct transactions appropriately, protecting user interests, the protocol and this DAO. This will be safeguards for potential damages in exceptional cases.

We are in support of this activity, which is expected to strengthen the community and accelerate the de-centralization of the ENS DAO.

We understand that the substantial contents of EP5.25 are already approved, and there is no practical change. We support the continued and stable activities by the established working groups.

1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address.

With a high degree of operational maturity, it is reasonable to improve efficiency through the introduction of an optimistic governance process. As a participant in governance, we support this proposal and will carefully monitor it to ensure that the committee functions correctly within this framework.

We voted for sunsetting Lido on Polygon, because - The future direction of the Polygon POS chain, especially its position within Polygon's AggLayer, is unclear. - Growth is difficult due to factors beyond the control of Shard Labs and Lido DAO. - Instead, the entire Lido DAO could focus on businesses that leverage stETH, which has some huge advantages in the market.

We voted for this proposal, because - Even when an incident has occurred, it is proper to take corrective measures and gradually resume operations. - This principle remains universal, even in the case of acquisition. - By thoroughly testing through a trial run on the testnet, a certain level of safety can be ensured. That being said, we believe it's worth regularly reviewing and discussing the possibility of replacing curated NOs —　not just those with prior incidents — to neutrally consider if there are other NOs more suitable for the curated set.

Similar to Bware Labs' case, we do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Its operational structure after the acquisition was announced to remain the same as before the acquisition.

We do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Bware Labs itself announced the continuity of its operational structure after acquisition.

We generally agree with the overall direction of Hasu's proposal, and thus voted for this proposal. However, we still have a concern regarding the main focus of the goal #1, Strengthen LDO’s Role in Governance. We acknowledge the importance of strengthening alignment across the DAO through revisions to the LDO token design. But given the presence of other challenges and the likelihood that implementing changes to the LDO token design will take considerable time, we do not believe it should be prioritized as the most critical theme in governance at this stage.

During its trial period, the GWG achieved clear results, such as improving voter participation and resolving quorum issues. This proposal offers practical ideas to solve important challenges in Compound governance, such as a new delegate reward program and better transparency in fund management.

This action strengthens the community’s commitment to user protection and increases trust in the protocol. While the return involves a 10% penalty and a reduction in reserves, it follows a transparent and fair process. This ensures that accidental transfers are handled clearly, improving the protocol’s reputation as user-friendly while balancing user protection and protocol sustainability.

Since LINK and UNI exhibit high volatility, the revision of the Liquidation Factor and Collateral Factor enables faster liquidations, reducing the platform's loss risk. Additionally, raising the liquidation penalty incentivizes liquidators, making the process more efficient and improving risk management. Furthermore, as the utilization rates of the supply caps are significantly low, reducing the supply caps is unlikely to negatively impact market liquidity or borrowing demand. The impact on positions with increased liquidation risk is also limited, making this proposal reasonable.

We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme. Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative.

The current APR for stablecoins on Compound is lower compared to Sky Protocol. However, deploying the USDS market and listing sUSDS can address this issue. The upgrade of Dai has the potential to attract more users and increase liquidity. Deploying the USDS market presents an opportunity for Compound to benefit from these advantages.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our opinions made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the new term of the ARDC. The funding amount was lower than the one we voted for, but with the recent price appreciation, it’s matched what we believe is the best.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our position made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the idea of establishing the 2025 events budget for the smooth budgeting process with a clear framework.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

It’s critical program to grow the ZKsync ecosystem at this stage.

This proposal offers advantages based on the high liquidity and reliability of FRAX, as well as the opportunity for users to leverage their assets for greater returns. Since the APY of $sFRAX is linked to the U.S. IORB rate, it is expected to provide a stable yield aligned with economic conditions, making it an attractive source of income for users. Additionally, it adds more options for collateral on Compound, helping users diversify their portfolios.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

By listing ETHx before competing DeFi protocols, Compound is expected to enhance its competitive edge. ETHx also seems low-risk because of its careful initial settings, strong decentralization, and sufficient liquidity. However, if demand changes, these settings might need to be adjusted in the future.

