1. stETH on L2 We support this proposal as it enhances the accessibility of stETH across L2 networks, leveraging existing wstETH infrastructure. This expansion will provide users with a consistent experience across both L1 and L2. 2. Organize the Lido Alliance Program as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent BORG We support setting up an EasyTrack for the Lido Alliance Operational Multisig to simplify operations. The approved BORG entity provides a legal framework for agreements without exposing Lido DAO to legal risks. This structure keeps Lido DAO decentralized while supporting the Alliance’s needs, with EasyTrack improving fund management.

Worth trying to attract applications to tackle this request

We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee.

We vote for Use ENS txt records on Snapshot. This change leads to a better accessibility of the metadata for the toolings in the ecosystem, without additional cost. We believe it’s acceptable to utilize the ENS records for the information.

We appreciate the potential value to be provided by the research from TogetherCrew team without cost from the DAO treasury. However, we are not certain that the DAO is the one to decide whether the API access to Discord is allowed, while most of the Discourse data is public and much related to discussions around the DAO. Either way, we support the concept and its modified implementation that addresses the concerns from the delegates and related parties.

We consider this as a simple oversight during the process and it’s natural to allow the provider with great track record to properly operate the validator as a Nova validator.

Eth.link has been used by various projects to provide access to ENS and IPFS sites. It has been utilized by some of the largest projects in the space, including Uniswap. It is important for ENS to responsibly maintain such a highly public domain, which is crucial not only for ENS but also for the Ethereum ecosystem as a whole.

We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP.

We believe adding (rather than changing) the functionality in proposing executable ENS proposals with a required bond mechanism is the right approach and the proposed initial values are reasonable. As Kent pointed out, we assume the frontends can utilize the additional changes provided by this proposal for the onchain tools to be supported by multiple platforms while the development is approved by the DAO to go ahead.

If you think about the Foundation as a service provider, they have done tremendous work so far including bringing strategic partnerships, to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Expanding more partnerships to compete other networks with more budget from the party with great track record makes total sense. However, as already pointed out, the transparency of the program and its reporting should be treated as the important deliverables to be promised by the Foundation. We also suggest the proposal to provide more break-downs of the budget with detailed objectives and plans before its onchain voting.

We appreciate all the work so far and effort to improve the program even further with a new system and established structure that apparently works for the objective. While there is an increase in spending from the DAO perspective, we believe the new V1.5 system has been designed well and ready to be experimented with administration support from the SEED team. The program lasts for 12 months but we like the fact that the details of the program can be modified based on the results that we will see.

We support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives.

As discussed separately with Klaus, this is a great update at this moment, and you can prepare for the 2025 event planning with other initiatives ahead into 2025. Looking forward to the GovHack Devcon!

We believe the GovHack will cover what this program has to provide in part and the only possible format to differentiate from the other offline event form is online events, but they have to be clearly designed, focused, promoted and executed with a much lower budget, which is challenging.

While the DAO needs to address the issue around the conversation between the fiat and ARB token, we agree that the initial promise and contract with service providers should be respected and followed through with funds compensated by the treasury. Now, it’s more critical to execute the program than delaying the operations.

We maintain our stance in the comment posted before and continue to support the progress of the development of Timeboost. We have also support the adjustments around a few parameters to be adjustable by Offchain Labs to fine-tune the design and achieve the stability, user experience and economics for the Arbitrum DAO. Also, interested in the future improvement partnering with the Espresso team.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

We believe all the options ranked high by the council deserve to accept applications within this cycle's budget

Abstain due to our role as a Grants Council member

We believe the selection is a great mix of members who has relevant experiences and expertises to serve as the Security Council

We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot.

While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same.

While the request itself seems totally valid and we expressed the support, we have resolved to respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. We apologize for the wrong signal made before realizing the Detox is in effect for the extension.

We appreciate all the work and comprehensive report provided for the Phase I and continuous effort to be made by the experienced actors in the area. However, we echo the concerns by other delegates on bigger scopes and higher compensations to each party (2.5x from the one in Phase I). Also, the detailed breakdown of the budget, especially the below part should be explicitly clarified in the proposal.

We maintain the support made in the comment before and appreciate RARI Foundation’s plan to offset the cost of bridging and implement potential incentives for its smoother transition.

We believe Stylus is an ambitious, yet reasonable innovation that Offchain Labs has developed to make Arbitrum even more attractive to Rust and C++ developers and it’s important to generate momentum of its use within the developer community to have attractive applications and toolings on the Arbitrum ecosystem, thus the program like this is timely, crucial and much needed. We also agree that having an Evaluation Committee is selected by the program manager from the beginning with Stylus experts, but it would be better to have consideration to include contributors who are familiar with the grants as it’s basically another grants program focusing on a particular type of applications on the ecosystem. Entropy can play a role in that perspective, but as other delegates pointed out, possibly a few grants/incentive-providing experts like JoJo can be involved. We also believe that conducting proper marketing campaigns about the program is the key. There doesn’t seem to be an explicit budget allocation to that point, but we would want the program manager to consider it to be included before its onchain ratification.

We fully support increasing both the number of committee members and working hours per member because the committee that has more responsibilities and commitments should greatly benefit the DAO. We also believe it’s crucial for the current members to continue serving on the committee, given their contributions so far. We look forward to seeing their continued efforts. The compensation for the overtime work in Season 2 is fair and necessary, and we consider the additional funding to be justified. The proposed budget for the committee’s compensations in the upcoming season is essential and should be approved. We would love to start supporting the committee even more in the future.

