This proposal to rotate the compromised oracle key is crucial for maintaining Lido protocol security, and we fully support this necessary action. While the oracle's 5/9 design mitigates immediate systemic risk from a single key compromise, allowing for a measured response, we stress the importance of a thorough post-incident report. We anticipate updates on the root cause and future preventative measures to continually enhance security practices and prevent similar incidents from recurring.

It is clear that the upgrade brings a genuinely large improvement. Although some factors were necessarily excluded from the simulations, the evidence still shows the chosen design offers the best balance between better execution and solver workload. We expect the higher core throughput to meet growing demand and to handle heavier transaction volume, and we hope to see the rollout completed safely and without issues.

We vote for PGov and citizen42. The committee needs high-skill members who are also free from outside incentives, and these two meet both tests. PGov brings rigorous KPI oversight across multiple blue-chip DAOs, and citizen42 contributed directly to PIP-63 design; neither holds paid roles with 1inch, CoW, or other intent-based DEX competitors. Their independence and complementary strengths will drive reliable growth delivery.

This proposal has had our support since the Snapshot; we keep supporting it because extending the UAC keeps core DAO work running smoothly. Raising the commitment to 10 hours a week and funding $370 k in UNI fairly matches the larger workload and removes the need for extra funding votes. Stable funding and clear roles protect the DAO’s day-to-day reliability.

This tops up the affected wallets with $280,142 in UNI, introduces no new spending, and makes no material changes to the original allocations. We supported it at the snapshot stage for precisely these reasons and continue to do so, as the adjustment poses no significant concerns and simply preserves existing commitments.

This proposal gives us a unified lens to compare incentive campaigns across chains and pools with identical metrics, letting us judge which designs truly sustain TVL, volume, and user retention. Side-by-side benchmarking will cut iteration time; it turns scattered reports into actionable evidence that guides smarter sizing and timing of future incentives. While further work is required to connect these insights to future liquidity-allocation strategies, we view this analysis as an essential step toward a full feedback loop and therefore support the requested funding.

Vote for: - Mantle - ZKsync - Sei - Polygon zkEVM We selected the four chains mainly based on the current TVL and the team's experience of ecosystem growth, while also considering other factors. This is because chains with those profiles tend to obtain deeper liquidity and larger user bases at some point, and thus should be prioritised in this case.

Although Morpho’s broad coverage of long-tail assets is an important differentiator, establishing an unassailable position in the highest-demand markets is the necessary step for expanding influence across the protocol. We believe this focus will maximize incentive efficiency to strengthen Morpho’s standing in the lending landscape.

This proposal supports a team that has consistently contributed to Uniswap’s multichain growth and delivers practical infrastructure. The $340K request appears reasonable given the scope, particularly for the V4 integration, which requires new development distinct from previous V3 work. Early and proactive support for V4 infrastructure is both necessary and strategically important to ensure smooth adoption across ecosystems.

This proposal consolidates the treasury’s short-term liquidity strategy by allocating the remaining ARB to three regulated tokenized money-market vehicles that we believe offer an attractive risk-adjusted yield. We believe that the committee ran a broad, competitive process and selected credible issuers, so the chosen split is acceptable given current market conditions. Nonetheless, continued reliance on United States government exposure concentrates macroeconomic and geopolitical risk; at some point, the DAO should begin evaluating on-chain access to other high-grade real-world assets such as EU sovereign bills, real-estate-backed notes, or diversified equity and crypto ETF products. We therefore approve the allocation today while urging the treasury working group to start exploring options for multi-jurisdiction and multi-asset diversification.

We voted for “Yes to both”. We believe we should fund the Hackathon Continuation Program because the DAO has already endorsed it, and the current funding shortfall now threatens to erode our credibility. Additionally, although unused Domain Allocator capital would normally return to the DAO treasury to keep purposes crystal clear, the Treasury Management Committee is yet to convert its 15M ARB allocation and presently lacks stablecoins, so allowing the remaining to seed the committee offers a practical bridge that turns idle funds into an immediate reserve.

This proposal is designed as a temporary measure necessary to maintain efficient DAO decision-making, incorporating several adjustments based on feedback from various delegates.To remain neutral as the author of the proposal, we are voting to abstain on this proposal as stated in the proposal’s discloure section.

This proposal provides a structured process for multi-chain v4 deployments, accelerating rollout and adoption. We supported it at the snapshot stage and remain in favor for the on-chain vote because this approach is an effective practice for driving v4 adoption across multiple chains.

This proposal effectively leverages a community-driven approach to growth initiatives, as demonstrated by several successful examples. A structured review after the initial 6-month trial is essential to ensure proper execution. Given the moderate scale of the proposed budget for a 6-month period, we see no significant concerns regarding expenditure.

This proposal represents a straightforward rebalance of previously approved budgets. It does not introduce new spending beyond existing commitments, nor does it involve substantial changes to the original allocations. Thus, there are no significant concerns or issues with this adjustment.

This proposal effectively extends UAC's operations and appropriately expands its capacity to manage growing DAO responsibilities. The requested budget is justified by the detailed accounting of their expanded workload and essential multisig security responsibilities. No substantial operational changes are introduced, thus maintaining continuity and stability in DAO functions.

We support this proposal because we believe Twyne delivers a innovative credit‑delegation primitive and has the technical depth to execute it. The market it addresses is still largely untapped yet has substantial growth potential, so bringing Twyne into the Lido Alliance will accelerate stETH adoption and open more capital‑efficient strategies across DeFi.

This proposal addresses the incremental tuning required to keep CSM a viable engine of Ethereum decentralization, raising the stakeShareLimit removes the growth ceiling for some 50 queued operators, while trimming the keyRemovalCharge re‑aligns safety costs with current gas levels. The change is prudent rather than drastic, unlocking broader community staking today and paving the way for future upgrades such as refinements to the bonding mechanism.

This is a straightforward housekeeping step rather than a strategic shift, so we see no substantive controversy. The higher cap removes an administrative choke‑point and lets the team execute its mandate without fragmented top‑ups, while the core security logic of Easy Track remains intact. That said, each increase in the withdrawal limit should be matched by a proportional upgrade in transparency; regular public statements of cash‑on‑hand, burn‑rate, and milestone progress would give tokenholders clear sight of how the grant flows into measurable outcomes. We therefore look forward to the Foundation publishing a recurring financial report for better accountability.

Lowering the entry bar to 1M LDO is a reasonable refinement made this time, as it brings dozens of mid‑sized wallets into scope and helps the delegate set mirror actual token distribution. Additionally, we encourage the Oversight Committee to release a guideline for the retroactive grants, with examples of eligible work, so contributors who fall outside the main incentive track can plan and execute meaningful contributions that will qualify for future retroactive funding.

This proposal involves a few necessary updates to ensure compatibility with Ethereum’s upcoming Pectra fork, and our verification of the referenced contract addresses found no issues. Additionally, the contracts themselves have been audited and deemed secure by reputable entities. Given these confirmations, we see no problems and support this proposal.

This proposal releases additional MORPHO only after the Plume market demonstrates sustained loan growth, so treasury spending is gated by clear performance and the downside is minimal. Pairing Plume’s RWA‑centric user base with Morpho’s permissionless markets should expand collateral diversity and deepen liquidity, giving the DAO measurable exposure to the fastest‑growing RWA venue.

This proposal represents a measured increase in contributor incentives that aligns with Morpho’s accelerated development pace. The payout appears proportional to current needs, and we see no credible downside; sustaining these rewards should keep the team focused on advancing Morpho as a core DeFi primitive.

This proposal implements a straightforward public rewards distribution using transparent, automated mechanisms that reduce manual overhead and risk of error. We reviewed the details and found no issues, supporting its approval.

We continue to support this proposal consistent with the Snapshot vote, believing that BOB has significant importance after it being the 3rd largest by TVL in the Superchain and 5th among Uniswap deployments. This shows a great potential for Uniswap to grow, and the amount requested is reasonable considering BOB’s $500k commitment.

As we saw the success of Lido’s GOOSE framework and other DAOs like Arbitrum follow the similar path to align the stakeholders for the platform/protocol, we believe it’s a great start to define and aligned on the goals that we ratify as a collective.

