Tané is running blockchain network operations, namely running validators and participating in protocols’ DAO governance as delegates in addition to the investment/incubation.
This page is to show our activities and provide useful information so that you can consider supporting us by staking/delegating your tokens to us.
Validators
We believe in the power of decentralization and the decentralized systems like blockchains. Validators are the essential components to keep blockchain running and delivering values to applications and their users. Since we are determined to contribute to Web3 projects as well as investments to them, we are running validators for them.
DAO Governance
DAO Governance should come with running validators. Validators are the key stakeholders and critical participants in each project which is going to become its DAO. Proactive participations like having civil and constructive discussions, making proposals and contributing to decisions to be made in the DAO can be meaningful and critical for the DAO to be successful in the long run.
All voting activities
Proposal | 📡 Protocol | Our Vote | Type of Vote | Rationale | Voting URL | Vote Date |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
For | Off-chain | We believe it makes sense to execute a sweep stored by the Nova transactions as discussed in the previous proposal that we already supported. We also believe bundling the Timeboost change and this proposal should make sense for their onchain voting. | February 5, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We voted in favor of this proposal as we agree with the direction of establishing a structured framework to support grant delivery and ensuring appropriate compensation for those efforts. However, we believe there are significant areas for improvement in the reward structure and role distribution, as we outlined in our comment. Given our experience in grant operations at Tané, we are eager to actively contribute to this area, including potential participation in the committee. | February 4, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | Properly pursuing investment returns is essential for CoW DAO’s long-term sustainability, and allocating these resources to the Core Treasury team aligns with that objective. We trust karpatkey’s proven track record to responsibly manage the treasury and drive meaningful value back to the DAO. | February 4, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We support this proposal as it enhances governance flexibility. It is expected to enable adjustments such as lowering the COMP requirement to encourage small holders' participation, raising the quorum to strengthen security, and modifying voting delay and period for faster decision-making and greater fairness. These improvements make governance more adaptable and inclusive. | January 31, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | Introducing the AssetListFactory removes contract size constraints, allowing flexible collateral additions for mainnet’s principal markets (USDC, USDT, USDS). This expansion is expected to boost liquidity and strengthen competitiveness, with OpenZeppelin’s audit concerns already addressed. Given strong community support and manageable risks, I believe the benefits outweigh any potential downsides. Thus, a favorable vote is justified. | January 31, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the proposal to implement Safe Harbor because it improves the protocol’s emergency response by enabling swift action from whitehat hackers. This helps reduce the risk of fund losses during blackhat attacks. Additionally, since this implementation does not require additional costs, it is a beneficial upgrade to the existing bug bounty program without imposing financial burdens. | January 30, 2025 | |||
Yes | On-chain | 1. CSM: Enable Permissionless Phase, Increase the Share Limit and Increase the Priority Exit Threshold We reaffirm our support for this proposal, consistent with our previous stance on Snapshot. We believe that fully opening CSM to the public will significantly enhance both Lido’s and Ethereum’s decentralization. 2. NO Acquisitions: Bridgetower is now part of Solstice Staking We continue to support this proposal, just as we did during the snapshot. We see no negative impact on operational quality or on Lido’s geographical dispersion, given that the operational structure will remain the same. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | Establishing the Ecosystem BORG Foundation clarifies accountability by consolidating decisions around external partnerships, cross-chain integrations, and institutional outreach within a single entity. This separation from protocol-focused tasks makes it easier to trace responsibility for strategic ecosystem decisions, benefiting both Lido DAO and external partners through greater transparency. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We see a clear advantage in establishing a dedicated entity for managing protocol development and governance, as it creates a single, accountable structure for critical activities. We believe this will foster transparent decision-making and reduce operational risks for contributors and the community. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | The proposed changes do not appear to introduce any concerns regarding operational quality or compromise the network’s geographical diversity. Consequently, there is no compelling reason to oppose Attestant’s continued participation under the new ownership structure. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We see no reason for concern regarding this transition, given that the on-premise setup and the core team appear to stay exactly the same, indicating no decline in operational quality nor negative impact on Lido’s geographical decentralization. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We agree with the proposal to replace Tim Beiko with Eric Siu and to allow the council to make such personnel changes without requiring DAO approval, as long as the process is transparent. We believe it is important for the DAO to retain the authority to exercise personnel rights over the council. The introduction of a notice period is meaningful and helps ensure proper transitions. As noted by @Alex_L, this notice period is expected to be properly implemented. However, one concern is that this was not explicitly stated in the Snapshot proposal. We hope that future proposals will clearly specify such details to maintain transparency and clarity. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | Morpho’s current TVL growth rate has been outpacing that of other major protocols, even after some reward reduction. We believe that lowering costs at this stage will not hinder Morpho’s overall trajectory and will free resources for future investment. | January 30, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | Based on our first-hand experience in the Lido DAO, implementing the GOOSE (Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise) for the DAO to be aligned on what the DAO should focus on, we believe this is the right approach to make the DAO move into its execution mode after setting the MVP. We also appreciate the carefully structured process and an additional consideration to incorporate partial recommendations utilizing the appropriate tool (which was our concern in the GOOSE process) As it’s discussed by @404DAO, and its trade-off is recognized by others, incentivizing the submissions from a variety of delegates/contributors would be the key to receiving as many great proposals as possible, otherwise the objective setting process feels “centralized” in the end. It would be interesting to consider what non-financial benefits can be awarded for the submitters of the competitive SOSs. | January 29, 2025 | |||
Against | Off-chain | We appreciate the ongoing efforts of the ArbitrumHub team. While we see the value in a centralized and regularly updated portal for Arbitrum DAO-related information, relying on a third-party team for its maintenance presents significant challenges and unnecessary costs. A more effective approach would be to align with existing initiatives like GRC and its dashboard or contribute to the Foundation’s team managing the main Arbitrum site. Otherwise, long-term discoverability and maintainability could become problematic. | January 29, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | CoW Protocol has already shown steady growth and needs a sustainable revenue structure. We believe that balancing user benefits with the protocol's financial health is the right move for fostering ongoing innovation and resilience. | January 27, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 7 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary. | January 25, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | In these assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, which may be insufficient to meet demand. From a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps appears necessary. | January 24, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We think creating a bounty program is the best way to tackle fund misuse in the DAO. It’s a practical approach that empowers the DAO to help keep things accountable. We appreciate Entropy to step up to take the initiative. All the key concerns raised have been addressed clearly, and the trial phase gives room for improvements. This is a solid step toward stronger transparency and trust in the ecosystem. | January 23, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe that both Pablo and Guillaume have ample experience and expertise through their work on DeFi projects like Angle and Merkl, making them well-qualified to serve as multisig signers. | January 22, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe curators are a key factor in Morpho’s competitiveness and must be appropriately incentivized, so we support the proposal’s move to exclude those who fail to meet a relative threshold that reflects Morpho’s growth. We also believe that both the minimum threshold and the overall reward mechanism, including the amount of incentives, should be regularly evaluated and optimized over the long term. | January 22, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | First, this integration itself is a significant initiative to enhance DeFi accessibility, and it makes sense to increase incentives to boost deposits in preparation for rising borrowing demand. Since increased borrowing demand can also lead to greater deposit demand, setting the incentive at 50% of the usual rate seems reasonable. | January 22, 2025 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | Described in the note | January 22, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain the support made at its Snapshot phase and continuously support the technical advancement in the Arbitrum ecosystem. Same goes to the Infura Nova validator whitelisting. | January 22, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | Considering the governance efficiencies introduced by SEP 49, the shift aligns well with the DAO's evolving needs. Additionally, given that each Sprint spans four weeks, which is a relatively long cycle, allowing all proposal types to be addressed in every Sprint significantly enhances Safe DAO's responsiveness to time-sensitive topics. | January 17, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We have already supported this proposal in the snapshot vote and did the same in this onchain vote. We believe that clarifying various rules like these will make the Uniswap DAO more transparent and open. | January 16, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | As stated for the previous snapshot vote, we believe this proposal is essential for enhancing Uniswap’s security and ensuring effective responses during critical situations. | January 16, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We