We believe this rebalancing is necessary due to the fluctuation of the UNI token price. We would suggest that the committee should consider adding some buffer for the future programs to the budget so that the DAO doesn’t have to vote on rebalancing again.

we maintain the rational made for its Snapshot and support the proposal to make a significant impact by applying those changes and monitoring the data.

While we agree that the Ethereum Foundation’s attacathon is trying to solve an important problem, we don’t feel strongly about the significance of sponsorship with such a large sum of money from the Uniswap DAO.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

We believe this is an interesting experiment to encourage small size token holders to get involved in the governance in a meaningful way and a good way of utilizing the treasury to contribute to the voting situations. Delegating the operations to the Arbitrum MSS also makes sense.

We recognize the strategic importance of the Lido Alliance and the need for a legal structure to facilitate agreements in its operations. The BORG structure provides a balanced approach, offering legal capabilities without directly exposing Lido DAO to potential legal risks. At the same time, we’d love to contribute to gradual improvements such as increasing transparency and appropriately handling such projects as Lido DAO.

As shared in the Snapshot page, the responses from both CryptoManufaktur and Galaxy indicate that there will be no significant changes in the key factors listed above, at least for the short term. This strongly suggests that the quality of the node operation by Galaxy will remain consistent with what CryptoManufaktur has been providing. Additionally, as a topic to be discussed in the future, we believe there’s a need for implementing a routine assessment of existing Node Operators in Lido’s Curated Module. This process would serve two crucial purposes: 1. To track any changes that may occur to Galaxy (or any other operator) in the mid/long term and regularly check their eligibility as a Node Operator in Lido’s Curated Module. 2. To identify and potentially remove Node Operators from Lido’s Curated Module that are no longer meeting the initial selection criteria, either due to changes in their operation or failure to keep up with the latest best practices of node operation. This proposed assessment process would ensure the ongoing quality and reliability of Lido’s Curated Module.

The budget was already approved and the distributions of it proposed by Alex makes sense, thus no reason to be against it. We appreciate all the contributors who are experienced in the process of LTIPP and other initiatives are compensated for their work for STIP-Bridge operations.

We believe the benefits of extending the L2 Core Time Lock delay should outweigh the downside described in the proposal and it’s reasonable as this change wouldn’t affect proposals that merely transfer funds from the treasury. We would review the planned check by the ARDC Security member before its onchain vote.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the proposal for the delegate incentives.

We would basically vote for “Panda Partners” that would give reasonable support to the initiative that contributes to the Arbitrum ecosystem as a whole.

The only candidate and the current lead of SC, who diligently coordinates with appropriate dev members and updates the activities.

While we have some concern on how the previous upgrade was deployed, this upgrade to fix the vulnerabilities found in the audit should be done anyway

We support this Cycle 2 proposal that allows new delegates like us to apply for and contribute to the DAO governance in a potentially sustainable way. We believe it’s a positive development that the Voting Power requirement has been removed, making it easier for new delegates like us to participate in. The scoring mechanism would be iterated over and the impact the program has been making should be reviewed for the future cycle, though.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

Same as the one made for Vote #177

No doubt the DAO should implement a disclosure policy at least. On top of that, we believe the Responsible Voting Policy is best suited for the current DAO voting situation as we see it working well in the Optimism for some of its election votings. As Frisson said, ideally the DAO proposals should be passed even with abstains from delegates who have conflicts with them, but practically it’s too early to implement Strict Self-Voting Policy especially for elections.

As a temp-check, we are in support of the general direction that the DAO should take for the treasury management. We are grateful of the extensive involvement from Karpatkey and Gauntlet. We don’t necessarily agree with the requirement that the DAO needs to set up a RFP for multiple service providers to apply for; With the reasonable proposal to kick start the important functions of the DAO, the DAO should practically choose the currently available and best options. The proposal includes the Oversight Committee and reporting requirements, which should work for the DAO to diligently monitor what the initiative will have been doing. Giving too much concerns before kickstarting things off would lead to huge opportunity costs. We would only ask clearer responsibilities that the initiative will take on while having a relatively high management fee (1% vs. 0.5% on the other protocol) before the onchain voting and a possible adjustment to the size of the fund to be managed based on the current market.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot voting and continue to support the proposal as it is.

The governance process should be clearly defined in the governance document and widely known especially to proposal creators (delegate with enough VPs to create proposals) who should be guardians of enforcing the guidance defined in the governance document.

We are in favor of exploring an opportunity for delegates to effectively work on important matters in an offline environment during a big conference like DevCon. The details and execution plan should be definitely sorted out, though.

It’s critical to keep the incentivized delegates who are actively contributing to the important DAO decision makings motivated with a short-term extension. We are excited about the updated v1.1 Delegate Incentive Program as well.

We vote For Elections Only. While we acknowledge the beauty of transparency of ongoing Snapshot votes, having shielded voting for elections would outweigh the benefit which encourages voters to vote on their preferred choices rather than following the current top choices.

We maintain the rationale made for its Snapshot and support the deployment of Uniswap v3 on X Layer and the cost for Oku Trade deployment.

We appreciate Austin’s proposal to compete with Aerodrome on Base, one of the most important battleground chains. We directionally agree with the proposal to experiment configurations to increase the protocol revenue. In addition to recognizing concerns from other delegates and community members, we would love to see a more concrete plan as it’s marked as an experiment; the plan should articulate 1) how those pools are created with minimized liquidity fragmentations 2) how the protocol reacts to fee changes by Aerodrome 3) how the DAO can evaluate the experiment success. How does the revenue increase from more market shares overweigh the decreases resulted from the lower fee pools? 4) how long the DAO experiments this and make sure the results will be properly evaluated. Who is responsible for the follow-through of the experiment? Looking forward to the complete on-chain proposal for a successful experiment to run for the protocol.