We voted for - Bartek.eth (L2BEAT) - Fred (Arbitrum Contributor) - Michael Lewellen (BlockAid) - Yoav.eth (Ethereum Foundation) Rationale: Our decision-making process focused primarily on three key criteria, with geographic diversity as a secondary consideration: Deep Security Expertise: This was paramount. The Security Council needs members capable of implementing rapid upgrades and fixes when vulnerabilities arise, requiring significant technical expertise. We highly valued not just general technical understanding, but specific knowledge of security practices – identifying vulnerabilities and knowing effective mitigation strategies, areas where auditors and security researchers often excel. Profound Understanding of the Arbitrum Protocol: A deep comprehension of Arbitrum's specific design and mechanics is crucial for effective security governance. Fred, in particular, stands out due to his role as a Tech Lead and deep involvement with the protocol's intricacies, making his continued presence on the council highly valuable. Proven Track Record in Security Council Participation: While relying solely on past participation risks stagnation, practical experience in handling emergency situations ("war room" scenarios) is critical. This goes beyond theoretical security knowledge to include demonstrated ability to act effectively under pressure, informed by protocol understanding. Several candidates have direct experience from the first cohort, and Michael Lewellen has extensive experience in similar roles across other DAOs. Geographic Diversity (Supplementary): Given the pool of candidates primarily from the US, Europe, and the Middle East, we aimed for a reasonable distribution across these regions. However, we note a significant gap in coverage for the Asian time zone. This remains a concern, and initiatives to encourage qualified individuals from this region to participate in future elections might be beneficial. Overall, these four candidates represent a strong combination of deep technical security skills, specific Arbitrum knowledge, and practical experience in handling critical security responsibilities, balanced with reasonable geographic distribution among the available nominees.

We support this proposal as it increases the options available to solvers; Integrating the Flash-Loan Router improves accessibility to flash-loans while helping solvers avoid unnecessary complexity and reducing security risks associated with their individual implementations.

We believe that the solver compensation is the core part of CoW Protocol, and this is a fundamental problem that requires an immediate solution. The proposed approach, which adjusts the definition of surplus from being based on limit sell amount to being based on the actual executed buy amount, would address the issue of inflated reward for solvers. There may be still ways to intentionally increase the gap between limit buy amount and executed buy amount, but that would not lead to higher scoring or rewards under the new scroing mechanism.

Given SEEDGov's significant existing role within Velora governance, expanding their responsibilities represents a logical progression. The demanding scope outlined in the proposal, covering vital governance functions and strategy, requires dedicated expertise and resources, which would require a decent amount of compensation. Also, aligning incentives with the overall success of the protocol is crucial, particularly as the role's scope includes activities focused on driving growth.

Considering BOB's already significant presence as the 3rd largest by TVL in the Superchain and 5th among Uniswap deployments, combined with the anticipated long-term growth of Bitcoin and its DeFi ecosystem (BTCfi), the requested contribution appears to be a reasonable investment.

Rapid multi-chain deployment is crucial for accelerating the adoption of v4. This approach of establishing a clear licensing process is well-suited for effectively leveraging external partners in the expansion of Uniswap v4.

Recent votes consistently show participation far exceeding the current quorum, often around 200M PSP, indicating the proposed threshold is readily achievable. Furthermore, raising the quorum enhances DAO security by making governance attacks more difficult and expensive, which is crucial for protecting the protocol.

The introduction of EVM emulation and the Fflonk verifier presents a significant opportunity for ZKsync to enhance its compatibility with Ethereum, ultimately improving the developer experience and reducing costs.

Given Gitcoin’s current financial situation, pursuing additional yield through the outlined treasury management strategy is both prudent and justified. The risks you’ve explained appear acceptable and manageable within reasonable control measures.

We acknowledge the technical audits by Zellic and QuillAudits. However, we have significant concerns regarding the coordination with the Network Expansion Committee and the handling of the past incident, issues highlighted during the discussion. While we lack direct insight into the actual communications, the comments from @Jenya_K and @TheDZhon suggest that the level of trust and operational alignment required for official DAO endorsement is currently insufficient.

We voted **for** the proposal. Regarding the Community Rounds and the GTC Utility experiment, as per our previous comments, we see no outstanding issues. For the OSS Quadratic Funding rounds, we acknowledge that appropriate modification has been made on the dApps & Apps category, specifically limiting the matching cap to 5%. Concerning the Retroactive Funding metrics, we recognize that important ecosystem indicators are covered to a reasonable extent. However, we believe it would be beneficial to measure aspects closer to actual outcomes in the future – for example, (purely as an illustration) considering metrics like GitHub repository stars for the tooling category. We are keen to contribute to developing these aspects further.

We proposed this initiative because we recognize the importance of evolving the Treasury Delegation program for the DAO’s health. To remain neutral as the author of the proposal, we are voting to abstain on this proposal as stated in the proposal’s discloure section.

Extending the collaboration with simplified leveraged positions and a liquidity migrator from Aave seems highly beneficial. Although we have reservations about the potential impact compared to the $340M TVL on Aave’s Polygon market (which constitutes 37.9% of Polygon’s $896M TVL) and Morpho’s $4.8B overall, a $60k allocation is reasonable in light of expected leverage-driven gains.

We believe in the approach to uphold acting in the best interest of the Solana network and JitoSOL token holders.

We strongly support the updated policy’s security enhancements, especially requiring use of hardware wallets and the prohibition of using signer wallets for other purposes for certain types of signers. Given recent Safe incidents, we believe prioritizing wallet security is essential, and these changes are a vital step.There is a more detailed multisig security policy, which we comply with for the multisig operation in Optimism (details). As it has more specific guidelines such as which specific hardware wallets to use, how to prepare the backup wallets, and how to travel with signing keys, this might be useful as a reference in the future policy updates.

We have also been utilizing SSV for our node operation and see great potential in it. The automation of validator assignments and cluster management using dedicated oracles represents a significant improvement in terms of scalability and reducing the risk of human error in protocol operations. This would be a substantial step forward for the protocol.

This strikes a good balance between operational efficiency and strong DAO governance through the well-structured implementation of Easy Track. We do not have any outstanding concerns with the Relay Maintenance Committee's performance, and believe this transition will be beneficial overall.

This presents a well-rounded approach to addressing Lido's key priorities, appropriately focusing on the responsibilities of the Lido Labs Foundation after its restructuring. We are particularly pleased with the combination of clearly defined objectives, measurable KPIs, and the stated intention to enhance transparency within the foundation's operations. This comprehensive approach is essential for Lido's continued success.

We are in favor of this proposal. Similar to the Labs' proposal, this covers initiatives that should be undertaken on an ongoing basis. Also, we believe that exploring protocol-owned liquidity (POL) is a significant new endeavor, as it has the potential to be more sustainable than traditional liquidity incentives.

We generally support this proposal, recognizing that these changes are necessary for the continued operation of the Lido protocol. It is crucial that the updates proceed safely, and we will be paying close attention to the upcoming audit reports to ensure a secure implementation.

We strongly support this proposal, which includes changes to the on-chain voting duration we initially put forward. This aligns with our ongoing commitment to lowering barriers to Lido DAO governance participation and enhancing DAO security. We have also consistently supported the establishment of the two BORG Foundations since the Snapshot vote (Lido Labs / Lido Ecosystem), and our position remains unchanged. The Easy Track setups are essential for the operational functionality of these two entities.

The opportunity to tap into the TON ecosystem through a Telegram Mini App offers significant potential for reaching a large retail user base, and we assess the requested funding as appropriate for the scope of work. The potential for increased user adoption through Telegram's extensive reach is indeed a key factor in our support for this proposal.

We continue to support this proposal, consistent with our Snapshot vote, recognizing these liquidity incentive programs as necessary expenditures to secure the competitive growth of Uniswap v4 and Unichain in the current highly competitive environment. This ultimately leads to maximizing long-term value for UNI token holders.

Our position remains largely unchanged from the Temp Check. We support this proposal because Uniswap v4 represents critical innovation in DeFi, and substantial investment in hook development and user onboarding remains essential.Although we recognize ongoing concerns about UF’s transparency and future grant management, we continue to see these as addressable challenges.

We recognize Saga’s unique approach and acknowledge its potential to become a meaningful market for Uniswap in the future. However, at this point, we haven’t yet seen sufficient traction or growth metrics that justify a $250k investment. We’d prefer a more conditional incentive program, possibly tied directly to measurable TVL growth, or alternatively, revisiting this discussion once initial growth and performance become clearer and easier to evaluate.

The design goal of establishing clear legal structures to mitigate regulatory uncertainty, while maintaining high organizational decentralization, appears reasonable. We voted for this proposal as this approach is sensible at this stage, though it is obvious that ongoing evaluation and future adjustments to the structure will be necessary to respond effectively to evolving regulatory landscapes.

It’s a no-brainer decision to unlock OBOL token for people who have contributed to the protocol.

We believe it’s a critical experiment that we should try to see if the governance staking is going to make good impact on the DAO governance as a whole.

We support this proposal because granting the Morpho Association the authority to adjust reward rates makes sense operationally. That said, we also believe it’s essential to clearly establish mechanisms ensuring accountability and transparency. In particular, we advocate for providing explicit veto rights to token holders as a robust governance safeguard, Lido’s Easy Track governance model for instance.

We have no major issues with the selection process, given Gauntlet’s track record and Aera’s qualifications. While concerns about the sustainability of the incentive's impact exist, focusing on failures isn’t productive. That said, we call for more transparency in the future selection process. We support the overall approach of the incentive program, but emphasize the need for ongoing monitoring. Gauntlet’s focus on high-volume core pairs seems valid. We agree to proceed but suggest adapting if necessary and reviewing progress regularly.