appreciate Devan and the committee members for their diligent executions and reporting in the initial STEP. The estimated annual yield, $875k from the $30 million endowment isn’t particularly impressive, but it should have played a good role in the Arbitrum RWA ecosystem. On condition that this is the last term of the STEP, considering other treasury diversification programs are planned, we support the continuation of the program with a great selection of the established actors in the committee and a reasonable budget. | January 16, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe it's beneficial to start from research and understand what builders want for the ecosystem by learning from other ecosystems. | January 13, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is a continuation of the adjustments made in Parts 1 through 6 and represents a consistent step in the ongoing improvement process. Considering that previous proposals have been aligned with market trends, this adjustment also appears well-reasoned and necessary. | January 12, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal aims to enhance liquidity and capital efficiency by increasing supply caps for key assets and adjusting interest rate curves for Mainnet USDC and USDT Comets. While we support these changes as they address growing demand and align with market conditions, we recommend providing additional data, such as utilization trends, to validate the necessity of these adjustments. | January 11, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | We keep supporting this proposal for the same reasons as its Snapshot vote, and we are looking to see the growth driven by this combined incentive program. | January 7, 2025 | |||
For | On-chain | Same as its Snapshot vote, we believe the amount requested seems reasonable considering the TVL and the expected growth of the Celo ecosystem. | January 7, 2025 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe a sudden, one-shot reward reduction could unexpectedly trigger a steep TVL decline, so a phased approach lets us monitor and respond quickly if TVL decreases beyond expectations. While the estimated $600k cost for this multi-stage method based on our calculation is a concern, we view it as a reasonable trade-off compared to the risk of losing a significant portion of our accumulated TVL at once. | December 31, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support this proposal because Sonic demonstrates significant growth potential and offers a dynamic environment suitable for a $250k incentive. Furthermore, its robust infrastructure, high throughput, and continued developer-focused efforts position Sonic as an emerging ecosystem where Uniswap can expand its market share. With these points in mind, we cast our vote in favor of this proposal. | December 25, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal improves capital efficiency by increasing supply caps and aligns interest rate curves with market demand. These changes enhance liquidity, promote competitiveness, and support the protocol’s adaptability in a dynamic market. | December 25, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We have voted in favor of this proposal, as we believe it enhances Uniswap DAO’s capital efficiency and ensures we do not miss opportunities to grow the DAO’s market share. We also look forward to the continued activities of the Uniswap Growth Program. | December 24, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | We oppose this proposal. Compared to other chains that have received incentives in the past, Metal’s TVL is still small, and we feel that granting 250k in incentives is not appropriate. While it is indeed important for Uniswap to build market share across various chains, we believe incentives should align with each chain’s growth stage. From that perspective, Metal has not yet reached a point where allocating 250k in incentives to gain market share is justified, and thus we have voted against this proposal. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support this proposal. Considering Celo’s TVL and its track record of collaboration with Uniswap, a $250k incentive alongside a $105k deployment cost appears to be a reasonable budget. Additionally, matching incentives from Celo itself is a welcome move. We look forward to seeing this proposal drive greater Uniswap share and activity on the Celo network. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The US-based ENS service provider, eth.limo requests a reimbursement of its ongoing legal fees. They have already spent over 24k USD to correspond to US federal requests. We recognize this proposal as the necessary cost for Limo, a service provider headquartered in the US, to continue providing services to ENS. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Preparation for CoW protocol's expansion to other chains in the coming years is essential. While it would have been ideal to maintain the same address without changes, given the technical constraints, this proposal represents a necessary and practical step forward. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | As highlighted in CIP-58, expansion remains a critical theme. This proposal constitutes a core component of that strategy. We found no significant objections or concerns to address in this proposal. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | The decision to pursue various forms of expansion next year is highly reasonable, given the current state of the products and their position in the market. Considering this, the proposed budget size is also appropriate, and budget management has been handled properly. | December 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support this proposal because it is critical for strengthening Uniswap’s security and provides the necessary budget and guidelines to achieve that goal. By protecting whitehat hackers and offering them proper incentives, we believe this approach will safeguard Uniswap’s customer assets. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal optimizes interest rate curves for select Comets and adjusts COMP rewards to align with market needs. By refining borrowing and supply incentives, it ensures efficient liquidity provision while curbing excessive spending. This targeted approach supports sustainability and competitiveness across chains. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | It allows Morpho’s core team to focus on protocol deployment while Oku provides a valuable initiative on the frontend. Although $400k is a significant amount, we believe it will be justified through user onboarding and incentive programs to be realized that attract users on L2 and alt-L1 ecosystems. For future proposals of this nature, whether submitted by GFXlabs or other contributors, it would be beneficial to design a compensation scheme that aligns the incentives of the proposer with those of the Morpho DAO as Leuts suggested. Ideally, the compensation for contributors like GFXlabs should be more directly tied to measurable performance outcomes, such as the growth in TVL driven by the Oku frontend initiative. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This allows the core team to focus solely on the deployment of the core protocol, significantly reducing their workload related to crosschain deployments. Additionally, by encouraging external developers to create independent frontends on specific chains, the framework fosters flexible user experiences and facilitates the addition of unique features tailored to individual ecosystems. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | The proposed changes appear to maintain a sufficiently competitive yield compared to key competitors, ensuring user attraction while optimizing costs. With more detailed data expected early next year, we look forward to contributing to future discussions on incentive design that are grounded in robust data analysis. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Supporting the liquidity of the MORPHO token contributes to the stable growth of the project. Combined with Uni v3, which is already whitelisted on Base, we expect this to improve the overall liquidity of the MORPHO token across Base. | December 22, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support the initiative to unify the Mission, Vision, and Purpose of the Arbitrum DAO. This foundational step will enable the DAO to craft and execute appropriate strategies, aligned with a to-be-determined Strategic Objective Setting, ensuring that stakeholders work cohesively toward shared goals. Drawing inspiration from successful implementations like Lido’s MVP and GOOSE initiatives, this proposal has the potential to align contributors and DAO participants effectively. We appreciate the Purpose statement for its clarity in defining why the DAO exists—it is well-articulated and resonates strongly. While the Mission provides a direction for what the DAO should do in the mid-term, its reference to “the best onchain world” could benefit from more specificity. Similarly, the Vision is thought-provoking but somewhat ambiguous, as the term “the universal shift” might need further clarification. Additionally, the emphasis on “onchain” in both the Mission and Vision could unintentionally exclude projects that bridge “offchain” and “onchain” ecosystems. However, we recognize that clear focus is crucial for defining the DAO’s trajectory. If these statements are widely agreed upon by the DAO participants, settling on them and executing aligned strategies is a meaningful and necessary step forward. | December 20, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support the overall direction of the initiative and greatly appreciate the effort, as well as the articulate and well-thought-out proposal by @Entropy. We recognize the value of an OpCo or its equivalent, as highlighted by @WintermuteGovernance. Our experience with dYdX governance reinforces our belief that such structures are critical and practical solutions for maturing DAOs with a broad base of stakeholders and delegates, like Arbitrum. However, we also have concerns regarding the size and budget of The OAT. While the OAT has hiring as its important task in the beginning, its key mandate should focus on observing and overseeing OpCo’s activities. In this context, having five members seems excessive. Additionally, bonus compensation should be outcome-based rather than granted simply for remaining in their positions. | December 20, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain our vote and reasoning at the Snapshot stage and continue to support the initiative while being a little skeptical about the success of the projects itself. Regarding the details of the capital commitment, we believe they could have been clarified and communicated better, but we appreciate the fact that the RnDAO team has committed their effort to the success of the builders for the Arbitrum ecosystem and consider it acceptable. We hope the team learnt from the failure of the previous experiment described in the Entropy’s rationale and will support the selected teams to further grow within the Arbitrum ecosystem. | December 20, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe this proposal enhances Uniswap’s security and operational resilience, while the agreement’s bounty structure is both reasonable and beneficial for users. | December 20, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | We appreciate @ostanescu.eth for the proposal first. We look forward to the presence from Arbitrum at ETH Bucharest! However, we can’t justify the funding as we echo @BlockworksResearch 's opinion on “the DAO Events budget should remain for Arbitrum-specific events” in addition to other concerns from delegates on the budgets and use of the Questbook grants and wouldn’t support this proposal as it stands. | December 19, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This is the resubmission of the ZIP-001 that we already supported and voted for. | December 19, 2024 | |||
