CoW DAO

Balancer already underpins CoWAMMs, so acquiring veBAL strengthens an essential partnership and lets the DAO steer liquidity incentives. The roughly $220k spend is modest relative to the governance leverage we gain. Locking both sides for two years secures long-term alignment while we complete a clear CoWAMM growth roadmap.

This proposal represents a reasonable tradeoff between convenience and security. While distributing rewards directly on destination chains might enhance UX for some solvers, the professional nature of these participants justifies a more cautious approach. Centralizing reward distribution on Ethereum mainnet reduces potential security risks associated with bridging and market fragmentation, making this choice prudent and aligned with the DAO’s risk management objectives.

It is clear that the upgrade brings a genuinely large improvement. Although some factors were necessarily excluded from the simulations, the evidence still shows the chosen design offers the best balance between better execution and solver workload. We expect the higher core throughput to meet growing demand and to handle heavier transaction volume, and we hope to see the rollout completed safely and without issues.

We support this proposal as it increases the options available to solvers; Integrating the Flash-Loan Router improves accessibility to flash-loans while helping solvers avoid unnecessary complexity and reducing security risks associated with their individual implementations.

We believe that the solver compensation is the core part of CoW Protocol, and this is a fundamental problem that requires an immediate solution. The proposed approach, which adjusts the definition of surplus from being based on limit sell amount to being based on the actual executed buy amount, would address the issue of inflated reward for solvers. There may be still ways to intentionally increase the gap between limit buy amount and executed buy amount, but that would not lead to higher scoring or rewards under the new scroing mechanism.

The design goal of establishing clear legal structures to mitigate regulatory uncertainty, while maintaining high organizational decentralization, appears reasonable. We voted for this proposal as this approach is sensible at this stage, though it is obvious that ongoing evaluation and future adjustments to the structure will be necessary to respond effectively to evolving regulatory landscapes.

We voted in favor of this proposal as we agree with the direction of establishing a structured framework to support grant delivery and ensuring appropriate compensation for those efforts. However, we believe there are significant areas for improvement in the reward structure and role distribution, as we outlined in our comment. Given our experience in grant operations at Tané, we are eager to actively contribute to this area, including potential participation in the committee.

Properly pursuing investment returns is essential for CoW DAO’s long-term sustainability, and allocating these resources to the Core Treasury team aligns with that objective. We trust karpatkey’s proven track record to responsibly manage the treasury and drive meaningful value back to the DAO.

CoW Protocol has already shown steady growth and needs a sustainable revenue structure. We believe that balancing user benefits with the protocol's financial health is the right move for fostering ongoing innovation and resilience.

Preparation for CoW protocol's expansion to other chains in the coming years is essential. While it would have been ideal to maintain the same address without changes, given the technical constraints, this proposal represents a necessary and practical step forward.

As highlighted in CIP-58, expansion remains a critical theme. This proposal constitutes a core component of that strategy. We found no significant objections or concerns to address in this proposal.

The decision to pursue various forms of expansion next year is highly reasonable, given the current state of the products and their position in the market. Considering this, the proposed budget size is also appropriate, and budget management has been handled properly.

Maintaining a high level of solver competition is essential to preserving CoW’s competitive edge. With the right incentives, the protocol can continue providing optimal services to its users.

Having transaction simulations available at the time of Snapshot submission, which can be verified, contributes to enhanced governance security. The other proposed changes also appear to be generally reasonable.

The bonding pool has been reimbursed, the root cause of the bug addressed, and the final procedures after the incident seem ready to be concluded. That said, we believe it is essential to establish more robust preventive measures against this kind of incident as shared here.

While it is unfortunate for CoW DAO that the solver operations will cease, even if only temporarily, this situation is unavoidable and should be addressed appropriately.　The necessary steps outlined in the thread have been properly followed prior to moving to the CIP phase, and we see no grounds for objection.

Protocol governance requires expertise, making it challenging to delegate responsibilities entirely to the community. Establishing roles like recognized delegates effectively involves experts and trusted participants, strengthening the governance system.

Clear guidelines ensures solvers conduct transactions appropriately, protecting user interests, the protocol and this DAO. This will be safeguards for potential damages in exceptional cases.