We have already supported this proposal in the snapshot vote and did the same in this onchain vote. We believe that clarifying various rules like these will make the Uniswap DAO more transparent and open.

As stated for the previous snapshot vote, we believe this proposal is essential for enhancing Uniswap’s security and ensuring effective responses during critical situations.

We keep supporting this proposal for the same reasons as its Snapshot vote, and we are looking to see the growth driven by this combined incentive program.

Same as its Snapshot vote, we believe the amount requested seems reasonable considering the TVL and the expected growth of the Celo ecosystem.

We support this proposal because Sonic demonstrates significant growth potential and offers a dynamic environment suitable for a $250k incentive. Furthermore, its robust infrastructure, high throughput, and continued developer-focused efforts position Sonic as an emerging ecosystem where Uniswap can expand its market share. With these points in mind, we cast our vote in favor of this proposal.

We have voted in favor of this proposal, as we believe it enhances Uniswap DAO’s capital efficiency and ensures we do not miss opportunities to grow the DAO’s market share. We also look forward to the continued activities of the Uniswap Growth Program.

We oppose this proposal. Compared to other chains that have received incentives in the past, Metal’s TVL is still small, and we feel that granting 250k in incentives is not appropriate. While it is indeed important for Uniswap to build market share across various chains, we believe incentives should align with each chain’s growth stage. From that perspective, Metal has not yet reached a point where allocating 250k in incentives to gain market share is justified, and thus we have voted against this proposal.

We support this proposal. Considering Celo’s TVL and its track record of collaboration with Uniswap, a $250k incentive alongside a $105k deployment cost appears to be a reasonable budget. Additionally, matching incentives from Celo itself is a welcome move. We look forward to seeing this proposal drive greater Uniswap share and activity on the Celo network.

We support this proposal because it is critical for strengthening Uniswap’s security and provides the necessary budget and guidelines to achieve that goal. By protecting whitehat hackers and offering them proper incentives, we believe this approach will safeguard Uniswap’s customer assets.

We believe this proposal enhances Uniswap’s security and operational resilience, while the agreement’s bounty structure is both reasonable and beneficial for users.

We believe that rules enhancing the transparency and public nature of the Uniswap DAO, and making DAO governance by delegates fairer, are important for the DAO. We agree with these principles, which can improve the health of the Uniswap DAO by garnering support from more delegates.

We support this proposal. Our questions regarding the budget and the proposal’s objectives have been addressed by @dennisonb. Tally is an essential service for Uniswap’s DAO governance, and we are in favor of providing this funding.

We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and continue to monitor the progress of the program.

We strongly support this proposal, especially since we believe that accommodating more than four chains approved by its Snapshot one is essential, even more so than during the previous vote.

By establishing a program like this, the DAO can effectively communicate with projects interested in collaborating with Uniswap and execute the initiatives for users, which we believe will impact Uniswap’s market share. Additionally, we believe that incorporating a trial period is crucial for forming a new organization. We acknowledge that the objectives for business development and marketing are clearly defined, and we feel that our previous concerns regarding the KPIs have been addressed.

We are opposed to this proposal. Our reason is that, compared to other chains, and considering that Lisk’s TVL is mostly composed of the LSK token, even when taking into account the promised $1 million in POL and the $250,000 Lisk incentive matching, we believe that the $375,000 incentive is too large. Gnosis Chain, which had a TVL of $300 million at the time of its proposal, was allocated $250,000 in the Onboarding Package via Snapshot. We also believe that Lisk Chain’s TVL is smaller compared to Linea and Scroll, which received $250,000 in incentives through the Onboarding Package. We think it would be better to reconsider this proposal on a smaller scale.

We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee.

We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP.

We support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives.

We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot.

We fully support increasing both the number of committee members and working hours per member because the committee that has more responsibilities and commitments should greatly benefit the DAO. We also believe it’s crucial for the current members to continue serving on the committee, given their contributions so far. We look forward to seeing their continued efforts. The compensation for the overtime work in Season 2 is fair and necessary, and we consider the additional funding to be justified. The proposed budget for the committee’s compensations in the upcoming season is essential and should be approved. We would love to start supporting the committee even more in the future.

We believe this rebalancing is necessary due to the fluctuation of the UNI token price. We would suggest that the committee should consider adding some buffer for the future programs to the budget so that the DAO doesn’t have to vote on rebalancing again.

we maintain the rational made for its Snapshot and support the proposal to make a significant impact by applying those changes and monitoring the data.

While we agree that the Ethereum Foundation’s attacathon is trying to solve an important problem, we don’t feel strongly about the significance of sponsorship with such a large sum of money from the Uniswap DAO.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the proposal for the delegate incentives.

We support this Cycle 2 proposal that allows new delegates like us to apply for and contribute to the DAO governance in a potentially sustainable way. We believe it’s a positive development that the Voting Power requirement has been removed, making it easier for new delegates like us to participate in. The scoring mechanism would be iterated over and the impact the program has been making should be reviewed for the future cycle, though.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the deployment of Uniswap v3 on X Layer and the cost for Oku Trade deployment.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

We maintain the rationale that we stated on the Snapshot and support the onboarding package for Gnosis Chain.

We support the deployment of Uniswap v3 and Oku Trade as we recognize the team’s commitment to providing $1M worth of liquidity in the protocol.

We generally agree on introducing an analytics tooling for the DAO to appropriately evaluate programs that the DAO has set out. Especially for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, we were wondering how the DAO evaluates the impact made by the incentives that were distributed to each chain and revisits how we can improve the program and calibrate how we distribute future incentives. Ideally, creating an RFP based on the requirements that this proposal is basically addressing, asking for potential service providers to work on it and organizing an election of the SP would be the way to approach this kind of initiatives, but practically, we believe the DAO should accept the best available option by the DAO contributor with the track record. For the selection of the chains to be analyzed, we choose Base, Scroll, and Blast and distributed our VP into each equally. 1) We believe with this budget as Wintermute suggested, the dashboard and analytics should cover 4 chains or more. 2) Arbitrum isn’t a part of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. While Arbitrum is a good chain to analyze on, the DAO should focus on how the program performs based on the data and insights provided by Forse. 3) Why don’t we have BSC as a selection? The DAO distributed 1M and it’s worth looking into the performance of it. If it’s in the selection, we would add BSC for a chain to be supported on the dashboard.

We oppose allocating any incentives from the Uniswap DAO to X Layer because the TVL on X Layer is significantly lower than that of other chains which have previously received $250,000 in incentives.

As we have posted here, we believe that Gnosis Chain will benefit from more participation and contribution from the Uniswap side. We believe that $250k is a reasonable incentive amount because Linea and Scroll, which have larger TVLs than Gnosis Chain, received $250k in incentives from https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-revitalization-and-growth/22616 3, and we believe that Gnosis Chain should follow the similar amount to them.

We thought $500k was the best amount at the time of the snapshot as written in https://gov.uniswap.org/t/arbitrum-ltipp-incentive-matching/24066/15?u=tane, but the collaboration with Arbitrum is important to Uniswap and we think $750k matching is a reasonable amount.