[Constitutional] AIP: Constitutional Quorum Threshold Reduction

While we fundamentally agree that quorum thresholds are an important friction in democratic processes, ensuring proposals only pass with genuine and substantial support, we also recognize the pragmatic need for adaptability, given Arbitrum's current governance landscape. Lowering quorum thresholds carries inherent risks, including increasing vulnerability to governance attacks or allowing insufficiently supported proposals to pass. We analyzed the potential risk of lowering quorum in the perspective of unintended DAO treasury leakage, and for constitutional proposals, we believe we should take more conservative approach as some protocol vulerbility or malicous upgrade could cost Arbitrum's TVL. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/constitutional-aip-constitutional-quorum-threshold-reduction/29145/9 However, considering Arbitrum’s current developmental phase as an evolving project rather than a matured governance system, maintaining an high quorum threshold could impede progress. Temporarily adjusting the threshold is acceptable as an interim measure to mitigate immediate governance gridlock, particularly when factoring in the safety net provided by the Security Council. Nonetheless, this approach should be seen explicitly as a temporary solution. Moving forward, we strongly encourage the DAO to address the root issues, such as low voter participation and engagement, rather than repeatedly adjusting quorum thresholds. Alternative approaches like treasury delegation and targeted incentives to boost voter participation should be explored in greater depth to ensure the long-term integrity and effectiveness of Arbitrum’s governance structure.