The USDC and DAI reserves are high enough, so even if the market changes, funds can be taken from the Aera vault to cover it. This proposal shows careful risk management that stays within safe limits.

The user bases of both Compound and Mantle are expected to expand. Also, Mantle Treasury holds substantial assets and it is expected to benefit from the growth of the Mantle ecosystem.

It’s been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users to arbitrage yields even when borrow rates are low. Additionally, since USDM is available on multiple chains, Compound can expand its user base, increase liquidity, and improve risk diversification.

We support this proposal. Our questions regarding the budget and the proposal’s objectives have been addressed by @dennisonb. Tally is an essential service for Uniswap’s DAO governance, and we are in favor of providing this funding.

Adjusting the IR curve is a flexible approach in response to market demand. Additionally, reducing excessive incentive spending would ease the financial burden on the protocol. Through these adjustments, it could reduce the risk of excessive utilization, balancing ease of use for users with the protocol’s profitability.

This proposal is expected to meet the incressing market demand, enhance protocol stability, and improving user experience.

Compared to other promising candidates, they are on the border of being chosen. With a limited amount of the VP we have, we use our 100% VP to support them. We would also vote for gzeon, Emiliano Bonassi, Immunefi and Dennison Bertram.

The charter has clarified criteria that the Standard Rollups should adhere to.

We believe it's an important step to more decentralization of the governance. The next big step would be to allow DAO members to permissionlessly create proposals and we should discuss how to achieve them.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and acknowledge two concerns are appropriately addressed after the Snapshot. We believe Stylus is the key innovation that the Arbitrum ecosystem should push forward and are looking forward to the success of this program.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team.

While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report 1, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it’s difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we’re looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities. For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author’s recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with.

While we acknowledge various concerns related to this program, we support the experimental nature of it and rely on the judgement and evaluations done by the selected program members. As GFX mentioned, the budget wouldn’t be used if the token swap doesn’t make sense. We see similar programs done by other DAOs while they are not necessarily proven successful yet. Many pointed out the risks, but there will be potential upsides that the DAO can take from this program and we believe it’s worth looking into. We would request changes if it goes to the onchain though: 1) as other delegates suggested, the lock-in period should be longer like 2-years for Arbitrum and target protocols to be aligned for the long term. 2) considering the experimental nature of the program, the compensations should be somehow split into an advance as the minimum base, and retroactive rewards based on successful token swap cases, otherwise, the program would pay out much expense without any success case (or lead to unnecessary pressure to the members to make some token swap happen.)

We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and continue to monitor the progress of the program.

We strongly support this proposal, especially since we believe that accommodating more than four chains approved by its Snapshot one is essential, even more so than during the previous vote.

Preconfirmation has been a hot topic around Ethereum staking and was also the initial scope in reGOOSE, so this kind of initiative makes sense. However, it is still unclear to what extent Lido DAO should support preconfirmation, and this should become clear after thorough research such as Nethermind's research on preconf's economic viability.

Currently, we want to grow both SDVT and CSM, and this seems like a very fair decision because the point incentives provided for SDVT's growth can also be utilized to incentivize deposits to CSM. In the future, it would make sense to have a separate vault for CSM, following the roadmap of Staking Router development, and let the market decide which staking module to be in favor.

We voted to recognize this bridge as canonical after checking the audits were done for these implementations. This should lead to the further expansion of stETH.Since the safety and effectiveness of code audits can vary depending on factors such as the auditor, reviews and checks like those performed by @TheDZhon are extremely helpful in enhancing security.

We supported all three of the proposals listed above. Especially, approving CSM is an important step toward enhancing the decentralization of Lido and Ethereum, and we didn’t find any issues with supporting them. We also acknowledge that the audits have been done by Ackee Blockchain and MixBytes. Everything seems on track, so we support this proposal as we have before.