We support the proposal as Uniswap v4 is a key innovation in DeFi, and significant investment in hook development and user onboarding is critical at this stage. Regarding Unichain, we believe using UNI token stakeing to recover investment is feasible. Treasury sustainability is critical for both the DAO and UNI holders. Despite the large expenditure, the investment is manageable given Uniswap's market position. We acknowledge concerns about UF’s transparency and future grant allocations but believe they can be addressed moving forward. This proposal is essential for strengthening Uniswap's position and increasing UNI token value, so we support it.

We continue to uphold our snapshot vote perspective. Our view remains unchanged, as the updated criteria, including the new tie-breaker mechanism and the integration of timely rationale submissions as part of the delegate requirements, clearly demonstrate improvements.

We support the updated criteria, as the updates such as the new tie-breaker mechanism demonstrates clear improvements. Over the long term, we also believe that the timely submission of rationales and forum participation should be integrated into the delegate selection scoring, even though objectively measuring the quality of discussion contributions remains challenging.

While the potential competitive relationship between Compound and Morpho was noted in the original proposal, we don’t see it as a problem. Or at least, Morpho receives a clear growth benefit from this collaboration. Morpho’s share of the funding seems reasonable as well, considering the benefit Morpho will have and what Compound and Polygon will be investing to this collaboration. Above all, having an open-source frontend is a major advantage, as it will make it easier for curators and others to build their own UIs in the future.

We support this proposal because it makes sense to reduce excessive incentives and reallocate funds toward more strategic investments. While Morpho’s growth has calmed somewhat under current market conditions, that slowdown isn’t a major concern given the broader stagnation in the lending sector. Now that rewards have moved closer to a proper level, a more careful, incremental approach will be needed to maintain healthy, long-term growth.

We previously supported Berachain’s use of the Morpho license in the prior proposal. While it is not ideal for the Association to receive the funds instead of the DAO, we view it as a practical approach to avoid potential tax issues. Considering the Association’s track record so far, we do not see this as a major concern.

The Service Provider Program is a crucial mechanism for rewarding ecosystem contributors who currently lack alternative funding channels. We believe this initiative drives sustainable growth for the ENS ecosystem while fostering innovation at the protocol level. Expanding financial resources allows more builders to focus full-time on ENS infrastructure development, creating long-term value for all token holders. For these reasons, we're supporting the Budget Increase option, which aligns with our commitment to decentralized infrastructure development and community-driven governance.

After careful review, we only cast votes for the grant proposals mentioned in Part1 and Part2 You can find the full details on the forum post.

We voted for the application of Twyne 50k MORPHO, based on our criteria such as significance of proposed solution, uniqueness, and team backgrounds. You can find the full details on the forum post.

We voted for the 4 applications below, based on our criteria such as significance of proposed solution, uniqueness, and team backgrounds. - Bleu Builders (Hook) 25k MORPHO - Stake DAO 25k MORPHO - Ojo 5k MORPHO - Unicord 15k MORPHO You can find the full details on the forum post.

We believe it makes sense to execute a sweep stored by the Nova transactions as discussed in the previous proposal that we already supported. We also believe bundling the Timeboost change and this proposal should make sense for their onchain voting.

We recognize that this measure is necessary to secure the fund for the ENS community activities.

We voted in favor of this proposal as we agree with the direction of establishing a structured framework to support grant delivery and ensuring appropriate compensation for those efforts. However, we believe there are significant areas for improvement in the reward structure and role distribution, as we outlined in our comment. Given our experience in grant operations at Tané, we are eager to actively contribute to this area, including potential participation in the committee.

Properly pursuing investment returns is essential for CoW DAO’s long-term sustainability, and allocating these resources to the Core Treasury team aligns with that objective. We trust karpatkey’s proven track record to responsibly manage the treasury and drive meaningful value back to the DAO.

We acknowledge the points outlined below and cast our vote in favor of this proposal. The ultimate goal of ENS is to provide services in a long-term sustainable manner. Securing self-sufficient funding sources is crucial for ENS's continued operation. Moving forward, we hope to see the management pursue higher revenue performance.

We support this proposal as it enhances governance flexibility. It is expected to enable adjustments such as lowering the COMP requirement to encourage small holders' participation, raising the quorum to strengthen security, and modifying voting delay and period for faster decision-making and greater fairness. These improvements make governance more adaptable and inclusive.

Introducing the AssetListFactory removes contract size constraints, allowing flexible collateral additions for mainnet’s principal markets (USDC, USDT, USDS). This expansion is expected to boost liquidity and strengthen competitiveness, with OpenZeppelin’s audit concerns already addressed. Given strong community support and manageable risks, I believe the benefits outweigh any potential downsides. Thus, a favorable vote is justified.

We support the proposal to implement Safe Harbor because it improves the protocol’s emergency response by enabling swift action from whitehat hackers. This helps reduce the risk of fund losses during blackhat attacks. Additionally, since this implementation does not require additional costs, it is a beneficial upgrade to the existing bug bounty program without imposing financial burdens.

1. CSM: Enable Permissionless Phase, Increase the Share Limit and Increase the Priority Exit Threshold We reaffirm our support for this proposal, consistent with our previous stance on Snapshot. We believe that fully opening CSM to the public will significantly enhance both Lido’s and Ethereum’s decentralization. 2. NO Acquisitions: Bridgetower is now part of Solstice Staking We continue to support this proposal, just as we did during the snapshot. We see no negative impact on operational quality or on Lido’s geographical dispersion, given that the operational structure will remain the same.

Establishing the Ecosystem BORG Foundation clarifies accountability by consolidating decisions around external partnerships, cross-chain integrations, and institutional outreach within a single entity. This separation from protocol-focused tasks makes it easier to trace responsibility for strategic ecosystem decisions, benefiting both Lido DAO and external partners through greater transparency.

We see a clear advantage in establishing a dedicated entity for managing protocol development and governance, as it creates a single, accountable structure for critical activities. We believe this will foster transparent decision-making and reduce operational risks for contributors and the community.

The proposed changes do not appear to introduce any concerns regarding operational quality or compromise the network’s geographical diversity. Consequently, there is no compelling reason to oppose Attestant’s continued participation under the new ownership structure.

We see no reason for concern regarding this transition, given that the on-premise setup and the core team appear to stay exactly the same, indicating no decline in operational quality nor negative impact on Lido’s geographical decentralization.

We agree with the proposal to replace Tim Beiko with Eric Siu and to allow the council to make such personnel changes without requiring DAO approval, as long as the process is transparent. We believe it is important for the DAO to retain the authority to exercise personnel rights over the council. The introduction of a notice period is meaningful and helps ensure proper transitions. As noted by @Alex_L, this notice period is expected to be properly implemented. However, one concern is that this was not explicitly stated in the Snapshot proposal. We hope that future proposals will clearly specify such details to maintain transparency and clarity.

Morpho’s current TVL growth rate has been outpacing that of other major protocols, even after some reward reduction. We believe that lowering costs at this stage will not hinder Morpho’s overall trajectory and will free resources for future investment.

Based on our first-hand experience in the Lido DAO, implementing the GOOSE (Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise) for the DAO to be aligned on what the DAO should focus on, we believe this is the right approach to make the DAO move into its execution mode after setting the MVP. We also appreciate the carefully structured process and an additional consideration to incorporate partial recommendations utilizing the appropriate tool (which was our concern in the GOOSE process) As it’s discussed by @404DAO, and its trade-off is recognized by others, incentivizing the submissions from a variety of delegates/contributors would be the key to receiving as many great proposals as possible, otherwise the objective setting process feels “centralized” in the end. It would be interesting to consider what non-financial benefits can be awarded for the submitters of the competitive SOSs.

We appreciate the ongoing efforts of the ArbitrumHub team. While we see the value in a centralized and regularly updated portal for Arbitrum DAO-related information, relying on a third-party team for its maintenance presents significant challenges and unnecessary costs. A more effective approach would be to align with existing initiatives like GRC and its dashboard or contribute to the Foundation’s team managing the main Arbitrum site. Otherwise, long-term discoverability and maintainability could become problematic.

CoW Protocol has already shown steady growth and needs a sustainable revenue structure. We believe that balancing user benefits with the protocol's financial health is the right move for fostering ongoing innovation and resilience.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 7 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

In these assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, which may be insufficient to meet demand. From a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps appears necessary.

We think creating a bounty program is the best way to tackle fund misuse in the DAO. It’s a practical approach that empowers the DAO to help keep things accountable. We appreciate Entropy to step up to take the initiative. All the key concerns raised have been addressed clearly, and the trial phase gives room for improvements. This is a solid step toward stronger transparency and trust in the ecosystem.

We believe that both Pablo and Guillaume have ample experience and expertise through their work on DeFi projects like Angle and Merkl, making them well-qualified to serve as multisig signers.

We believe curators are a key factor in Morpho’s competitiveness and must be appropriately incentivized, so we support the proposal’s move to exclude those who fail to meet a relative threshold that reflects Morpho’s growth. We also believe that both the minimum threshold and the overall reward mechanism, including the amount of incentives, should be regularly evaluated and optimized over the long term.