We believe better understanding of the governance and delegates is critical for the DAO to improve its governance and evaluate the ongoing programs (e.g. Delegate Incentive Program). Regarding the overlap on the tools, we consider the proposed dashboard is more for retroactive analysis on the governance while Karma is to capture snapshots of how the delegates perform, thus they can exist and complement each other.

We maintain the directional support that was made in our comment and recognize all the changes made by incorporating the feedback from the delegates. We are excited about the power and benefits that Tally Protocol can bring and further improvements to be made on the Arbitrum DAO governance and alignments between stakeholders.

After our initial comment, there have been more clarifications, discussions and affirmations (on the cost by other data tool providers) that make this proposal appealing and we are convinced of potential returns that this analytics tools can provide in the long run. Especially the development cost of the foundation is considered reasonable and promising for future marketing uses that would lead to more developers and users on the Arbitrum ecosystem.

1. Oracle member rotation While there have been several interests from potential oracle operators, we agree to choose MatrixedLink for the rotation on this occasion as they are one of operators that have experienced the Oracle testnet run and look for more improvements to be introduced with Second Opinion Oracle project. 2. Node Operator name & reward address update This is a highly administrative matter, and we don’t have any particular objections to it. This kind of administrative approval should not need snapshot or on-chain vote. As Izzy mentioned in the forum, setting up Easy Track for this kind of case would be helpful. 3. On-Chain Delegation Having good governance is the key for DAO to be successful. However, there have been several proposals that were rejected due to the lack of the amount of votes. This implementation will enable delegating onchain voting power for LDO holders and thus more voting power can be utilized for the governance. This is an important step for strengthening Lido DAO governance.

We maintain the rationale below on this proposal and continue to support the selected members to act as the guardians of the Arbitrum Multi-sig. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/rfc-arbitrum-multi-sig-support-service-mss/23737/32?u=tane

We maintain our rationales below for each individual update and support a package of those updates to be deployed as "Bianca". We appreciate the proper audits on each implementation and OpenZeppelin's reviews as a part of ARDC works. https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-activate-stylus-and-enable-next-gen-webassembly-smart-contracts-arbos-30/22970/34?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-nova-fee-router-proposal-arbos-30/23310/25?u=tane https://forum.arbitrum.foundation/t/aip-support-rip-7212-for-account-abstraction-wallets-arbos-30/23298/33?u=tane We are particularly excited to see Stylus finally going live!

We maintain the rationale that we stated on the Snapshot and support the onboarding package for Gnosis Chain.

We support the deployment of Uniswap v3 and Oku Trade as we recognize the team’s commitment to providing $1M worth of liquidity in the protocol.

We generally agree on introducing an analytics tooling for the DAO to appropriately evaluate programs that the DAO has set out. Especially for the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program, we were wondering how the DAO evaluates the impact made by the incentives that were distributed to each chain and revisits how we can improve the program and calibrate how we distribute future incentives. Ideally, creating an RFP based on the requirements that this proposal is basically addressing, asking for potential service providers to work on it and organizing an election of the SP would be the way to approach this kind of initiatives, but practically, we believe the DAO should accept the best available option by the DAO contributor with the track record. For the selection of the chains to be analyzed, we choose Base, Scroll, and Blast and distributed our VP into each equally. 1) We believe with this budget as Wintermute suggested, the dashboard and analytics should cover 4 chains or more. 2) Arbitrum isn’t a part of the Uniswap Revitalization and Growth Program. While Arbitrum is a good chain to analyze on, the DAO should focus on how the program performs based on the data and insights provided by Forse. 3) Why don’t we have BSC as a selection? The DAO distributed 1M and it’s worth looking into the performance of it. If it’s in the selection, we would add BSC for a chain to be supported on the dashboard.

We consider the STIP (and its bridge) and LTIPP are purely experiments that need deep analysis and considerations for its complete version of the mechanism. To do so, the DAO requires dedicated resources including time, thus having the detox period makes perfect sense. We appreciate the work by all the contributors including L2BEAT, Matt from StableLab, the LTIPP council members and advisors, so far and in the future.As dk3 suggested, we would also suggest a name to clarify that it’s not just about “detoxing” but more of a reflection and review. Incentives Program Reflection Period is our suggestion.

Expansion of wstETH to Mode is favorable, as Mode could potentially be a DeFi hub of the Superchain ecosystem and bring huge utility to wstETH. The only concern was the security. After reviewing the assessment provided by the working group of Lido on Ethereum protocol contributors, we do not see any issues with using this bridge.

Unlike previous bridge proposals, this one uniquely combines Wormhole and Axelar, rather than utilizing a canonical bridge for a specific rollup or chain. While TheDZhon’s suggestion to add more bridges with a 2/3 threshold would undoubtedly enhance security in the future, the current proposal seems to provide adequate security measures for the time being.

We vote for Oxytocin because of their experience as a CoCC member and continuous contributions to the DAO as a delegate, Pumbi and Alex because of their contributions to the DAO and unique experiences, and CryptoReuMD because their completely unique experience and knowledge with the DAO.

We oppose allocating any incentives from the Uniswap DAO to X Layer because the TVL on X Layer is significantly lower than that of other chains which have previously received $250,000 in incentives.

While there have been several interests from potential oracle operators, we agree to choose MatrixedLink for the rotation on this occasion as they are one of operators that have experienced the Oracle testnet run and look for more improvements to be introduced with Second Opinion Oracle project.

