It’s been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution.

Compared to other promising candidates, they are on the border of being chosen. With a limited amount of the VP we have, we use our 100% VP to support them. We would also vote for gzeon, Emiliano Bonassi, Immunefi and Dennison Bertram.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and acknowledge two concerns are appropriately addressed after the Snapshot. We believe Stylus is the key innovation that the Arbitrum ecosystem should push forward and are looking forward to the success of this program.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team.

While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report 1, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it’s difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we’re looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities. For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author’s recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with.

While we acknowledge various concerns related to this program, we support the experimental nature of it and rely on the judgement and evaluations done by the selected program members. As GFX mentioned, the budget wouldn’t be used if the token swap doesn’t make sense. We see similar programs done by other DAOs while they are not necessarily proven successful yet. Many pointed out the risks, but there will be potential upsides that the DAO can take from this program and we believe it’s worth looking into. We would request changes if it goes to the onchain though: 1) as other delegates suggested, the lock-in period should be longer like 2-years for Arbitrum and target protocols to be aligned for the long term. 2) considering the experimental nature of the program, the compensations should be somehow split into an advance as the minimum base, and retroactive rewards based on successful token swap cases, otherwise, the program would pay out much expense without any success case (or lead to unnecessary pressure to the members to make some token swap happen.)

While we have some concerns about the quality of the executions and outcome from this initiative, we consider it worth a try to focus on aligning the DAO’s key members with the strategic directions that the DAO needs to tackle going forward.

We maintain the support at the Snapshot stage and look forward to the transition of the RARI DAO governance onto Arbitrum with additional treatments like offsetting the cost of bridging and potential incentives for the transition.

We maintain the support made in the Snapshot phase and acknowledge that lack of transparency is largely due to the nature of partnership discussions and the protection for the competitive edge. We will review the special section dedicated to this partnership funds in the future transparency reports.

We maintain our stance made in the Snapshot phase and continue to support the change after having reviewed the report by the ARDC.

We maintain our decision made at its Snapshot voting phase and appreciate the additional information added to the proposal. We also appreciate the future effort to make sure that there will be elections before the next phase of the committee with potential collaborations with Entropy and/or other suitable entities.

We maintain our support from the Snapshot voting for the “Panda Partners” tier sponsorship of the event. We believe in the direct mission alignment between the Arbitrum ecosystem and the Attackathon and the donation amount is reasonable.

We vote for Use ENS txt records on Snapshot. This change leads to a better accessibility of the metadata for the toolings in the ecosystem, without additional cost. We believe it’s acceptable to utilize the ENS records for the information.

We appreciate the potential value to be provided by the research from TogetherCrew team without cost from the DAO treasury. However, we are not certain that the DAO is the one to decide whether the API access to Discord is allowed, while most of the Discourse data is public and much related to discussions around the DAO. Either way, we support the concept and its modified implementation that addresses the concerns from the delegates and related parties.

We consider this as a simple oversight during the process and it’s natural to allow the provider with great track record to properly operate the validator as a Nova validator.

If you think about the Foundation as a service provider, they have done tremendous work so far including bringing strategic partnerships, to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Expanding more partnerships to compete other networks with more budget from the party with great track record makes total sense. However, as already pointed out, the transparency of the program and its reporting should be treated as the important deliverables to be promised by the Foundation. We also suggest the proposal to provide more break-downs of the budget with detailed objectives and plans before its onchain voting.

We appreciate all the work so far and effort to improve the program even further with a new system and established structure that apparently works for the objective. While there is an increase in spending from the DAO perspective, we believe the new V1.5 system has been designed well and ready to be experimented with administration support from the SEED team. The program lasts for 12 months but we like the fact that the details of the program can be modified based on the results that we will see.

As discussed separately with Klaus, this is a great update at this moment, and you can prepare for the 2025 event planning with other initiatives ahead into 2025. Looking forward to the GovHack Devcon!

We believe the GovHack will cover what this program has to provide in part and the only possible format to differentiate from the other offline event form is online events, but they have to be clearly designed, focused, promoted and executed with a much lower budget, which is challenging.

While the DAO needs to address the issue around the conversation between the fiat and ARB token, we agree that the initial promise and contract with service providers should be respected and followed through with funds compensated by the treasury. Now, it’s more critical to execute the program than delaying the operations.