Yes | On-chain | December 19, 2024 | ||||
Yes | On-chain | We support the defense mechanism to protect the liquidity of the JitoSol while wondering if there is any other way to prevent this from happening rather than putting on fees on those “toxic” flows. | December 19, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain the voting and rationale made at the Snapshot stage and also look forward to OpCo being in charge of the initiative going forward. We also echo @pedrob 's points on “being very difficult for THE DAO to reject recommendations from the selected council members” and would still like to see a more automated solution for the treasury management with a clarified and articulated IPS being agreed on by the DAO. | December 18, 2024 | |||
Yes | On-chain | 1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe that the requested amount is reasonable compared to previous grants and it aligns with Lido's goals. Delivering dual governance and permissionless CSM is essential, and we look forward to seeing these milestones achieved and the next initiatives proposed. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This is a significant step towards improving decentralization for both Lido and the broader Ethereum ecosystem. Allowing CSM to become fully permissionless while carefully managing risks is a sensible and desirable approach to expand its scale and impact. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This appropriately aligns the Standard Node Operator Protocol (SNOP) with the evolving landscape of new Staking Modules, ensuring policies remain relevant, particularly regarding exit processes. Clarifying the recovery process for Node Operators (NOs) to return to in good standing should reduce participation barriers and encourages broader engagement. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This proposal aligns with GOOSE-2 vision of diversifying product lines to expand stETH adoption, leveraging external resources through the Lido Alliance. Projects like Mellow Protocol already demonstrate strong growth potential, and the budget appears reasonable. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | As Tané, we are pleased to contribute to the Lido DAO through making this proposal with Lido DAO Ops. By extending the voting duration, as outlined, we believe it will reduce the burden on participants, enabling safer and more efficient governance. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We are excited to observe this experimental initiative managed by Butter and Uniswap Foundation and look forward to seeing the details of the project in coming months. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | It’s critical to hyper-focus on the important metric with other parties aligned. Less budget allocated makes sense as the superchain grants are out of scope from this season. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the Security Council requests and owns its budget from the governance, and operate for the governance. The appropriate compensation balance between the lead and the members can be revisited in the next season. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The existence of the council has been discussed since the last season and it makes sense for us to dissolve it as the Foundation suggests it will be independent from the power dynamics of the Token House. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the transition of the M&M to an own council to operate under its own budget. The scope of the work is reasonable and Jun from PGov is a great lead to manage the council. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the budget request and changes to the scope of the DAB as the DAB has been critical in the operations of the Grants Council and contributions to the Collective. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the audacious changes to the structure of the council based on the careful considerations on the feedback and learnings in the Season 6. We continue to support the contributions from the Grants Council and other structures in the Collective. | December 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe the Collective still needs this structure to keep the health of the governance. | December 16, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe hyper-focus on an important north star metric is critical for all the parties involved for the Superchain growth. | December 16, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | All the proposed changes that are the chain derivation changes, the EIP-1559 elasticity parameter change and the MIPS related changes look reasonable and make sense, to be staged for the future major upgrades. The failure mode analysis provided for these changes is well-thought-out while these changes are not audited according to the Audit Framework. | December 16, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Great to see this function to be live soon with diligent testings | December 16, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Maintaining a high level of solver competition is essential to preserving CoW’s competitive edge. With the right incentives, the protocol can continue providing optimal services to its users. | December 16, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for Limes, an experienced Steward with high time commitment, Slobo, another experienced Steward, and cap, whose knowledge and experience as a Dapps Builder is expected to be valuable in future Namechain and other L2 platforms. Although these three have significantly different backgrounds, we expect that this diversity will promote new ideas in the ENS Ecosystem. | December 14, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | To support the long-term and continuous development of ENS DAO, we support new talents emerging as Stewards. Therefore, we voted for the two current experienced Stewards and sovereignsignal, who excel in Grant management. We expect that with current Stewards and experienced new members, new improvement ideas for ENS Public Goods will be promoted. | December 14, 2024 | |||