As stated in the updated scorecard, there are a lot of points to be improved in Lido DAO’s governance. As we saw success of similar delegate programs in other DAOs, we believe introducing a program to invite publicly declared delegates to increase quality delegates and incentivizing them based on particular conditions to improve the voting process in the Lido DAO should be a huge step towards better decentralized governance.

We’ve been supporting Lido’s staking decentralization, and we consider this proposal necessary to achieve that.

We believe the dedicated and capable actor that focuses on operations, strategy alignment and key coordinations is clearly demanded in the DAO governance, and Entropy has proven to be the one in Arbitrum. We are very excited to have them exclusively work with Arbitrum DAO. We have similar concerns about the hiring part, which is rare for this kind of proposals. We would ask them to consider a short-term pilot project with the currently hired or to-be-hired members to further prove the results that they can provide, but we would still vote for the proposal on Tally even as it is because we believe it’s practically better to have Entropy with a little over-budget rather than losing them or delaying them to fully focus on their operations.

David Bolger: An obvious choice. His experience and context are much needed for the role as a Growth / BD Expert. Karthik Raju: As a Venture Expert, he stands out the most and is best suitable for the role. Greg Canessa: He has the most relevant experiences when it comes to supporting the GCP initiative as an Operations Expert. Devansh Mehta: His contributions to the STEP were impressive and we recognize him as a great addition as a Gov Expert for the GCP initiative.

Economically and practically, allowing new Orbit chains on any blockchain that demand the technology built by OCL and managed by the Foundation and DAO makes sense. We believe it’s beneficial especially for more Stylus uses, which will lead to the world where developers can easily deploy their applications on the established environment. However, since Arbitrum is Ethereum-aligned as clearly stated as its first community value, the Foundation and OCL should still prioritize the development and integration with the chains that are settled on Ethereum L1. Of course, there are various perspectives when it comes to defining “Ethereum-aligned” but settling on Ethereum L1 should be the most important value that “Ethereum” provides and it’s still valued in the decision making process by the Arbitrum members.

As we have posted here, we believe that Gnosis Chain will benefit from more participation and contribution from the Uniswap side. We believe that $250k is a reasonable incentive amount because Linea and Scroll, which have larger TVLs than Gnosis Chain, received $250k in incentives from https://gov.uniswap.org/t/uniswap-revitalization-and-growth/22616 3, and we believe that Gnosis Chain should follow the similar amount to them.

Since we approved the EGG request including the 180k LDO transfer, we approve the transfer in this onchain voting and same for the Expanding the Simple DVT Module request.

We maintain the decision on Snapshot and continue to express the support for the program. We are looking forward to the outcome generated by the team and contributors!

As DisruptionJoe described, this can work in collaboration with the Firestarters program in the form of a Questbook grant program that requires a domain allocator elected by the DAO to manage the fund. We would like plurality in this kind of problem areas and look forward to seeing more quality proposals on critical issues/problems created by the programs.

We chose the requests because we believe they are the most critical to achieve the Intent 3A goal: increase the active developers with quality projects/platforms with the allocated fund.

We choose those requests because either technical solutions or research/analysis are critical to increase the votable supply.

Supporting the OP chains is one of the important Intents in S6 and we are in full support of achieve the goal with the allocated budget.

We voted for the option, "8 weeks and $2.5M fund" and maintain the stance for the onchain proposal. It's critical for the DAO to allocate the fund for the smaller projects with security considered. We also appreciate the ADPC team for accommodating the feedback from the delegates and pushing through the proposal to get started.

As described in our feedback to the original proposal, we had concerns on the approval process and criteria but Entropy team provided the updated proposal, which is reasonable to us, and since we see the Optimism Collective has applied this system in a slightly different form and it works to some extent, we believe it's worth trying it at least as a trial. We also understand that the current form works as expected (a few proposals are rejected on Snapshot as temp-checks), and only improving predicability is already a reasonable improvement for the governance.

We believe the program is a great step to experiment the treasury diversification and trust the committee’s recommendations of the providers. We are also curious about the reporting mechanism and how the DAO can continuously review how the investments work.

We voted for this proposal, as it protects Lido DAO from a potential default judgment, which could have serious negative consequences, including potential web infrastructure takedowns, delisting of LDO from trading venues, and creating precedents that could be used in future legal actions against Lido DAO or similar entities.

See Expanding the Simple DVT Module and LIP-22: stETH on L2 — wstETH on Optimism bridge endpoints upgrade

This proposal outlines the major grant requests for the half-year period as follows: - 24.6m DAI + 180k LDO in grant continuity for the Lido Contributor’s Group - 7.1m DAI in grant continuity for the Liquidity Observation Lab - 400k DAI for the Community Lifeguard initiative These are essential initiatives for achieving the goals set by GOOSE and reGOOSE, and we support this proposal.

This is a proposal to establish a vault with additional incentives provided by Obol, SSV and the DVT modules of Lido. This initiative aims to encourage stakers to deposit into SDVT validators, thereby expanding the share of SDVT. We support this proposal as SDVT is one of the most critical efforts to enhance decentralization in Lido's staking and this proposal would surely promote this initiative faster.

This proposal suggests organizing CLI as a subcommittee of LEGO with a budget of approximately 200k USD per quarter. CLI aims to invigorate community activities and increase the number of contributors, such as community stakers, by managing community programs, creating content for community stakers, and identifying and supporting grant opportunities. This initiative is crucial for enhancing the decentralization of Lido and expanding a diverse base of contributors. We support this proposal.