We maintain our stance in the comment posted before and continue to support the progress of the development of Timeboost. We have also support the adjustments around a few parameters to be adjustable by Offchain Labs to fine-tune the design and achieve the stability, user experience and economics for the Arbitrum DAO. Also, interested in the future improvement partnering with the Espresso team.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

While the request itself seems totally valid and we expressed the support, we have resolved to respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. We apologize for the wrong signal made before realizing the Detox is in effect for the extension.

We appreciate all the work and comprehensive report provided for the Phase I and continuous effort to be made by the experienced actors in the area. However, we echo the concerns by other delegates on bigger scopes and higher compensations to each party (2.5x from the one in Phase I). Also, the detailed breakdown of the budget, especially the below part should be explicitly clarified in the proposal.

We maintain the support made in the comment before and appreciate RARI Foundation’s plan to offset the cost of bridging and implement potential incentives for its smoother transition.

We believe Stylus is an ambitious, yet reasonable innovation that Offchain Labs has developed to make Arbitrum even more attractive to Rust and C++ developers and it’s important to generate momentum of its use within the developer community to have attractive applications and toolings on the Arbitrum ecosystem, thus the program like this is timely, crucial and much needed. We also agree that having an Evaluation Committee is selected by the program manager from the beginning with Stylus experts, but it would be better to have consideration to include contributors who are familiar with the grants as it’s basically another grants program focusing on a particular type of applications on the ecosystem. Entropy can play a role in that perspective, but as other delegates pointed out, possibly a few grants/incentive-providing experts like JoJo can be involved. We also believe that conducting proper marketing campaigns about the program is the key. There doesn’t seem to be an explicit budget allocation to that point, but we would want the program manager to consider it to be included before its onchain ratification.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

The budget was already approved and the distributions of it proposed by Alex makes sense, thus no reason to be against it. We appreciate all the contributors who are experienced in the process of LTIPP and other initiatives are compensated for their work for STIP-Bridge operations.

We believe the benefits of extending the L2 Core Time Lock delay should outweigh the downside described in the proposal and it’s reasonable as this change wouldn’t affect proposals that merely transfer funds from the treasury. We would review the planned check by the ARDC Security member before its onchain vote.

We would basically vote for “Panda Partners” that would give reasonable support to the initiative that contributes to the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.

No doubt the DAO should implement a disclosure policy at least. On top of that, we believe the Responsible Voting Policy is best suited for the current DAO voting situation as we see it working well in the Optimism for some of its election votings. As Frisson said, ideally the DAO proposals should be passed even with abstains from delegates who have conflicts with them, but practically it’s too early to implement Strict Self-Voting Policy especially for elections.

As a temp-check, we are in support of the general direction that the DAO should take for the treasury management. We are grateful of the extensive involvement from Karpatkey and Gauntlet. We don’t necessarily agree with the requirement that the DAO needs to set up a RFP for multiple service providers to apply for; With the reasonable proposal to kick start the important functions of the DAO, the DAO should practically choose the currently available and best options. The proposal includes the Oversight Committee and reporting requirements, which should work for the DAO to diligently monitor what the initiative will have been doing. Giving too much concerns before kickstarting things off would lead to huge opportunity costs. We would only ask clearer responsibilities that the initiative will take on while having a relatively high management fee (1% vs. 0.5% on the other protocol) before the onchain voting and a possible adjustment to the size of the fund to be managed based on the current market.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot voting and continue to support the proposal as it is.

The governance process should be clearly defined in the governance document and widely known especially to proposal creators (delegate with enough VPs to create proposals) who should be guardians of enforcing the guidance defined in the governance document.

We are in favor of exploring an opportunity for delegates to effectively work on important matters in an offline environment during a big conference like DevCon. The details and execution plan should be definitely sorted out, though.

It’s critical to keep the incentivized delegates who are actively contributing to the important DAO decision makings motivated with a short-term extension. We are excited about the updated v1.1 Delegate Incentive Program as well.

We vote For Elections Only. While we acknowledge the beauty of transparency of ongoing Snapshot votes, having shielded voting for elections would outweigh the benefit which encourages voters to vote on their preferred choices rather than following the current top choices.

We believe better understanding of the governance and delegates is critical for the DAO to improve its governance and evaluate the ongoing programs (e.g. Delegate Incentive Program). Regarding the overlap on the tools, we consider the proposed dashboard is more for retroactive analysis on the governance while Karma is to capture snapshots of how the delegates perform, thus they can exist and complement each other.