First, this integration itself is a significant initiative to enhance DeFi accessibility, and it makes sense to increase incentives to boost deposits in preparation for rising borrowing demand. Since increased borrowing demand can also lead to greater deposit demand, setting the incentive at 50% of the usual rate seems reasonable.

Described in the note

We maintain the support made at its Snapshot phase and continuously support the technical advancement in the Arbitrum ecosystem. Same goes to the Infura Nova validator whitelisting.

Considering the governance efficiencies introduced by SEP 49, the shift aligns well with the DAO's evolving needs. Additionally, given that each Sprint spans four weeks, which is a relatively long cycle, allowing all proposal types to be addressed in every Sprint significantly enhances Safe DAO's responsiveness to time-sensitive topics.

We have already supported this proposal in the snapshot vote and did the same in this onchain vote. We believe that clarifying various rules like these will make the Uniswap DAO more transparent and open.

As stated for the previous snapshot vote, we believe this proposal is essential for enhancing Uniswap’s security and ensuring effective responses during critical situations.

We appreciate Devan and the committee members for their diligent executions and reporting in the initial STEP. The estimated annual yield, $875k from the $30 million endowment isn’t particularly impressive, but it should have played a good role in the Arbitrum RWA ecosystem. On condition that this is the last term of the STEP, considering other treasury diversification programs are planned, we support the continuation of the program with a great selection of the established actors in the committee and a reasonable budget.

We believe it's beneficial to start from research and understand what builders want for the ecosystem by learning from other ecosystems.

This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 6 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary.

This proposal aims to enhance liquidity and capital efficiency by increasing supply caps for key assets and adjusting interest rate curves for Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets. While we support these changes as they address growing demand and align with market conditions, we recommend providing additional data, such as utilization trends, to validate the necessity of these adjustments.

We keep supporting this proposal for the same reasons as its Snapshot vote, and we are looking to see the growth driven by this combined incentive program.

Same as its Snapshot vote, we believe the amount requested seems reasonable considering the TVL and the expected growth of the Celo ecosystem.

We believe a sudden, one-shot reward reduction could unexpectedly trigger a steep TVL decline, so a phased approach lets us monitor and respond quickly if TVL decreases beyond expectations. While the estimated $600k cost for this multi-stage method based on our calculation is a concern, we view it as a reasonable trade-off compared to the risk of losing a significant portion of our accumulated TVL at once.

We support this proposal because Sonic demonstrates significant growth potential and offers a dynamic environment suitable for a $250k incentive. Furthermore, its robust infrastructure, high throughput, and continued developer-focused efforts position Sonic as an emerging ecosystem where Uniswap can expand its market share. With these points in mind, we cast our vote in favor of this proposal.

This proposal improves capital efficiency by increasing supply caps and aligns interest rate curves with market demand. These changes enhance liquidity, promote competitiveness, and support the protocol’s adaptability in a dynamic market.

We have voted in favor of this proposal, as we believe it enhances Uniswap DAO’s capital efficiency and ensures we do not miss opportunities to grow the DAO’s market share. We also look forward to the continued activities of the Uniswap Growth Program.

We oppose this proposal. Compared to other chains that have received incentives in the past, Metal’s TVL is still small, and we feel that granting 250k in incentives is not appropriate. While it is indeed important for Uniswap to build market share across various chains, we believe incentives should align with each chain’s growth stage. From that perspective, Metal has not yet reached a point where allocating 250k in incentives to gain market share is justified, and thus we have voted against this proposal.

We support this proposal. Considering Celo’s TVL and its track record of collaboration with Uniswap, a $250k incentive alongside a $105k deployment cost appears to be a reasonable budget. Additionally, matching incentives from Celo itself is a welcome move. We look forward to seeing this proposal drive greater Uniswap share and activity on the Celo network.

The US-based ENS service provider, eth.limo requests a reimbursement of its ongoing legal fees. They have already spent over 24k USD to correspond to US federal requests. We recognize this proposal as the necessary cost for Limo, a service provider headquartered in the US, to continue providing services to ENS.

Preparation for CoW protocol's expansion to other chains in the coming years is essential. While it would have been ideal to maintain the same address without changes, given the technical constraints, this proposal represents a necessary and practical step forward.

As highlighted in CIP-58, expansion remains a critical theme. This proposal constitutes a core component of that strategy. We found no significant objections or concerns to address in this proposal.

The decision to pursue various forms of expansion next year is highly reasonable, given the current state of the products and their position in the market. Considering this, the proposed budget size is also appropriate, and budget management has been handled properly.

We support this proposal because it is critical for strengthening Uniswap’s security and provides the necessary budget and guidelines to achieve that goal. By protecting whitehat hackers and offering them proper incentives, we believe this approach will safeguard Uniswap’s customer assets.

This proposal optimizes interest rate curves for select Comets and adjusts COMP rewards to align with market needs. By refining borrowing and supply incentives, it ensures efficient liquidity provision while curbing excessive spending. This targeted approach supports sustainability and competitiveness across chains.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

It allows Morpho’s core team to focus on protocol deployment while Oku provides a valuable initiative on the frontend. Although $400k is a significant amount, we believe it will be justified through user onboarding and incentive programs to be realized that attract users on L2 and alt-L1 ecosystems. For future proposals of this nature, whether submitted by GFXlabs or other contributors, it would be beneficial to design a compensation scheme that aligns the incentives of the proposer with those of the Morpho DAO as Leuts suggested. Ideally, the compensation for contributors like GFXlabs should be more directly tied to measurable performance outcomes, such as the growth in TVL driven by the Oku frontend initiative.

This allows the core team to focus solely on the deployment of the core protocol, significantly reducing their workload related to crosschain deployments. Additionally, by encouraging external developers to create independent frontends on specific chains, the framework fosters flexible user experiences and facilitates the addition of unique features tailored to individual ecosystems.

The proposed changes appear to maintain a sufficiently competitive yield compared to key competitors, ensuring user attraction while optimizing costs. With more detailed data expected early next year, we look forward to contributing to future discussions on incentive design that are grounded in robust data analysis.

Supporting the liquidity of the MORPHO token contributes to the stable growth of the project. Combined with Uni v3, which is already whitelisted on Base, we expect this to improve the overall liquidity of the MORPHO token across Base.

We support the initiative to unify the Mission, Vision, and Purpose of the Arbitrum DAO. This foundational step will enable the DAO to craft and execute appropriate strategies, aligned with a to-be-determined Strategic Objective Setting, ensuring that stakeholders work cohesively toward shared goals. Drawing inspiration from successful implementations like Lido’s MVP and GOOSE initiatives, this proposal has the potential to align contributors and DAO participants effectively. We appreciate the Purpose statement for its clarity in defining why the DAO exists—it is well-articulated and resonates strongly. While the Mission provides a direction for what the DAO should do in the mid-term, its reference to “the best onchain world” could benefit from more specificity. Similarly, the Vision is thought-provoking but somewhat ambiguous, as the term “the universal shift” might need further clarification. Additionally, the emphasis on “onchain” in both the Mission and Vision could unintentionally exclude projects that bridge “offchain” and “onchain” ecosystems. However, we recognize that clear focus is crucial for defining the DAO’s trajectory. If these statements are widely agreed upon by the DAO participants, settling on them and executing aligned strategies is a meaningful and necessary step forward.

We support the overall direction of the initiative and greatly appreciate the effort, as well as the articulate and well-thought-out proposal by @Entropy. We recognize the value of an OpCo or its equivalent, as highlighted by @WintermuteGovernance. Our experience with dYdX governance reinforces our belief that such structures are critical and practical solutions for maturing DAOs with a broad base of stakeholders and delegates, like Arbitrum. However, we also have concerns regarding the size and budget of The OAT. While the OAT has hiring as its important task in the beginning, its key mandate should focus on observing and overseeing OpCo’s activities. In this context, having five members seems excessive. Additionally, bonus compensation should be outcome-based rather than granted simply for remaining in their positions.

We maintain our vote and reasoning at the Snapshot stage and continue to support the initiative while being a little skeptical about the success of the projects itself. Regarding the details of the capital commitment, we believe they could have been clarified and communicated better, but we appreciate the fact that the RnDAO team has committed their effort to the success of the builders for the Arbitrum ecosystem and consider it acceptable. We hope the team learnt from the failure of the previous experiment described in the Entropy’s rationale and will support the selected teams to further grow within the Arbitrum ecosystem.

We believe this proposal enhances Uniswap’s security and operational resilience, while the agreement’s bounty structure is both reasonable and beneficial for users.

We appreciate @ostanescu.eth for the proposal first. We look forward to the presence from Arbitrum at ETH Bucharest! However, we can’t justify the funding as we echo @BlockworksResearch 's opinion on “the DAO Events budget should remain for Arbitrum-specific events” in addition to other concerns from delegates on the budgets and use of the Questbook grants and wouldn’t support this proposal as it stands.

This is the resubmission of the ZIP-001 that we already supported and voted for.