Currently, wstETH is deployed on various L2 networks. In addition to this, this is a proposal to make stETH available on L2 as well. By utilizing existing bridges and wrapping wstETH on L2, stETH can be used on L2 networks. Ensuring that stETH maintains the same utility on L2 as it does on L1 is crucial for user experience, and we support this proposal.

We thought $500k was the best amount at the time of the snapshot as written in https://gov.uniswap.org/t/arbitrum-ltipp-incentive-matching/24066/15?u=tane, but the collaboration with Arbitrum is important to Uniswap and we think $750k matching is a reasonable amount.

We vote to select the members below based on their contributions, and the fact that they have deep knowledge and context about the DAO.

We simply believe it crams all the conceptual ideas into one proposal with a high operational cost without track record or clear and foreseeable deliverables to be proven to the stakeholders in Arbitrum, while understanding the reasoning behind all of them into one. We also believe what to aim to achieve is valid and broken-down initiatives can be considered worth a try. We’d look forward to continuous bets from the team.

It was tough to choose from candidates with great applications. We value the mix of leadership (Ed), specialized skills (Blockdev for ZK, philogy for auditing), and communication/collaboration/high-context knowledge with the Collective (anika, noah and wbnns) and vote for them accordingly.

We expected more lower budget increases as discussed in the forum, but appreciate their effort and recognize the need to continue CoCC operation in a continuous way. We will vote against future proposals that only increase budget without consideration of the feedback from delegates, though.

With the new intent featuring the Superchain strategy and considering the proper participation from the participating chains is necessary for the appropriate "collective" governance, we believe the amendment and the expansion of it are appropriate.

The amendment and clarification make sense and we support continuity of ACC.

We have reviewed the specs and the summary of the changes in the call. RIP-7212 change leads to a better UX and we are great to see this and other improvements including the new compression implementation in this upgrade.

We also suggest that separating the research work with limited scopes and budgets first from the whole R&D proposal is a great first step for the further considerations within the DAO to achieve what this proposal originally aimed to do. As Joseph seemingly has already agreed with the general direction, we appreciate all the effort so far from the OD team and look forward to the revised proposal in the near future.

We appreciate and support their interest from Anthias Labs that has experiences in supporting the grants and providing tools for risk monitoring , and continuous support from SEED Latam team in the program.

We are impressed about what Juan has provided and achieved in the Collective, its GC and other prominent DAOs including Uniswap and Arbitrum and what Murphy has been providing with Karma and his service to the Optimism GC.

We appreciate all the work and contributions that the Season 5 council Growth Experiments and Builders members and recognize continuous support from them in Season 6. Aside from them, we choose Jrocki, brichis, Sov and ourselves for the new members given the relevancy, expertises and contributions to the Collective so far.

BoLD unlocks permissionless validations for the Arbitrum chains, which a great step and technological feat provided by Offchain Labs. While we need to review the economical incentive that is also sustainable for a more diversified set of operators to join in the future, we are in 100% support of the proposal and implementation of it as it stands.

It makes sense to subsidize the first operator running the BoLD validator and cover the operation costs by the DAO. Although the DAO will need a more sustainable model to attract operators running BoLD, we support the fund as it stands.

It makes sense to support the Foundation to bootstrap the first BoLD validator as the trusted and honest party. It’s also great to confirm that the Foundation will equip themselves with a team of operators running a node with help from Offchain Labs.

We chose Stakehouse because their extensive experience and track record stand out quite a bit. We believe the higher fee is justified with the outcomes that they should be able to bring. We also chose Avantgarde because of their expertise and their balanced fee structure. We believe both entities should be able to offer great services as the first Arbitrum STEP Program Manager.

We appreciate the AVI team’s effort and approach to address feedback from the delegates. While we still believe potential overlap would be found through the course and as DAO, we need to evaluate if this initiative should be prioritized and funded in a big scale, the budget ask is reasonable enough for a capable and passionate team to start the pilot phase to explore the opportunities.

We maintained the vote from Snapshot as we believe increasing the threshold to 9/12 is the vital first step to improve the system to achieve the revised Stage1 designation.

We maintained our Snapshot vote to fund 500k ARB each as we are generally supportive of the initiative and consider it important for the Arbitrum DAO to contribute to the cause.

We appreciate all the effort by the contributors for the past 6 months and believe in the needs to focus more on building strong ecosystem in the gaming category. There are obviously a few concerns that were already discussed in the thread and the X Space held today, but we are confident that the appointed GCP council, GCP team and Foundation incorporate feedback from the DAO and advisors and appropriately oversee the progress of the initiative.

RIP-7212 has been well-supported by the community and other L2 will certainly introduce it on their chains. This enables more secure smart wallets to be easily utilized on the L2 environments, which is a clear win for the better UX.

Stylus is an ambitious, yet reasonable innovation that Offchain Labs has developed to make Arbitrum even more attractive to Rust and C++ developers. We’d hope that the technology will be integrated into other L2 chains so that the smart contract composability will remain as we have on the EVM platforms.

We consider it rather a fix to apply the change and simplify the fee related operations for the DAO.

We also believe the ADPC can handle the operations and the governance minimization matters especially in the Arbitrum DAO. If the ADPC didn’t account for the operations, we’d consider an additional small funding can be an option.

This not only enhances the decentralization and security of Lido's Node Operators but also improves the economics for Node Operators participating in DVT. Therefore, we support this proposal.

As this proposal will lead to further strengthening of the robustness of the Lido protocol, we vote in favor of it.

As DeFi activities centered around LST expand beyond the Ethereum mainnet, partnerships like this, which address cross-chain compatibility, help meet the growing needs of LST-based DeFi activities. Therefore, we vote in favor of this proposal.