We maintain the directional support that was made in our comment and recognize all the changes made by incorporating the feedback from the delegates. We are excited about the power and benefits that Tally Protocol can bring and further improvements to be made on the Arbitrum DAO governance and alignments between stakeholders.

After our initial comment, there have been more clarifications, discussions and affirmations (on the cost by other data tool providers) that make this proposal appealing and we are convinced of potential returns that this analytics tools can provide in the long run. Especially the development cost of the foundation is considered reasonable and promising for future marketing uses that would lead to more developers and users on the Arbitrum ecosystem.

We maintain the rationale below on this proposal and continue to support the selected members to act as the guardians of the Arbitrum Multi-sig. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/32?u=tane

We maintain our rationales below for each individual update and support a package of those updates to be deployed as "Bianca". We appreciate the proper audits on each implementation and OpenZeppelin's reviews as a part of ARDC works. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-activate-stylus-and-enable-next-gen-webassembly-smart-contracts-arbos-30/22970/34?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-nova-fee-router-proposal-arbos-30/23310/25?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-support-rip-7212-for-account-abstraction-wallets-arbos-30/23298/33?u=tane We are particularly excited to see Stylus finally going live!

We consider the STIP (and its bridge) and LTIPP are purely experiments that need deep analysis and considerations for its complete version of the mechanism. To do so, the DAO requires dedicated resources including time, thus having the detox period makes perfect sense. We appreciate the work by all the contributors including L2BEAT, Matt from StableLab, the LTIPP council members and advisors, so far and in the future.As dk3 suggested, we would also suggest a name to clarify that it’s not just about “detoxing” but more of a reflection and review. Incentives Program Reflection Period is our suggestion.

We believe the dedicated and capable actor that focuses on operations, strategy alignment and key coordinations is clearly demanded in the DAO governance, and Entropy has proven to be the one in Arbitrum. We are very excited to have them exclusively work with Arbitrum DAO. We have similar concerns about the hiring part, which is rare for this kind of proposals. We would ask them to consider a short-term pilot project with the currently hired or to-be-hired members to further prove the results that they can provide, but we would still vote for the proposal on Tally even as it is because we believe it’s practically better to have Entropy with a little over-budget rather than losing them or delaying them to fully focus on their operations.

David Bolger: An obvious choice. His experience and context are much needed for the role as a Growth / BD Expert. Karthik Raju: As a Venture Expert, he stands out the most and is best suitable for the role. Greg Canessa: He has the most relevant experiences when it comes to supporting the GCP initiative as an Operations Expert. Devansh Mehta: His contributions to the STEP were impressive and we recognize him as a great addition as a Gov Expert for the GCP initiative.

Economically and practically, allowing new Orbit chains on any blockchain that demand the technology built by OCL and managed by the Foundation and DAO makes sense. We believe it’s beneficial especially for more Stylus uses, which will lead to the world where developers can easily deploy their applications on the established environment. However, since Arbitrum is Ethereum-aligned as clearly stated as its first community value, the Foundation and OCL should still prioritize the development and integration with the chains that are settled on Ethereum L1. Of course, there are various perspectives when it comes to defining “Ethereum-aligned” but settling on Ethereum L1 should be the most important value that “Ethereum” provides and it’s still valued in the decision making process by the Arbitrum members.

We maintain the decision on Snapshot and continue to express the support for the program. We are looking forward to the outcome generated by the team and contributors!

As DisruptionJoe described, this can work in collaboration with the Firestarters program in the form of a Questbook grant program that requires a domain allocator elected by the DAO to manage the fund. We would like plurality in this kind of problem areas and look forward to seeing more quality proposals on critical issues/problems created by the programs.

As described in our feedback to the original proposal, we had concerns on the approval process and criteria but Entropy team provided the updated proposal, which is reasonable to us, and since we see the Optimism Collective has applied this system in a slightly different form and it works to some extent, we believe it's worth trying it at least as a trial. We also understand that the current form works as expected (a few proposals are rejected on Snapshot as temp-checks), and only improving predicability is already a reasonable improvement for the governance.