By establishing a program like this, the DAO can effectively communicate with projects interested in collaborating with Uniswap and execute the initiatives for users, which we believe will impact Uniswap’s market share. Additionally, we believe that incorporating a trial period is crucial for forming a new organization. We acknowledge that the objectives for business development and marketing are clearly defined, and we feel that our previous concerns regarding the KPIs have been addressed.

While we have some concerns about the quality of the executions and outcome from this initiative, we consider it worth a try to focus on aligning the DAO’s key members with the strategic directions that the DAO needs to tackle going forward.

We maintain the support at the Snapshot stage and look forward to the transition of the RARI DAO governance onto Arbitrum with additional treatments like offsetting the cost of bridging and potential incentives for the transition.

We maintain the support made in the Snapshot phase and acknowledge that lack of transparency is largely due to the nature of partnership discussions and the protection for the competitive edge. We will review the special section dedicated to this partnership funds in the future transparency reports.

We value the consistent financial support to the whole Ethereum ecosystem by ENS DAO given that ENS's future is tightly knitted to the development of the ecosystem and that ENS DAO is highly profitable when compared with other major DAOs. This is a contribution that few DAOs can afford to, and thus very meaningful.

This is also where continuity matters as this will give reliability to the ENS as a platform to build something upon from builders' perspective. We see some unique and exciting projects that received grants such as 3DNS. It seems that grants are distributed in a desirable way.

This is necessary, just like for other working groups, and should be approved without question unless there are significant changes or significant needs for changes. We believe there's no problem with approving it this time.

We are opposed to this proposal. Our reason is that, compared to other chains, and considering that Lisk’s TVL is mostly composed of the LSK token, even when taking into account the promised $1 million in POL and the $250,000 Lisk incentive matching, we believe that the $375,000 incentive is too large. Gnosis Chain, which had a TVL of $300 million at the time of its proposal, was allocated $250,000 in the Onboarding Package via Snapshot. We also believe that Lisk Chain’s TVL is smaller compared to Linea and Scroll, which received $250,000 in incentives through the Onboarding Package. We think it would be better to reconsider this proposal on a smaller scale.

We maintain our stance made in the Snapshot phase and continue to support the change after having reviewed the report by the ARDC.

We maintain our decision made at its Snapshot voting phase and appreciate the additional information added to the proposal. We also appreciate the future effort to make sure that there will be elections before the next phase of the committee with potential collaborations with Entropy and/or other suitable entities.

We maintain our support from the Snapshot voting for the “Panda Partners” tier sponsorship of the event. We believe in the direct mission alignment between the Arbitrum ecosystem and the Attackathon and the donation amount is reasonable.

1. stETH on L2 We support this proposal as it enhances the accessibility of stETH across L2 networks, leveraging existing wstETH infrastructure. This expansion will provide users with a consistent experience across both L1 and L2. 2. Organize the Lido Alliance Program as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent BORG We support setting up an EasyTrack for the Lido Alliance Operational Multisig to simplify operations. The approved BORG entity provides a legal framework for agreements without exposing Lido DAO to legal risks. This structure keeps Lido DAO decentralized while supporting the Alliance’s needs, with EasyTrack improving fund management.

Worth trying to attract applications to tackle this request

We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee.

We vote for Use ENS txt records on Snapshot. This change leads to a better accessibility of the metadata for the toolings in the ecosystem, without additional cost. We believe it’s acceptable to utilize the ENS records for the information.

We appreciate the potential value to be provided by the research from TogetherCrew team without cost from the DAO treasury. However, we are not certain that the DAO is the one to decide whether the API access to Discord is allowed, while most of the Discourse data is public and much related to discussions around the DAO. Either way, we support the concept and its modified implementation that addresses the concerns from the delegates and related parties.