We believe that as a member of the Lido Alliance, Mellow can contribute to the growth of the Lido ecosystem by expanding the utility of stETH.

We vote FOR the proposal while we recognize controversial perspectives around this one-off incentives request, but as it can be considered as a great opportunity for the Arbitrum ecosystem to grow, we would like to approve this funding as we voted for the Curve proposal. We also appreciate all the efforts to address the feedback from the delegates and modify the proposal to the ideal state of it under the DAO’s framework (LTIPP). Our concern is around how the protocol can retain users after the incentives program end. Eventually, we should see how it turns out, but we are particularly looking forward to their committed developments for the Arbitrum native products and ongoing treatments to achieve the success of their multi-chain strategy.

While we strongly recommend the council to reconsider the rewards, the intention of the council’s inception should be valued and without a particular structure or proposal that is sustainable to address the CoC related matters, we should keep the council running.

We appreciate and value the work the LTIPP council has done, and continuous effort the council will put in for the DAO. We also like the challenge process done in the STIP bridge process, but not necessarily a dealbreaker for the proposal to be passed or not.

Introducing the long-waited fault proofs is clearly one of the most important steps that Optimism should take. Considering the comments from Mofi, we vote FOR the proposal and rely on the coordination with the security council and OP Labs for the timing of the deployment.

Focused fundings on the new Intent to grow the Superchain makes sense strategically. Supporting the chain-specific grants programs is an interesting approach. We fully support the Intents and their budgets and look forward to the impacts that they make.

We vote FOR the proposal because it’s essential for the Collective to support a well-established grant system and adjust the rewards based on the increased works and scopes to take on. Organizing a grant system with an appropriate structure is an incredible feat and should be valued. We are excited to see the measurements that the new Grant Council can achieve with updated Intents. OP Chain grants programs are something we particularly look forward.

While we appreciate Ed's additional requirements to be presented, less budget increases with the current scope of work led by Zach makes sense to us.

All of the proposed Intents make perfect sense. Excited to see Intent 2 can make impact on the growth of Optimism ecosystem.

It’s a minor, but important fix to improve the advanced delegation on Agora.

It’s great to see the continuous efforts to improve on the security, integrity and decentralization of the rollup.

We vote FOR the proposal at its Snapshot phase with the additional report included as the first selection. As described, this change will clearly increase the efficiency of the similar operations for the various initiatives. We would also like to see the election and term systems to be included in the Tally voting as suggested by other delegates. We don’t necessarily mind 1 year term, but it would be good to see staggered signer terms (e.g. 6 people cycles in 6 months.)

Described in the page

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because we believe it’s important to provide a non-developer friendly UI to force transaction inclusions possibly regardless of sequencer being down or not for less trust assumptions.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally because it’s very well-considered and positive to both of Arbitrum and Curve ecosystems as a whole. Additional commitments from Michael is great as well.

We vote FOR the proposal on Tally as the same reason provided in the Snapshot voting. We also understand that the deliverables that the team focuses on are as described, and our requested information will be delivered afterwards.

With the ReGOOSE update by hasu, we believe establishing the Lido Alliance would lead the direction toward a more decentralized and safer Ethereum ecosystem.

The proposal addresses key issues that are essential for Lido DAO’s future strategy.

We appreciate all the work the working group has produced and consider it rational to extend the research with a reasonable budget assigned to the passionate operator.

Same as the off-chain one

it’s clearly addressed the feedback on the Subsidy Fund proposal, the selection of the firm, DeDaub is solid (Excellent works with recognized projects), and the cost seems reasonable.

We generally agree with GFX Labs’ take on the process of having the applications immediately after the official application period. While there are some good ones, we believe they should have waited for the next round of the grant program (either the next LTIPP or a permanent program) to be ready. Only Curve one is an exception as it’s not marked as an LTIPP application and huge commitment promised by the Curve founder with a well-crafted application.

The proposal has been updated with additional commitments from the LTIPP advisors and promised program manager role as well as the data and audit reports by OBL for us to evaluate the results by the STIP and optimistically approve the additional fundings.

GovHack in ETHDenver was a success in terms of connecting the delegates, contributors and core team members (Foundation and OCL) to have a opportunity to gather and discuss important topics in the Arbitrum DAO. We enjoyed the event as a whole and fully support the succeeding one in Brussels.

While we vote for this option to signal the support for the overall initiative, we expect it to be revised by incorporating feedback

We generally support the initiative while the exact amount for the Arbitrum DAO to offer can be discussed more before the on-chain voting

We consider this proposal as a good experiment to enhance the powers that retail users have with the leverage powered by the product aligned with the Arbitrum vision.

Same as Renew GateSeal for the Withdrawal Queue and Validator Exit Bus Oracle

The intension, implementation and audit reports look all good. We support the new addition to the governance system.

We assume this proposal was created based on careful considerations by the Grants Council and contributors and it’s generally considered optimal to reallocate unused funds to the needed area

Chose candidates for 1) Arbitrum codebase expert (fred) 2) security expert (Certora) 3) Arbitrum ecosystem expert (bartek.eth from L2BEAT) based on background diversity, technical capabilities and geographical diversity. 4k for bartek, 4k for Certora, and other 5k+ for fred.

We vote FOR the continuation of the program and the updated compensations for DA and PM as we did at its temp check voting. We have also confirmed that Questbook team suggest annual re-elections of the members which was a concern at the Snapshot phase and appropriately addressed in the forum.

We vote FOR the proposal while we understand that having trust-minimized options for unexpected emergencies is crucial to keep the protocol safe and that Lido is still on the way to achieve making them into protocols

Because of clear guidance provided by the council, we vote for most of the protocols besides some exceptions described in the the page.