We voted for the option, "8 weeks and $2.5M fund" and maintain the stance for the onchain proposal. It's critical for the DAO to allocate the fund for the smaller projects with security considered. We also appreciate the ADPC team for accommodating the feedback from the delegates and pushing through the proposal to get started.

We believe the program is a great step to experiment the treasury diversification and trust the committee’s recommendations of the providers. We are also curious about the reporting mechanism and how the DAO can continuously review how the investments work.

We vote to select the members below based on their contributions, and the fact that they have deep knowledge and context about the DAO.

We simply believe it crams all the conceptual ideas into one proposal with a high operational cost without track record or clear and foreseeable deliverables to be proven to the stakeholders in Arbitrum, while understanding the reasoning behind all of them into one. We also believe what to aim to achieve is valid and broken-down initiatives can be considered worth a try. We’d look forward to continuous bets from the team.

We also suggest that separating the research work with limited scopes and budgets first from the whole R&D proposal is a great first step for the further considerations within the DAO to achieve what this proposal originally aimed to do. As Joseph seemingly has already agreed with the general direction, we appreciate all the effort so far from the OD team and look forward to the revised proposal in the near future.

It makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.

It makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.

BoLD unlocks permissionless validations for the Arbitrum chains, which a great step and technological feat provided by Offchain Labs. While we need to review the economical incentive that is also sustainable for a more diversified set of operators to join in the future, we are in 100% support of the proposal and implementation of it as it stands.

We appreciate the AVI team’s effort and approach to address feedback from the delegates. While we still believe potential overlap would be found through the course and as DAO, we need to evaluate if this initiative should be prioritized and funded in a big scale, the budget ask is reasonable enough for a capable and passionate team to start the pilot phase to explore the opportunities.

We chose Stakehouse because their extensive experience and track record stand out quite a bit. We believe the higher fee is justified with the outcomes that they should be able to bring. We also chose Avantgarde because of their expertise and their balanced fee structure. We believe both entities should be able to offer great services as the first Arbitrum STEP Program Manager.

We maintained the vote from Snapshot as we believe increasing the threshold to 9/12 is the vital first step to improve the system to achieve the revised Stage1 designation.

We maintained our Snapshot vote to fund 500k ARB each as we are generally supportive of the initiative and consider it important for the Arbitrum DAO to contribute to the cause.

We appreciate all the effort by the contributors for the past 6 months and believe in the needs to focus more on building strong ecosystem in the gaming category. There are obviously a few concerns that were already discussed in the thread and the X Space held today, but we are confident that the appointed GCP council, GCP team and Foundation incorporate feedback from the DAO and advisors and appropriately oversee the progress of the initiative.

RIP-7212 has been well-supported by the community and other L2 will certainly introduce it on their chains. This enables more secure smart wallets to be easily utilized on the L2 environments, which is a clear win for the better UX.

Stylus is an ambitious, yet reasonable innovation that Offchain Labs has developed to make Arbitrum even more attractive to Rust and C++ developers. We’d hope that the technology will be integrated into other L2 chains so that the smart contract composability will remain as we have on the EVM platforms.

We consider it rather a fix to apply the change and simplify the fee related operations for the DAO.

We also believe the ADPC can handle the operations and the governance minimization matters especially in the Arbitrum DAO. If the ADPC didn’t account for the operations, we’d consider an additional small funding can be an option.

We vote FOR the proposal while we recognize controversial perspectives around this one-off incentives request, but as it can be considered as a great opportunity for the Arbitrum ecosystem to grow, we would like to approve this funding as we voted for the Curve proposal. We also appreciate all the efforts to address the feedback from the delegates and modify the proposal to the ideal state of it under the DAO’s framework (LTIPP). Our concern is around how the protocol can retain users after the incentives program end. Eventually, we should see how it turns out, but we are particularly looking forward to their committed developments for the Arbitrum native products and ongoing treatments to achieve the success of their multi-chain strategy.

We appreciate and value the work the LTIPP council has done, and continuous effort the council will put in for the DAO. We also like the challenge process done in the STIP bridge process, but not necessarily a dealbreaker for the proposal to be passed or not.

We vote FOR the proposal at its Snapshot phase with the additional report included as the first selection. As described, this change will clearly increase the efficiency of the similar operations for the various initiatives. We would also like to see the election and term systems to be included in the Tally voting as suggested by other delegates. We don’t necessarily mind 1 year term, but it would be good to see staggered signer terms (e.g. 6 people cycles in 6 months.)