We support the defense mechanism to protect the liquidity of the JitoSol while wondering if there is any other way to prevent this from happening rather than putting on fees on those “toxic” flows.

We maintain the voting and rationale made at the Snapshot stage and also look forward to OpCo being in charge of the initiative going forward. We also echo @pedrob 's points on “being very difficult for THE DAO to reject recommendations from the selected council members” and would still like to see a more automated solution for the treasury management with a clarified and articulated IPS being agreed on by the DAO.

1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address.

We believe that the requested amount is reasonable compared to previous grants and it aligns with Lido's goals. Delivering dual governance and permissionless CSM is essential, and we look forward to seeing these milestones achieved and the next initiatives proposed.

This is a significant step towards improving decentralization for both Lido and the broader Ethereum ecosystem. Allowing CSM to become fully permissionless while carefully managing risks is a sensible and desirable approach to expand its scale and impact.

This appropriately aligns the Standard Node Operator Protocol (SNOP) with the evolving landscape of new Staking Modules, ensuring policies remain relevant, particularly regarding exit processes. Clarifying the recovery process for Node Operators (NOs) to return to in good standing should reduce participation barriers and encourages broader engagement.

This proposal aligns with GOOSE-2 vision of diversifying product lines to expand stETH adoption, leveraging external resources through the Lido Alliance. Projects like Mellow Protocol already demonstrate strong growth potential, and the budget appears reasonable.

As Tané, we are pleased to contribute to the Lido DAO through making this proposal with Lido DAO Ops. By extending the voting duration, as outlined, we believe it will reduce the burden on participants, enabling safer and more efficient governance.

We are excited to observe this experimental initiative managed by Butter and Uniswap Foundation and look forward to seeing the details of the project in coming months.

It’s critical to hyper-focus on the important metric with other parties aligned. Less budget allocated makes sense as the superchain grants are out of scope from this season.

We support the Security Council requests and owns its budget from the governance, and operate for the governance. The appropriate compensation balance between the lead and the members can be revisited in the next season.

The existence of the council has been discussed since the last season and it makes sense for us to dissolve it as the Foundation suggests it will be independent from the power dynamics of the Token House.

We support the transition of the M&M to an own council to operate under its own budget. The scope of the work is reasonable and Jun from PGov is a great lead to manage the council.

We support the budget request and changes to the scope of the DAB as the DAB has been critical in the operations of the Grants Council and contributions to the Collective.

We support the audacious changes to the structure of the council based on the careful considerations on the feedback and learnings in the Season 6. We continue to support the contributions from the Grants Council and other structures in the Collective.

We believe the Collective still needs this structure to keep the health of the governance.

We believe hyper-focus on an important north star metric is critical for all the parties involved for the Superchain growth.

All the proposed changes that are the chain derivation changes, the EIP-1559 elasticity parameter change and the MIPS related changes look reasonable and make sense, to be staged for the future major upgrades. The failure mode analysis provided for these changes is well-thought-out while these changes are not audited according to the Audit Framework.

Great to see this function to be live soon with diligent testings

Maintaining a high level of solver competition is essential to preserving CoW’s competitive edge. With the right incentives, the protocol can continue providing optimal services to its users.

To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for Limes, an experienced Steward with high time commitment, Slobo, another experienced Steward, and cap, whose knowledge and experience as a Dapps Builder is expected to be valuable in future Namechain and other L2 platforms. Although these three have significantly different backgrounds, we expect that this diversity will promote new ideas in the ENS Ecosystem.

To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for the two current experienced Stewards and sovereignsignal, who excel in Grant management. We expect that with current Stewards and experienced new members, new improvement ideas for ENS Public Goods will be promoted.

We will abstain from voting for one of the candidates. However, if we were to select two candidates other than ourselves, we would recommend the two experienced Stewards.

We believe it is reasonable to make the decisive judgment to discontinue this feature, understanding that it is expected to be short-lived for v2.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

This proposal also addresses the need to adjust COMP rewards to better align with market dynamics. By reducing borrow-side COMP rewards, it aims to curb excessive spending and promote a more sustainable incentive structure. Meanwhile, maintaining robust supply-side rewards ensures continued liquidity provision and supports the protocol’s competitiveness in attracting suppliers. This balanced approach reflects the evolving needs of the market while preserving the protocol's long-term stability.

This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing.

Both of the security service providers are very strong candidates without doubt and qualified for the role. Slightly favored in OpenZeppelin because of the competitive hourly fee and experience as the V1 contributions and context around the vision and challenges.

With the top-class researchers and experiences in the blockchain industry, @Nethermind stands out as a key candidate for the Risk role. They have been involved in the Arbitrum as a member of the STEP committee and surely provide the critical contributions to the ARDC V2.

With the ongoing involvement for the Arbitrum research projects and contributions, we chose @BlockworksResearch and @CastleCapital (with Llama Research). Having @Messari as a prominent crypto research institution (and complementary marketing support) is definitely a plus for the Arbitrum DAO.

Operations: Entropy + Tamara we are grateful to see Entropy being involved with the operations, and working with a promising DAO operator, Tamara. Communications: Frisson and JuanRah + Alex Lumley. @Frisson has been a critical delegate and representative of Tally which is a vital tool for the Arbitrum DAO with great communication and coordination skills. We are impressed with the background and involvement with the Arbitrum DAO from @Juanrah and believe a great addition to the council with @AlexLumley involvement.

We vote for Renew with 5 domains (adding Orbit) . With a good structure and system, Questbook to target the right audience to provide the grants for the Arbitrum ecosystem. the Arbitrum D.A.O. (while we don’t necessarily like the naming of it as it’s confusing with DAO) should continue with the new addition for the important offering of the Arbitrum ecosystem, Orbit. We appreciate @maxlomu 's contribution to the Orbit domain grants as well.

While we haven’t received a clear answer to the compensation structure in our comment below, we agree with the general direction of the concept and this proposal should go for an onchain vote. We also believe the DAO should pay governance analysts and program contributors, but there should be a compensation structure that is aligned with what the program can achieve with clear goal that comes with the KPIs. While being challenging to set the right KPIs to monitor the ongoing impact from the governance fellows, it’s critical to design the program to dare to address the ultimate issues that the DAO has. [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp Proposals

Having transaction simulations available at the time of Snapshot submission, which can be verified, contributes to enhanced governance security. The other proposed changes also appear to be generally reasonable.

We recognize the clear risks of relying on external protocols that are not immutable for the Optimizer. While the current TVL is approximately $500M, we believe this decision is essential to safeguard the growth of Morpho Blue and maintain the Morpho brand accordingly.

We support this proposal as it enables Morpho to secure a low 7-figure fee, even though the exact amount is undisclosed. Additionally, it does not place an excessive burden on the contributors’ resources.

We believe that Ethereum’s rollup-centric roadmap makes it strategically important to secure a significant position in the largest rollup ecosystem over the medium to long term. Therefore, incentives on Base should be actively increased. While this proposal represents a gradual increase, we remain open to considering more assertive approaches if deemed necessary in the future.

The introduction of a grant program is a vital step in expanding the ecosystem. Running it as a pilot program will likely reveal various challenges, and we aim to contribute meaningfully to address them.

Contributors should be fairly compensated for their efforts, and the amount proposed is reasonable and well within acceptable parameters. Importantly, the allocation process appears both transparent and proper.

The change makes sense to improve the user experience with the Security Council oversight in place.

We believe that rules enhancing the transparency and public nature of the Uniswap DAO, and making DAO governance by delegates fairer, are important for the DAO. We agree with these principles, which can improve the health of the Uniswap DAO by garnering support from more delegates.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

We vote for Arbitrum and two others. We support the general direction of the initiative; it’s vital to understand what customers think about the product and ecosystem via user research. While the ARDC could cover this in an ideal world, we think it’s acceptable for another initiative like this to cover the important initiative. Eventually, the DAO should have its continuous system to work on efforts around this user research area. Without compared ecosystems to research against, the research outcome will be less valuable, thus we choose the option including two others. They should not necessarily be Solana and OP Mainnet, but can be Solana and Base, or even Solana ecosystem and Superchain ecosystem, which would be more valuable. Articulated criteria on how to choose builders for the research is critical to answer but can be further reported in the ongoing meetings (e.g. GRC) Forming a “council” does make sense but we consider it more like a review group with different stakeholders, rather than “council” that has been more operating roles within the Arbitrum DAO, to our knowledge (e.g. LTIPP council) On metagovernance topics like “why this proposal was rushed onto Snapshot?”, we should create a certain social rule on how long a proposal should be discussed before going into its Snapshot rather than arbitrarily pointing it out as it’s too short for the Snapshot phase, etc.

We acknowledge that this version of the proposal will be updated with another proposal in the near future.

Testing for the treasury transfer from the onchain voting

While it is unfortunate for CoW DAO that the solver operations will cease, even if only temporarily, this situation is unavoidable and should be addressed appropriately.　The necessary steps outlined in the thread have been properly followed prior to moving to the CIP phase, and we see no grounds for objection.