We’d like to express full support of the initiative that covers a list of necessary improvements to be done for the better DAO operations by all parties and we are looking forward to seeing a great DAO tooling product thrive with the growth of the Arbitrum DAO.

We recognize the contributions by the early contributors and consider the rewards reasonable as a one-off.

Great step to experiment treasury diversifications with a group of experienced service providers to lead the program

Voted for Jordan from Event Horizon as other prominent candidates are already qualified for the next round

We vote against it because we believe it's simply too rushed and more analysis is required for the experiment to be funded further.

We appreciate the effort that PL has put in and agree with the lessons that they will address with the renewed budget and structure.

The proposal covers a list of necessary improvements to be done for the better DAO operations by all parties and we are looking forward to seeing a great DAO tooling product thrive with the growth of the Arbitrum DAO.

While the budget appears huge, the Arbitrum DAO needs to catch up with other L2 to make it home for the gaming projects and the initiative is much needed for the purpose.

We understand this is an important step for the automation to achieve further decentralization

While we have several questions to be answered, we vote for the proposal since we agree with its general direction.

As delegation has been proven to work well in the other DAOs, this is a great step for a better governance of Lido.

As it has been proven to be the best approach to prioritize the native bridges to avoid liquidity fragmentation, we consider this approach to deploy wstETH should be the right decision.

We highly appreciate efforts made for the investigation by the team, and we believe this is a part of the process of making secure system.

We believe it’s important to provide a non-developer friendly UI to force transaction inclusions and WakeUp team should be able to provide this with reasonable compensations.

We support the continuation of the program and the updated compensations for DA and PM. We also echo others who mentioned that the renewal of the DAs should be discussed and up for election in the future.

We are voting in favor of “Set L1 Surplus Fee and L2 Minimum Base Fee” because we believe DAO should prioritize UX over revenue at this moment.

40% each on Trail of Bits and OpenZeppelin, renowned security experts and 20% on Halborn who has started being involved in Arbitrum DAO with their great track record.

We are in favor of electing Chaos Labs because their track record related to risk assessment is great and the only candidate.

100% on L2BEAT/Ant Federation because what L2BEAT has done to Arbitrum and the ecosystem is amazing and a great candidate working with Ant Federation.

100% on Blockworks/Delphi because members who are more dedicated to Arbitrum DAO are involved while The Block is a prominent candidate for the Research Member

We are voting for the proposal because we are in full support of the activation that adopts EIP-4844 blobs to see a drastic reductions in transaction fees and additional changes to the OP stack from the L1 Dencun improvements.

We are in support of the proposed specs and implementations. The audit results are good to proceed without small fixes. While we think this change doesn't have to be passed with the Ecotone change, we vote for the proposal.

ICP is a good addition to the dYdX market.

While we see some improvements to be done by the newly formed EDP team especially on the transparent reporting, we support the program to continuously support the dYdX ecosystem.

We appreciate the effort by Offchain Labs to support EIP-4844 swiftly for the upcoming mainnet release and are confident these improvements make positive impact on the Arbitrum ecosystem.

The motivation and implementations are reasonable and we believe this change leads to a better election process of the Security Council members.

EOS is a reasonable addition to the dYdX market

ORDI is an interesting one and good to be in the dYdX market

JTO is a great addition to the dYdX market

We are in support of the proposal that makes governance more accessible to improvements of the dYdX chain.

We believe new members are great addition to the DOT

As stated in our snapshot voting, we believe the pilot program has been improved with new actors and considerable thoughts and effort so that it will make impact to the growth of the Arbitrum ecosystem.

Voted for all requests except for 3B (We'd wait for the impact made by WLTA), 3C (Not quite clear what it can achieve with a huge budget), 3D (Abstain as a dYdX delegate), 3M (Not quite sure if it's worth a mission request)

All mission requests have potentials that make impact per token spent.

The intention to the main changes is reasonable. The specs look good. Other two changes (a fix on a potential issue during an upgrade and token creation related changes) look also good (though the third change seems unrelated to the main changes.)

Voted for all requests except for 2K (we’d see if ETHCC one succeeds), 2C (better with Foundation support) and 2I (Agreed with Krzysztof on focusing on phase 1 with less budget)

All of those development related requests are promising to make impact depending on applications.

We believe BNB market is a great addition to the dYdX chain

We believe AAVE market is a great addition to the market

This should be evaluated based on a specific framework and by a group of members who are experienced in gaming and its grant system.

We appreciate all the work put by Arbiters during the launch of Arbitrum, but are against their retro rewards because 1) they have already received some compensations from the Foundation. 2) there were no key measurements or criteria set for the rewards when it comes to managing the Discord community. It should have been clearly discussed beforehand with the Foundation or whoever manages the Discord or local communities.

Both changes make sense and the code is simple with unit tests and audit by ToB.

Great step to experiment treasury diversifications with a group of experienced service providers to lead the program

The motivation and implementations are reasonable and we believe this change leads to a better election process of the Security Council members.

JUP is an upcoming and promising token for the dYdX to add to the market and see the data to be ready for the permissionless market introduction

It’s favorable to form a committee to be specialized in procurement for the DAO and we have a great selection of members working on this initiative.

Voted 40% for Joseph as he should lead the committee, voted 30% each for Jeff and Bernard to support him with ample experiences that they have

We appreciate rigorous and thorough analysis on the first distribution of the launch incentives by Chaos Labs and look forward to the coming distributions

We are in full support of the Foundation to keep their work within dYdX and collaborate with us and other stakeholders.