Described in the page

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally as the same reason provided in the Snapshot voting. We also understand that the deliverables that the team focuses on are as described, and our requested information will be delivered afterwards.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because it’s very well-considered and positive to both of Arbitrum and Curve ecosystems as a whole. Additional commitments from Michael is great as well.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because we believe it’s important to provide a non-developer friendly UI to force transaction inclusions possibly regardless of sequencer being down or not for less trust assumptions.

We appreciate all the work the working group has produced and consider it rational to extend the research with a reasonable budget assigned to the passionate operator.

Same as the off-chain one

it’s clearly addressed the feedback on the Subsidy Fund proposal, the selection of the firm, DeDaub is solid (Excellent works with recognized projects), and the cost seems reasonable.

GovHack in ETHDenver was a success in terms of connecting the delegates, contributors and core team members (Foundation and OCL) to have a opportunity to gather and discuss important topics in the Arbitrum DAO. We enjoyed the event as a whole and fully support the succeeding one in Brussels.

We generally agree with GFX Labs’ take on the process of having the applications immediately after the official application period. While there are some good ones, we believe they should have waited for the next round of the grant program (either the next LTIPP or a permanent program) to be ready. Only Curve one is an exception as it’s not marked as an LTIPP application and huge commitment promised by the Curve founder with a well-crafted application.

The proposal has been updated with additional commitments from the LTIPP advisors and promised program manager role as well as the data and audit reports by OBL for us to evaluate the results by the STIP and optimistically approve the additional fundings.

While we vote for this option to signal the support for the overall initiative, we expect it to be revised by incorporating feedback

We generally support the initiative while the exact amount for the Arbitrum DAO to offer can be discussed more before the on-chain voting

We consider this proposal as a good experiment to enhance the powers that retail users have with the leverage powered by the product aligned with the Arbitrum vision.

Chose candidates for 1) Arbitrum codebase expert (fred) 2) security expert (Certora) 3) Arbitrum ecosystem expert (bartek.eth from L2BEAT) based on background diversity, technical capabilities and geographical diversity. 4k for bartek, 4k for Certora, and other 5k+ for fred.

We vote FOR the continuation of the program and the updated compensations for DA and PM as we did at its temp check voting. We have also confirmed that Questbook team suggest annual re-elections of the members which was a concern at the Snapshot phase and appropriately addressed in the forum.

Because of clear guidance provided by the council, we vote for most of the protocols besides some exceptions described in the the page.

We’d like to express full support of the initiative that covers a list of necessary improvements to be done for the better DAO operations by all parties and we are looking forward to seeing a great DAO tooling product thrive with the growth of the Arbitrum DAO.

We recognize the contributions by the early contributors and consider the rewards reasonable as a one-off.

Great step to experiment treasury diversifications with a group of experienced service providers to lead the program

We vote against it because we believe it's simply too rushed and more analysis is required for the experiment to be funded further.

Voted for Jordan from Event Horizon as other prominent candidates are already qualified for the next round

We appreciate the effort that PL has put in and agree with the lessons that they will address with the renewed budget and structure.

The proposal covers a list of necessary improvements to be done for the better DAO operations by all parties and we are looking forward to seeing a great DAO tooling product thrive with the growth of the Arbitrum DAO.

While the budget appears huge, the Arbitrum DAO needs to catch up with other L2 to make it home for the gaming projects and the initiative is much needed for the purpose.

We believe it’s important to provide a non-developer friendly UI to force transaction inclusions and WakeUp team should be able to provide this with reasonable compensations.

We support the continuation of the program and the updated compensations for DA and PM. We also echo others who mentioned that the renewal of the DAs should be discussed and up for election in the future.

We are voting in favor of “Set L1 Surplus Fee and L2 Minimum Base Fee” because we believe DAO should prioritize UX over revenue at this moment.

40% each on Trail of Bits and OpenZeppelin, renowned security experts and 20% on Halborn who has started being involved in Arbitrum DAO with their great track record.

We are in favor of electing Chaos Labs because their track record related to risk assessment is great and the only candidate.

100% on L2BEAT/Ant Federation because what L2BEAT has done to Arbitrum and the ecosystem is amazing and a great candidate working with Ant Federation.