The bonding pool has been reimbursed, the root cause of the bug addressed, and the final procedures after the incident seem ready to be concluded. That said, we believe it is essential to establish more robust preventive measures against this kind of incident as shared here.

Protocol governance requires expertise, making it challenging to delegate responsibilities entirely to the community. Establishing roles like recognized delegates effectively involves experts and trusted participants, strengthening the governance system.

We believe that the proposal to introduce Compound Sandbox has the potential to realize governance efficiency, which is currently a key focus for the protocol. By allowing anyone to freely create and test markets, it decentralizes the experimentation process for new markets and reduces the overall burden on the protocol. Additionally, the process of promoting only successful markets to the main protocol simplifies the traditional steps of "proposal → discussion → voting → execution," accelerating the protocol’s overall growth.

Continuous risk monitoring is essential as Mantle pursues its strategy to expand its ecosystem through collaboration with Compound. By strengthening the connection between Compound and Mantle Network, this proposal aims to activate capital flows between the two, potentially enhancing the value of Compound itself.

This proposal is deemed appropriate as a mechanism to significantly reduce the frequency of voting and alleviate the burden on participants. It achieves a balance between efficiency and security through the introduction of timelocks and guardian roles. However, it is considered necessary to establish rules for notification to ensure transparency and implement features for referencing change histories. These measures would make it easier for participants to understand the details of changes and enhance the overall reliability of the system.

Critical protocol updates for gas optimization and maintainability with the audit done by OpenZeppelin.

Compound is experiencing growing demand in various markets, and maintaining competitiveness requires offering attractive incentives for borrowers. While high interest rates are already appealing, enhancing incentives remains a reasonable step to encourage broader protocol adoption. With appropriate adjustments, replenishing the rewards contracts is a justified appraoch.

By adding wUSDM as a new collateral asset, users can leverage arbitrage opportunities utilizing its 5% annual yield, enabling efficient asset management even in low borrow rate environments. Furthermore, as a stable collateral asset with minimal price volatility, wUSDM allows users to manage their positions efficiently while reducing risks.

We are in support of this activity, which is expected to strengthen the community and accelerate the de-centralization of the ENS DAO.

We understand that the substantial contents of EP5.25 are already approved, and there is no practical change. We support the continued and stable activities by the established working groups.

1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address.

With a high degree of operational maturity, it is reasonable to improve efficiency through the introduction of an optimistic governance process. As a participant in governance, we support this proposal and will carefully monitor it to ensure that the committee functions correctly within this framework.

We voted for sunsetting Lido on Polygon, because - The future direction of the Polygon POS chain, especially its position within Polygon's AggLayer, is unclear. - Growth is difficult due to factors beyond the control of Shard Labs and Lido DAO. - Instead, the entire Lido DAO could focus on businesses that leverage stETH, which has some huge advantages in the market.

We voted for this proposal, because - Even when an incident has occurred, it is proper to take corrective measures and gradually resume operations. - This principle remains universal, even in the case of acquisition. - By thoroughly testing through a trial run on the testnet, a certain level of safety can be ensured. That being said, we believe it's worth regularly reviewing and discussing the possibility of replacing curated NOs —　not just those with prior incidents — to neutrally consider if there are other NOs more suitable for the curated set.

Similar to Bware Labs' case, we do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Its operational structure after the acquisition was announced to remain the same as before the acquisition.

We do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Bware Labs itself announced the continuity of its operational structure after acquisition.

We generally agree with the overall direction of Hasu's proposal, and thus voted for this proposal. However, we still have a concern regarding the main focus of the goal #1, Strengthen LDO’s Role in Governance. We acknowledge the importance of strengthening alignment across the DAO through revisions to the LDO token design. But given the presence of other challenges and the likelihood that implementing changes to the LDO token design will take considerable time, we do not believe it should be prioritized as the most critical theme in governance at this stage.

Clear guidelines ensures solvers conduct transactions appropriately, protecting user interests, the protocol and this DAO. This will be safeguards for potential damages in exceptional cases.

During its trial period, the GWG achieved clear results, such as improving voter participation and resolving quorum issues. This proposal offers practical ideas to solve important challenges in Compound governance, such as a new delegate reward program and better transparency in fund management.

This action strengthens the community’s commitment to user protection and increases trust in the protocol. While the return involves a 10% penalty and a reduction in reserves, it follows a transparent and fair process. This ensures that accidental transfers are handled clearly, improving the protocol’s reputation as user-friendly while balancing user protection and protocol sustainability.

Since LINK and UNI exhibit high volatility, the revision of the Liquidation Factor and Collateral Factor enables faster liquidations, reducing the platform's loss risk. Additionally, raising the liquidation penalty incentivizes liquidators, making the process more efficient and improving risk management. Furthermore, as the utilization rates of the supply caps are significantly low, reducing the supply caps is unlikely to negatively impact market liquidity or borrowing demand. The impact on positions with increased liquidation risk is also limited, making this proposal reasonable.

We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme. Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative.

The current APR for stablecoins on Compound is lower compared to Sky Protocol. However, deploying the USDS market and listing sUSDS can address this issue. The upgrade of Dai has the potential to attract more users and increase liquidity. Deploying the USDS market presents an opportunity for Compound to benefit from these advantages.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our opinions made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the new term of the ARDC. The funding amount was lower than the one we voted for, but with the recent price appreciation, it’s matched what we believe is the best.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our position made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the idea of establishing the 2025 events budget for the smooth budgeting process with a clear framework.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

It’s critical program to grow the ZKsync ecosystem at this stage.

This proposal offers advantages based on the high liquidity and reliability of FRAX, as well as the opportunity for users to leverage their assets for greater returns. Since the APY of $sFRAX is linked to the U.S. IORB rate, it is expected to provide a stable yield aligned with economic conditions, making it an attractive source of income for users. Additionally, it adds more options for collateral on Compound, helping users diversify their portfolios.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound.

In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary.

By listing ETHx before competing DeFi protocols, Compound is expected to enhance its competitive edge. ETHx also seems low-risk because of its careful initial settings, strong decentralization, and sufficient liquidity. However, if demand changes, these settings might need to be adjusted in the future.

The USDC and DAI reserves are high enough, so even if the market changes, funds can be taken from the Aera vault to cover it. This proposal shows careful risk management that stays within safe limits.

The user bases of both Compound and Mantle are expected to expand. Also, Mantle Treasury holds substantial assets and it is expected to benefit from the growth of the Mantle ecosystem.

It’s been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.

Using wUSDM as collateral allows users to arbitrage yields even when borrow rates are low. Additionally, since USDM is available on multiple chains, Compound can expand its user base, increase liquidity, and improve risk diversification.

We support this proposal. Our questions regarding the budget and the proposal’s objectives have been addressed by @dennisonb. Tally is an essential service for Uniswap’s DAO governance, and we are in favor of providing this funding.

Adjusting the IR curve is a flexible approach in response to market demand. Additionally, reducing excessive incentive spending would ease the financial burden on the protocol. Through these adjustments, it could reduce the risk of excessive utilization, balancing ease of use for users with the protocol’s profitability.

This proposal is expected to meet the incressing market demand, enhance protocol stability, and improving user experience.

Compared to other promising candidates, they are on the border of being chosen. With a limited amount of the VP we have, we use our 100% VP to support them. We would also vote for gzeon, Emiliano Bonassi, Immunefi and Dennison Bertram.

The charter has clarified criteria that the Standard Rollups should adhere to.

We believe it's an important step to more decentralization of the governance. The next big step would be to allow DAO members to permissionlessly create proposals and we should discuss how to achieve them.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and acknowledge two concerns are appropriately addressed after the Snapshot. We believe Stylus is the key innovation that the Arbitrum ecosystem should push forward and are looking forward to the success of this program.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team.

While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report 1, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it’s difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we’re looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities. For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author’s recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with.

While we acknowledge various concerns related to this program, we support the experimental nature of it and rely on the judgement and evaluations done by the selected program members. As GFX mentioned, the budget wouldn’t be used if the token swap doesn’t make sense. We see similar programs done by other DAOs while they are not necessarily proven successful yet. Many pointed out the risks, but there will be potential upsides that the DAO can take from this program and we believe it’s worth looking into. We would request changes if it goes to the onchain though: 1) as other delegates suggested, the lock-in period should be longer like 2-years for Arbitrum and target protocols to be aligned for the long term. 2) considering the experimental nature of the program, the compensations should be somehow split into an advance as the minimum base, and retroactive rewards based on successful token swap cases, otherwise, the program would pay out much expense without any success case (or lead to unnecessary pressure to the members to make some token swap happen.)

We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and continue to monitor the progress of the program.

We strongly support this proposal, especially since we believe that accommodating more than four chains approved by its Snapshot one is essential, even more so than during the previous vote.

Preconfirmation has been a hot topic around Ethereum staking and was also the initial scope in reGOOSE, so this kind of initiative makes sense. However, it is still unclear to what extent Lido DAO should support preconfirmation, and this should become clear after thorough research such as Nethermind's research on preconf's economic viability.