To achieve the revised Stage1 designation, we believe increasing the threshold to 9/12 is the vital first step to improve the council

Now that the CoC exists in Optimism Collective, it makes sense to rely on it to properly manage the issues around grant misusage with the process clearly ratified.

“Span Batches” to be introduced with this upgrade reduces the L1 costs for OP chains, which is nothing but great for the Optimism ecosystem.

Introducing the ICA host submodule and other improvements is welcome changes to the chain and we are in full support of the upgrade

We believe this is the essential first step to rewards active delegates and continuous commitments from existing and new dedicated participants to the DAO. We appreciate the careful considerations and clearly outlined evaluation process.

We are in support of the initiative to go forward after the diligent considerations and amendments made to improve the original proposal. It's great to see a democratic process to choose the service providers to address issues that have been discussed for a while.

Chose 3 candidates. Clarified the reasonings in the description.

Clarified in https://twitter.com/tanelabs/status/1749078806877397499

An improved version of the STIP and we believe it's worth trying it as a pilot

No reason to oppose to continuous updates to the Arbitrum stack

Any changes to the chain state should be done when it’s absolutely required, and we don’t consider this case to be one of them.

We believe it’s a great idea to move governance for existing components into the new system

We believe it’s a great addition to the dYdX to have TIA and upcoming tokens that have potential to attract more traders and volumes

While 10% discount is not ideal for the DAO, Wintermute is dYdX’s one of the long-time partners and we believe it’s important to seed the insurance fund sooner rather than waiting for better offers.

No objection to include well-tested and less critical changes to the protocol into the Optimism stacks. Side note: great summary of the upgrade in the forum, but the proposal description can better incorporate it with organized structure.

While we agree with the points that prominent delegates who voted abstain, we believe the motivation and the selection of the members are solid and meaningful for Optimism, thus we vote for the ratification of the council members selected by the Foundation.

While it’s not an ideal solution, the social committee approach is the best mitigation solution that we can apply at this point. We also expect the capable group of contributors to come up with a framework to better address the MEV in the future.

It’s critical to move forward with the incentive programs despite the fact that there are still concerns on the centralization of staking to top X validators. We expect users/traders/stakers to stake more once the trading ramps up the volume and staking APR is available for them.

Chose those three for their activities and contributions in the forum

Chose Jack Anorak and Gonna.eth for their technical capabilities and Kaereste for their involvement as L2BEAT

MMhurthy for his experiences in building Karma, Raho for his contributions to the Arbitrum STIP, and Curia for their continuous contributions to the protocols

While many unclear points are not being discussed (e.g. how to select a chain and how much tokens to delegate, etc), this is important for the Optimism family to grow based on shared vision and aligned incentives

It’s good for the Collective to be responsible for the budgets and spends on all Intents going forward in the coming Seasons. The budgets seem reasonable and we are looking forward to the outcome made by the initiatives supported by them.

Chose 3 members for their experience in Optimism governance and 2 members for their expertises to be effective to resolve conflicts based on CoC

This is a critical step to structure rules for chains using OP Stack to be aligned and grow together as an alliance

We believe we are ready to go for the trading with all markets available on the dYdX Chain

The idea of having an organization like this is appealing but the details, structure and framework need to be further discussed and reach to consensus before deciding to fund it

No reason to be against the idea of the consolidation

DAO shouldn’t reward contributors without the information about who they are, what each of them has done and how they are selected and others are not.

This bridging of the Community and Rewards Treasuries is the critical step to properly bootstrap the dYdX Chain with the proposed Launch Incentive Program and other initiatives, and it’s important for the community to fully support its implementation and execution.

The most important expertise required for a security council member is the deep knowledge with the protocol tech stacks and Harry, CTO of Offchain Labs is undoubtedly the best candidate.

While we believe the security is paramountly important in the self-custody environment and what Webacy has been doing is clearly beneficial to the whole ecosystem, there are a couple of reasons that the proposal is not fit for STIP grant distributions: 1) the justification of the requested grant size is weak compared to the outcome. 2) incentives are prone to sybil attacks 3) not clear incentives to Arbitrum itself

Camelot kicked off this STIP movement, and diligently tried to get aligned with what it can do for Arbitrum throughout the process. Definitely beneficial for Arbitrum to have Camelot thrive as one of the household names.

While Vertex is an interesting protocol to thrive in Arbitrum, we abstain because we are an Endorsed Delegate of dYdX which is the direct competitor of Vertex from users’ perspective.

Tally’s mission is to advance on-chain governance further and it’s aligned very well with L2 like Arbitrum because of its lower gas. The requested grant size is reasonable and we believe that the Tally team is diligently allocating them to the DAOs on Arbitrum, which would make impact on Arbitrum with the great governance tool.

On top of the raised concerns around dominance of stETH in Ethereum, the justifications of the grant size seems weak and off as stETH related trading volume is already huge. We would like Lido to propose their request in another way, address concerns and focus on properly introducing the native stETH in Arbitrum.

unshETH is very unique and natively supported on Arbitrum. It’s good to contribute to decentralization of liquid staking tokens. The requested grant size is reasonable.

We’ve seen their founders active in the NYC crypto meetups and spoken highly of Arbitrum in terms of experiences on the platform. The reasonable requested grant size. We believe the incentive is to be used to promote more interesting use within the ecosystem.

Pendle is bringing interest derivative market into DeFi and evolving the ecosystem with unique offerings. The requested grant size is reasonable and set out to be used efficiently.

While GMX is a leading protocol to thrive in Arbitrum, we abstain because we are an Endorsed Delegate of dYdX which is the direct competitor of GMX from users’ perspective.