Compound

We support the proposal to implement Safe Harbor because it improves the protocol’s emergency response by enabling swift action from whitehat hackers. This helps reduce the risk of fund losses during blackhat attacks. Additionally, since this implementation does not require additional costs, it is a beneficial upgrade to the existing bug bounty program without imposing financial burdens.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 7 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

In these assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, which may be insufficient to meet demand. From a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps appears necessary.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 6 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

This proposal aims to enhance liquidity and capital efficiency by increasing supply caps for key assets and adjusting interest rate curves for Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets. While we support these changes as they address growing demand and align with market conditions, we recommend providing additional data, such as utilization trends, to validate the necessity of these adjustments.

This proposal improves capital efficiency by increasing supply caps and aligns interest rate curves with market demand. These changes enhance liquidity, promote competitiveness, and support the protocol’s adaptability in a dynamic market.

This proposal optimizes interest rate curves for select Comets and adjusts COMP rewards to align with market needs. By refining borrowing and supply incentives, it ensures efficient liquidity provision while curbing excessive spending. This targeted approach supports sustainability and competitiveness across chains.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

This proposal also addresses the need to adjust COMP rewards to better align with market dynamics. By reducing borrow-side COMP rewards, it aims to curb excessive spending and promote a more sustainable incentive structure. Meanwhile, maintaining robust supply-side rewards ensures continued liquidity provision and supports the protocol’s competitiveness in attracting suppliers. This balanced approach reflects the evolving needs of the market while preserving the protocol's long-term stability.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

We believe that the proposal to introduce Compound Sandbox has the potential to realize governance efficiency, which is currently a key focus for the protocol. By allowing anyone to freely create and test markets, it decentralizes the experimentation process for new markets and reduces the overall burden on the protocol. Additionally, the process of promoting only successful markets to the main protocol simplifies the traditional steps of "proposal → discussion → voting → execution," accelerating the protocol’s overall growth.

Continuous risk monitoring is essential as Mantle pursues its strategy to expand its ecosystem through collaboration with Compound. By strengthening the connection between Compound and Mantle Network, this proposal aims to activate capital flows between the two, potentially enhancing the value of Compound itself.

This proposal is deemed appropriate as a mechanism to significantly reduce the frequency of voting and alleviate the burden on participants. It achieves a balance between efficiency and security through the introduction of timelocks and guardian roles. However, it is considered necessary to establish rules for notification to ensure transparency and implement features for referencing change histories. These measures would make it easier for participants to understand the details of changes and enhance the overall reliability of the system.

Compound is experiencing growing demand in various markets, and maintaining competitiveness requires offering attractive incentives for borrowers. While high interest rates are already appealing, enhancing incentives remains a reasonable step to encourage broader protocol adoption. With appropriate adjustments, replenishing the rewards contracts is a justified appraoch.

By adding wUSDM as a new collateral asset, users can leverage arbitrage opportunities utilizing its 5% annual yield, enabling efficient asset management even in low borrow rate environments. Furthermore, as a stable collateral asset with minimal price volatility, wUSDM allows users to manage their positions efficiently while reducing risks.

During its trial period, the GWG achieved clear results, such as improving voter participation and resolving quorum issues. This proposal offers practical ideas to solve important challenges in Compound governance, such as a new delegate reward program and better transparency in fund management.

This action strengthens the community’s commitment to user protection and increases trust in the protocol. While the return involves a 10% penalty and a reduction in reserves, it follows a transparent and fair process. This ensures that accidental transfers are handled clearly, improving the protocol’s reputation as user-friendly while balancing user protection and protocol sustainability.

Since LINK and UNI exhibit high volatility, the revision of the Liquidation Factor and Collateral Factor enables faster liquidations, reducing the platform's loss risk. Additionally, raising the liquidation penalty incentivizes liquidators, making the process more efficient and improving risk management. Furthermore, as the utilization rates of the supply caps are significantly low, reducing the supply caps is unlikely to negatively impact market liquidity or borrowing demand. The impact on positions with increased liquidation risk is also limited, making this proposal reasonable.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

The current APR for stablecoins on Compound is lower compared to Sky Protocol. However, deploying the USDS market and listing sUSDS can address this issue. The upgrade of Dai has the potential to attract more users and increase liquidity. Deploying the USDS market presents an opportunity for Compound to benefit from these advantages.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

This proposal offers advantages based on the high liquidity and reliability of FRAX, as well as the opportunity for users to leverage their assets for greater returns. Since the APY of $sFRAX is linked to the U.S. IORB rate, it is expected to provide a stable yield aligned with economic conditions, making it an attractive source of income for users. Additionally, it adds more options for collateral on Compound, helping users diversify their portfolios.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

By listing ETHx before competing DeFi protocols, Compound is expected to enhance its competitive edge. ETHx also seems low-risk because of its careful initial settings, strong decentralization, and sufficient liquidity. However, if demand changes, these settings might need to be adjusted in the future.

The USDC and DAI reserves are high enough, so even if the market changes, funds can be taken from the Aera vault to cover it. This proposal shows careful risk management that stays within safe limits.

The user bases of both Compound and Mantle are expected to expand. Also, Mantle Treasury holds substantial assets and it is expected to benefit from the growth of the Mantle ecosystem.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users to arbitrage yields even when borrow rates are low. Additionally, since USDM is available on multiple chains, Compound can expand its user base, increase liquidity, and improve risk diversification.

Adjusting the IR curve is a flexible approach in response to market demand. Additionally, reducing excessive incentive spending would ease the financial burden on the protocol. Through these adjustments, it could reduce the risk of excessive utilization, balancing ease of use for users with the protocol’s profitability.

This proposal is expected to meet the incressing market demand, enhance protocol stability, and improving user experience.