Currently, we want to grow both SDVT and CSM, and this seems like a very fair decision because the point incentives provided for SDVT's growth can also be utilized to incentivize deposits to CSM. In the future, it would make sense to have a separate vault for CSM, following the roadmap of Staking Router development, and let the market decide which staking module to be in favor.

We voted to recognize this bridge as canonical after checking the audits were done for these implementations. This should lead to the further expansion of stETH.Since the safety and effectiveness of code audits can vary depending on factors such as the auditor, reviews and checks like those performed by @TheDZhon are extremely helpful in enhancing security.

We supported all three of the proposals listed above. Especially, approving CSM is an important step toward enhancing the decentralization of Lido and Ethereum, and we didn’t find any issues with supporting them. We also acknowledge that the audits have been done by Ackee Blockchain and MixBytes. Everything seems on track, so we support this proposal as we have before.

By establishing a program like this, the DAO can effectively communicate with projects interested in collaborating with Uniswap and execute the initiatives for users, which we believe will impact Uniswap’s market share. Additionally, we believe that incorporating a trial period is crucial for forming a new organization. We acknowledge that the objectives for business development and marketing are clearly defined, and we feel that our previous concerns regarding the KPIs have been addressed.

While we have some concerns about the quality of the executions and outcome from this initiative, we consider it worth a try to focus on aligning the DAO’s key members with the strategic directions that the DAO needs to tackle going forward.

We maintain the support at the Snapshot stage and look forward to the transition of the RARI DAO governance onto Arbitrum with additional treatments like offsetting the cost of bridging and potential incentives for the transition.

We maintain the support made in the Snapshot phase and acknowledge that lack of transparency is largely due to the nature of partnership discussions and the protection for the competitive edge. We will review the special section dedicated to this partnership funds in the future transparency reports.

We value the consistent financial support to the whole Ethereum ecosystem by ENS DAO given that ENS's future is tightly knitted to the development of the ecosystem and that ENS DAO is highly profitable when compared with other major DAOs. This is a contribution that few DAOs can afford to, and thus very meaningful.

This is also where continuity matters as this will give reliability to the ENS as a platform to build something upon from builders' perspective. We see some unique and exciting projects that received grants such as 3DNS. It seems that grants are distributed in a desirable way.

This is necessary, just like for other working groups, and should be approved without question unless there are significant changes or significant needs for changes. We believe there's no problem with approving it this time.

We are opposed to this proposal. Our reason is that, compared to other chains, and considering that Lisk’s TVL is mostly composed of the LSK token, even when taking into account the promised $1 million in POL and the $250,000 Lisk incentive matching, we believe that the $375,000 incentive is too large. Gnosis Chain, which had a TVL of $300 million at the time of its proposal, was allocated $250,000 in the Onboarding Package via Snapshot. We also believe that Lisk Chain’s TVL is smaller compared to Linea and Scroll, which received $250,000 in incentives through the Onboarding Package. We think it would be better to reconsider this proposal on a smaller scale.

We maintain our stance made in the Snapshot phase and continue to support the change after having reviewed the report by the ARDC.

We maintain our support from the Snapshot voting for the “Panda Partners” tier sponsorship of the event. We believe in the direct mission alignment between the Arbitrum ecosystem and the Attackathon and the donation amount is reasonable.

1. stETH on L2 We support this proposal as it enhances the accessibility of stETH across L2 networks, leveraging existing wstETH infrastructure. This expansion will provide users with a consistent experience across both L1 and L2. 2. Organize the Lido Alliance Program as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent BORG We support setting up an EasyTrack for the Lido Alliance Operational Multisig to simplify operations. The approved BORG entity provides a legal framework for agreements without exposing Lido DAO to legal risks. This structure keeps Lido DAO decentralized while supporting the Alliance’s needs, with EasyTrack improving fund management.

We maintain our decision made at its Snapshot voting phase and appreciate the additional information added to the proposal. We also appreciate the future effort to make sure that there will be elections before the next phase of the committee with potential collaborations with Entropy and/or other suitable entities.

Worth trying to attract applications to tackle this request

We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee.

We vote for Use ENS txt records on Snapshot. This change leads to a better accessibility of the metadata for the toolings in the ecosystem, without additional cost. We believe it’s acceptable to utilize the ENS records for the information.

We appreciate the potential value to be provided by the research from TogetherCrew team without cost from the DAO treasury. However, we are not certain that the DAO is the one to decide whether the API access to Discord is allowed, while most of the Discourse data is public and much related to discussions around the DAO. Either way, we support the concept and its modified implementation that addresses the concerns from the delegates and related parties.

We consider this as a simple oversight during the process and it’s natural to allow the provider with great track record to properly operate the validator as a Nova validator.

Eth.link has been used by various projects to provide access to ENS and IPFS sites. It has been utilized by some of the largest projects in the space, including Uniswap. It is important for ENS to responsibly maintain such a highly public domain, which is crucial not only for ENS but also for the Ethereum ecosystem as a whole.

We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP.

We believe adding (rather than changing) the functionality in proposing executable ENS proposals with a required bond mechanism is the right approach and the proposed initial values are reasonable. As Kent pointed out, we assume the frontends can utilize the additional changes provided by this proposal for the onchain tools to be supported by multiple platforms while the development is approved by the DAO to go ahead.

If you think about the Foundation as a service provider, they have done tremendous work so far including bringing strategic partnerships, to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Expanding more partnerships to compete other networks with more budget from the party with great track record makes total sense. However, as already pointed out, the transparency of the program and its reporting should be treated as the important deliverables to be promised by the Foundation. We also suggest the proposal to provide more break-downs of the budget with detailed objectives and plans before its onchain voting.

We appreciate all the work so far and effort to improve the program even further with a new system and established structure that apparently works for the objective. While there is an increase in spending from the DAO perspective, we believe the new V1.5 system has been designed well and ready to be experimented with administration support from the SEED team. The program lasts for 12 months but we like the fact that the details of the program can be modified based on the results that we will see.

We support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives.

As discussed separately with Klaus, this is a great update at this moment, and you can prepare for the 2025 event planning with other initiatives ahead into 2025. Looking forward to the GovHack Devcon!

We believe the GovHack will cover what this program has to provide in part and the only possible format to differentiate from the other offline event form is online events, but they have to be clearly designed, focused, promoted and executed with a much lower budget, which is challenging.

While the DAO needs to address the issue around the conversation between the fiat and ARB token, we agree that the initial promise and contract with service providers should be respected and followed through with funds compensated by the treasury. Now, it’s more critical to execute the program than delaying the operations.

We maintain our stance in the comment posted before and continue to support the progress of the development of Timeboost. We have also support the adjustments around a few parameters to be adjustable by Offchain Labs to fine-tune the design and achieve the stability, user experience and economics for the Arbitrum DAO. Also, interested in the future improvement partnering with the Espresso team.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

We believe all the options ranked high by the council deserve to accept applications within this cycle's budget

Abstain due to our role as a Grants Council member

We believe the selection is a great mix of members who has relevant experiences and expertises to serve as the Security Council

We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

While the request itself seems totally valid and we expressed the support, we have resolved to respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. We apologize for the wrong signal made before realizing the Detox is in effect for the extension.

We appreciate all the work and comprehensive report provided for the Phase I and continuous effort to be made by the experienced actors in the area. However, we echo the concerns by other delegates on bigger scopes and higher compensations to each party (2.5x from the one in Phase I). Also, the detailed breakdown of the budget, especially the below part should be explicitly clarified in the proposal.

We maintain the support made in the comment before and appreciate RARI Foundation’s plan to offset the cost of bridging and implement potential incentives for its smoother transition.

We believe Stylus is an ambitious, yet reasonable innovation that Offchain Labs has developed to make Arbitrum even more attractive to Rust and C++ developers and it’s important to generate momentum of its use within the developer community to have attractive applications and toolings on the Arbitrum ecosystem, thus the program like this is timely, crucial and much needed. We also agree that having an Evaluation Committee is selected by the program manager from the beginning with Stylus experts, but it would be better to have consideration to include contributors who are familiar with the grants as it’s basically another grants program focusing on a particular type of applications on the ecosystem. Entropy can play a role in that perspective, but as other delegates pointed out, possibly a few grants/incentive-providing experts like JoJo can be involved. We also believe that conducting proper marketing campaigns about the program is the key. There doesn’t seem to be an explicit budget allocation to that point, but we would want the program manager to consider it to be included before its onchain ratification.

We fully support increasing both the number of committee members and working hours per member because the committee that has more responsibilities and commitments should greatly benefit the DAO. We also believe it’s crucial for the current members to continue serving on the committee, given their contributions so far. We look forward to seeing their continued efforts. The compensation for the overtime work in Season 2 is fair and necessary, and we consider the additional funding to be justified. The proposed budget for the committee’s compensations in the upcoming season is essential and should be approved. We would love to start supporting the committee even more in the future.