100% on Blockworks/Delphi because members who are more dedicated to Arbitrum DAO are involved while The Block is a prominent candidate for the Research Member

We appreciate the effort by Offchain Labs to support EIP-4844 swiftly for the upcoming mainnet release and are confident these improvements make positive impact on the Arbitrum ecosystem.

The motivation and implementations are reasonable and we believe this change leads to a better election process of the Security Council members.

As stated in our snapshot voting, we believe the pilot program has been improved with new actors and considerable thoughts and effort so that it will make impact to the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

We appreciate all the work put by Arbiters during the launch of Arbitrum, but are against their retro rewards because 1) they have already received some compensations from the Foundation. 2) there were no key measurements or criteria set for the rewards when it comes to managing the Discord community. It should have been clearly discussed beforehand with the Foundation or whoever manages the Discord or local communities.

Both changes make sense and the code is simple with unit tests and audit by ToB.

This should be evaluated based on a specific framework and by a group of members who are experienced in gaming and its grant system.

Great step to experiment treasury diversifications with a group of experienced service providers to lead the program

The motivation and implementations are reasonable and we believe this change leads to a better election process of the Security Council members.

It’s favorable to form a committee to be specialized in procurement for the DAO and we have a great selection of members working on this initiative.

Voted 40% for Joseph as he should lead the committee, voted 30% each for Jeff and Bernard to support him with ample experiences that they have

To achieve the revised Stage1 designation, we believe increasing the threshold to 9/12 is the vital first step to improve the council

We believe this is the essential first step to rewards active delegates and continuous commitments from existing and new dedicated participants to the DAO. We appreciate the careful considerations and clearly outlined evaluation process.

We are in support of the initiative to go forward after the diligent considerations and amendments made to improve the original proposal. It's great to see a democratic process to choose the service providers to address issues that have been discussed for a while.

Chose 3 candidates. Clarified the reasonings in the description.

Clarified in https://twitter.com/tanelabs/status/1749078806877397499

An improved version of the STIP and we believe it's worth trying it as a pilot

No reason to oppose to continuous updates to the Arbitrum stack

The idea of having an organization like this is appealing but the details, structure and framework need to be further discussed and reach to consensus before deciding to fund it

No reason to be against the idea of the consolidation

DAO shouldn’t reward contributors without the information about who they are, what each of them has done and how they are selected and others are not.

The most important expertise required for a security council member is the deep knowledge with the protocol tech stacks and Harry, CTO of Offchain Labs is undoubtedly the best candidate.

While GMX is a leading protocol to thrive in Arbitrum, we abstain because we are an Endorsed Delegate of dYdX which is the direct competitor of GMX from users’ perspective.

Pendle is bringing interest derivative market into DeFi and evolving the ecosystem with unique offerings. The requested grant size is reasonable and set out to be used efficiently.

We’ve seen their founders active in the NYC crypto meetups and spoken highly of Arbitrum in terms of experiences on the platform. The reasonable requested grant size. We believe the incentive is to be used to promote more interesting use within the ecosystem.

unshETH is very unique and natively supported on Arbitrum. It’s good to contribute to decentralization of liquid staking tokens. The requested grant size is reasonable.

On top of the raised concerns around dominance of stETH in Ethereum, the justifications of the grant size seems weak and off as stETH related trading volume is already huge. We would like Lido to propose their request in another way, address concerns and focus on properly introducing the native stETH in Arbitrum.

Tally’s mission is to advance on-chain governance further and it’s aligned very well with L2 like Arbitrum because of its lower gas. The requested grant size is reasonable and we believe that the Tally team is diligently allocating them to the DAOs on Arbitrum, which would make impact on Arbitrum with the great governance tool.

While Vertex is an interesting protocol to thrive in Arbitrum, we abstain because we are an Endorsed Delegate of dYdX which is the direct competitor of Vertex from users’ perspective.

While we believe the security is paramountly important in the self-custody environment and what Webacy has been doing is clearly beneficial to the whole ecosystem, there are a couple of reasons that the proposal is not fit for STIP grant distributions: 1) the justification of the requested grant size is weak compared to the outcome. 2) incentives are prone to sybil attacks 3) not clear incentives to Arbitrum itself

Camelot kicked off this STIP movement, and diligently tried to get aligned with what it can do for Arbitrum throughout the process. Definitely beneficial for Arbitrum to have Camelot thrive as one of the household names.