We believe this rebalancing is necessary due to the fluctuation of the UNI token price. We would suggest that the committee should consider adding some buffer for the future programs to the budget so that the DAO doesn’t have to vote on rebalancing again.

we maintain the rational made for its Snapshot and support the proposal to make a significant impact by applying those changes and monitoring the data.

While we agree that the Ethereum Foundation’s attacathon is trying to solve an important problem, we don’t feel strongly about the significance of sponsorship with such a large sum of money from the Uniswap DAO.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

We recognize the strategic importance of the Lido Alliance and the need for a legal structure to facilitate agreements in its operations. The BORG structure provides a balanced approach, offering legal capabilities without directly exposing Lido DAO to potential legal risks. At the same time, we’d love to contribute to gradual improvements such as increasing transparency and appropriately handling such projects as Lido DAO.

As shared in the Snapshot page, the responses from both CryptoManufaktur and Galaxy indicate that there will be no significant changes in the key factors listed above, at least for the short term. This strongly suggests that the quality of the node operation by Galaxy will remain consistent with what CryptoManufaktur has been providing. Additionally, as a topic to be discussed in the future, we believe there’s a need for implementing a routine assessment of existing Node Operators in Lido’s Curated Module. This process would serve two crucial purposes: 1. To track any changes that may occur to Galaxy (or any other operator) in the mid/long term and regularly check their eligibility as a Node Operator in Lido’s Curated Module. 2. To identify and potentially remove Node Operators from Lido’s Curated Module that are no longer meeting the initial selection criteria, either due to changes in their operation or failure to keep up with the latest best practices of node operation. This proposed assessment process would ensure the ongoing quality and reliability of Lido’s Curated Module.

The budget was already approved and the distributions of it proposed by Alex makes sense, thus no reason to be against it. We appreciate all the contributors who are experienced in the process of LTIPP and other initiatives are compensated for their work for STIP-Bridge operations.

We believe the benefits of extending the L2 Core Time Lock delay should outweigh the downside described in the proposal and it’s reasonable as this change wouldn’t affect proposals that merely transfer funds from the treasury. We would review the planned check by the ARDC Security member before its onchain vote.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the proposal for the delegate incentives.

We would basically vote for “Panda Partners” that would give reasonable support to the initiative that contributes to the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.

The only candidate and the current lead of SC, who diligently coordinates with appropriate dev members and updates the activities.

While we have some concern on how the previous upgrade was deployed, this upgrade to fix the vulnerabilities found in the audit should be done anyway

We support this Cycle 2 proposal that allows new delegates like us to apply for and contribute to the DAO governance in a potentially sustainable way. We believe it’s a positive development that the Voting Power requirement has been removed, making it easier for new delegates like us to participate in. The scoring mechanism would be iterated over and the impact the program has been making should be reviewed for the future cycle, though.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

Same as the one made for Vote #177

No doubt the DAO should implement a disclosure policy at least. On top of that, we believe the Responsible Voting Policy is best suited for the current DAO voting situation as we see it working well in the Optimism for some of its election votings. As Frisson said, ideally the DAO proposals should be passed even with abstains from delegates who have conflicts with them, but practically it’s too early to implement Strict Self-Voting Policy especially for elections.

As a temp-check, we are in support of the general direction that the DAO should take for the treasury management. We are grateful of the extensive involvement from Karpatkey and Gauntlet. We don’t necessarily agree with the requirement that the DAO needs to set up a RFP for multiple service providers to apply for; With the reasonable proposal to kick start the important functions of the DAO, the DAO should practically choose the currently available and best options. The proposal includes the Oversight Committee and reporting requirements, which should work for the DAO to diligently monitor what the initiative will have been doing. Giving too much concerns before kickstarting things off would lead to huge opportunity costs. We would only ask clearer responsibilities that the initiative will take on while having a relatively high management fee (1% vs. 0.5% on the other protocol) before the onchain voting and a possible adjustment to the size of the fund to be managed based on the current market.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot voting and continue to support the proposal as it is.

The governance process should be clearly defined in the governance document and widely known especially to proposal creators (delegate with enough VPs to create proposals) who should be guardians of enforcing the guidance defined in the governance document.

We are in favor of exploring an opportunity for delegates to effectively work on important matters in an offline environment during a big conference like DevCon. The details and execution plan should be definitely sorted out, though.

It’s critical to keep the incentivized delegates who are actively contributing to the important DAO decision makings motivated with a short-term extension. We are excited about the updated v1.1 Delegate Incentive Program as well.

We vote For Elections Only. While we acknowledge the beauty of transparency of ongoing Snapshot votes, having shielded voting for elections would outweigh the benefit which encourages voters to vote on their preferred choices rather than following the current top choices.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the deployment of Uniswap v3 on X Layer and the cost for Oku Trade deployment.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

We believe better understanding of the governance and delegates is critical for the DAO to improve its governance and evaluate the ongoing programs (e.g. Delegate Incentive Program). Regarding the overlap on the tools, we consider the proposed dashboard is more for retroactive analysis on the governance while Karma is to capture snapshots of how the delegates perform, thus they can exist and complement each other.

We maintain the directional support that was made in our comment and recognize all the changes made by incorporating the feedback from the delegates. We are excited about the power and benefits that Tally Protocol can bring and further improvements to be made on the Arbitrum DAO governance and alignments between stakeholders.

After our initial comment, there have been more clarifications, discussions and affirmations (on the cost by other data tool providers) that make this proposal appealing and we are convinced of potential returns that this analytics tools can provide in the long run. Especially the development cost of the foundation is considered reasonable and promising for future marketing uses that would lead to more developers and users on the Arbitrum ecosystem.

1. Oracle member rotation While there have been several interests from potential oracle operators, we agree to choose MatrixedLink for the rotation on this occasion as they are one of operators that have experienced the Oracle testnet run and look for more improvements to be introduced with Second Opinion Oracle project. 2. Node Operator name & reward address update This is a highly administrative matter, and we don’t have any particular objections to it. This kind of administrative approval should not need snapshot or on-chain vote. As Izzy mentioned in the forum, setting up Easy Track for this kind of case would be helpful. 3. On-Chain Delegation Having good governance is the key for DAO to be successful. However, there have been several proposals that were rejected due to the lack of the amount of votes. This implementation will enable delegating onchain voting power for LDO holders and thus more voting power can be utilized for the governance. This is an important step for strengthening Lido DAO governance.

We maintain the rationale below on this proposal and continue to support the selected members to act as the guardians of the Arbitrum Multi-sig. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/32?u=tane

We maintain our rationales below for each individual update and support a package of those updates to be deployed as "Bianca". We appreciate the proper audits on each implementation and OpenZeppelin's reviews as a part of ARDC works. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-activate-stylus-and-enable-next-gen-webassembly-smart-contracts-arbos-30/22970/34?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-nova-fee-router-proposal-arbos-30/23310/25?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-support-rip-7212-for-account-abstraction-wallets-arbos-30/23298/33?u=tane We are particularly excited to see Stylus finally going live!

We maintain the rationale that we stated on the Snapshot and support the onboarding package for Gnosis Chain.

We support the deployment of Uniswap v3 and Oku Trade as we recognize the team’s commitment to providing $1M worth of liquidity in the protocol.

We generally agree on introducing an analytics tooling for the DAO to appropriately evaluate programs that the DAO has set out. Especially for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, we were wondering how the DAO evaluates the impact made by the incentives that were distributed to each chain and revisits how we can improve the program and calibrate how we distribute future incentives. Ideally, creating an RFP based on the requirements that this proposal is basically addressing, asking for potential service providers to work on it and organizing an election of the SP would be the way to approach this kind of initiatives, but practically, we believe the DAO should accept the best available option by the DAO contributor with the track record. For the selection of the chains to be analyzed, we choose Base, Scroll, and Blast and distributed our VP into each equally. 1) We believe with this budget as Wintermute suggested, the dashboard and analytics should cover 4 chains or more. 2) Arbitrum isn’t a part of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. While Arbitrum is a good chain to analyze on, the DAO should focus on how the program performs based on the data and insights provided by Forse. 3) Why don’t we have BSC as a selection? The DAO distributed 1M and it’s worth looking into the performance of it. If it’s in the selection, we would add BSC for a chain to be supported on the dashboard.

We consider the STIP (and its bridge) and LTIPP are purely experiments that need deep analysis and considerations for its complete version of the mechanism. To do so, the DAO requires dedicated resources including time, thus having the detox period makes perfect sense. We appreciate the work by all the contributors including L2BEAT, Matt from StableLab, the LTIPP council members and advisors, so far and in the future.As dk3 suggested, we would also suggest a name to clarify that it’s not just about “detoxing” but more of a reflection and review. Incentives Program Reflection Period is our suggestion.

Expansion of wstETH to Mode is favorable, as Mode could potentially be a DeFi hub of the Superchain ecosystem and bring huge utility to wstETH. The only concern was the security. After reviewing the assessment provided by the working group of Lido on Ethereum protocol contributors, we do not see any issues with using this bridge.