Abstain | Off-chain | We will abstain from voting for one of the candidates. However, if we were to select two candidates other than ourselves, we would recommend the two experienced Stewards. | December 14, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe it is reasonable to make the decisive judgment to discontinue this feature, understanding that it is expected to be short-lived for v2. | December 14, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary. | December 14, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal also addresses the need to adjust COMP rewards to better align with market dynamics. By reducing borrow-side COMP rewards, it aims to curb excessive spending and promote a more sustainable incentive structure. Meanwhile, maintaining robust supply-side rewards ensures continued liquidity provision and supports the protocol’s competitiveness in attracting suppliers. This balanced approach reflects the evolving needs of the market while preserving the protocol's long-term stability. | December 14, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is a concrete implementation of the recently discussed opinion that "supply-side incentives should be strengthened, and borrow-side incentives should be reduced," and the reasons for agreement are clear. By increasing supply rates at low utilization, it aims to provide attractive returns for suppliers and promote liquidity provision. On the other hand, borrow-side incentives have been reviewed by raising borrow rates at high utilization, effectively curbing excessive borrowing. | December 14, 2024 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | Both of the security service providers are very strong candidates without doubt and qualified for the role. Slightly favored in OpenZeppelin because of the competitive hourly fee and experience as the V1 contributions and context around the vision and challenges. | December 13, 2024 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | With the top-class researchers and experiences in the blockchain industry, @Nethermind stands out as a key candidate for the Risk role. They have been involved in the Arbitrum as a member of the STEP committee and surely provide the critical contributions to the ARDC V2. | December 13, 2024 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | With the ongoing involvement for the Arbitrum research projects and contributions, we chose @BlockworksResearch and @CastleCapital (with Llama Research). Having @Messari as a prominent crypto research institution (and complementary marketing support) is definitely a plus for the Arbitrum DAO. | December 13, 2024 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | Operations: Entropy + Tamara we are grateful to see Entropy being involved with the operations, and working with a promising DAO operator, Tamara. Communications: Frisson and JuanRah + Alex Lumley. @Frisson has been a critical delegate and representative of Tally which is a vital tool for the Arbitrum DAO with great communication and coordination skills. We are impressed with the background and involvement with the Arbitrum DAO from @Juanrah and believe a great addition to the council with @AlexLumley involvement. | December 13, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We vote for Renew with 5 domains (adding Orbit) . With a good structure and system, Questbook to target the right audience to provide the grants for the Arbitrum ecosystem. the Arbitrum D.A.O. (while we don’t necessarily like the naming of it as it’s confusing with DAO) should continue with the new addition for the important offering of the Arbitrum ecosystem, Orbit. We appreciate @maxlomu 's contribution to the Orbit domain grants as well. | December 13, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | While we haven’t received a clear answer to the compensation structure in our comment below, we agree with the general direction of the concept and this proposal should go for an onchain vote. We also believe the DAO should pay governance analysts and program contributors, but there should be a compensation structure that is aligned with what the program can achieve with clear goal that comes with the KPIs. While being challenging to set the right KPIs to monitor the ongoing impact from the governance fellows, it’s critical to design the program to dare to address the ultimate issues that the DAO has. [NON-CONSTITUTIONAL] Arbitrum Onboarding V2: A Governance Bootcamp Proposals | December 13, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Having transaction simulations available at the time of Snapshot submission, which can be verified, contributes to enhanced governance security. The other proposed changes also appear to be generally reasonable. | December 10, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We recognize the clear risks of relying on external protocols that are not immutable for the Optimizer. While the current TVL is approximately $500M, we believe this decision is essential to safeguard the growth of Morpho Blue and maintain the Morpho brand accordingly. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support this proposal as it enables Morpho to secure a low 7-figure fee, even though the exact amount is undisclosed. Additionally, it does not place an excessive burden on the contributors’ resources. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe that Ethereum’s rollup-centric roadmap makes it strategically important to secure a significant position in the largest rollup ecosystem over the medium to long term. Therefore, incentives on Base should be actively increased. While this proposal represents a gradual increase, we remain open to considering more assertive approaches if deemed necessary in the future. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | The introduction of a grant program is a vital step in expanding the ecosystem. Running it as a pilot program will likely reveal various challenges, and we aim to contribute meaningfully to address them. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Contributors should be fairly compensated for their efforts, and the amount proposed is reasonable and well within acceptable parameters. Importantly, the allocation process appears both transparent and proper. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The change makes sense to improve the user experience with the Security Council oversight in place. | December 9, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe that rules enhancing the transparency and public nature of the Uniswap DAO, and making DAO governance by delegates fairer, are important for the DAO. We agree with these principles, which can improve the health of the Uniswap DAO by garnering support from more delegates. | December 8, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary. | December 7, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We vote for Arbitrum and two others. We support the general direction of the initiative; it’s vital to understand what customers think about the product and ecosystem via user research. While the ARDC could cover this in an ideal world, we think it’s acceptable for another initiative like this to cover the important initiative. Eventually, the DAO should have its continuous system to work on efforts around this user research area. Without compared ecosystems to research against, the research outcome will be less valuable, thus we choose the option including two others. They should not necessarily be Solana and OP Mainnet, but can be Solana and Base, or even Solana ecosystem and Superchain ecosystem, which would be more valuable. Articulated criteria on how to choose builders for the research is critical to answer but can be further reported in the ongoing meetings (e.g. GRC) Forming a “council” does make sense but we consider it more like a review group with different stakeholders, rather than “council” that has been more operating roles within the Arbitrum DAO, to our knowledge (e.g. LTIPP council) On metagovernance topics like “why this proposal was rushed onto Snapshot?”, we should create a certain social rule on how long a proposal should be discussed before going into its Snapshot rather than arbitrarily pointing it out as it’s too short for the Snapshot phase, etc. | December 6, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | We acknowledge that this version of the proposal will be updated with another proposal in the near future. | December 6, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Testing for the treasury transfer from the onchain voting | December 4, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | While it is unfortunate for CoW DAO that the solver operations will cease, even if only temporarily, this situation is unavoidable and should be addressed appropriately. The necessary steps outlined in the thread have been properly followed prior to moving to the CIP phase, and we see no grounds for objection. | December 4, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | The bonding pool has been reimbursed, the root cause of the bug addressed, and the final procedures after the incident seem ready to be concluded. That said, we believe it is essential to establish more robust preventive measures against this kind of incident as shared here. | December 4, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Protocol governance requires expertise, making it challenging to delegate responsibilities entirely to the community. Establishing roles like recognized delegates effectively involves experts and trusted participants, strengthening the governance system. | December 4, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe that the proposal to introduce Compound Sandbox has the potential to realize governance efficiency, which is currently a key focus for the protocol. By allowing anyone to freely create and test markets, it decentralizes the experimentation process for new markets and reduces the overall burden on the protocol. Additionally, the process of promoting only successful markets to the main protocol simplifies the traditional steps of "proposal → discussion → voting → execution," accelerating the protocol’s overall growth. | December 3, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Continuous risk monitoring is essential as Mantle pursues its strategy to expand its ecosystem through collaboration with Compound. By strengthening the connection between Compound and Mantle Network, this proposal aims to activate capital flows between the two, potentially enhancing the value of Compound itself. | December 2, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is deemed appropriate as a mechanism to significantly reduce the frequency of voting and alleviate the burden on participants. It achieves a balance between efficiency and security through the introduction of timelocks and guardian roles. However, it is considered necessary to establish rules for notification to ensure transparency and implement features for referencing change histories. These measures would make it easier for participants to understand the details of changes and enhance the overall reliability of the system. | December 2, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Critical protocol updates for gas optimization and maintainability with the audit done by OpenZeppelin. | December 1, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Compound is experiencing growing demand in various markets, and maintaining competitiveness requires offering attractive incentives for borrowers. While high interest rates are already appealing, enhancing incentives remains a reasonable step to encourage broader protocol adoption. With appropriate adjustments, replenishing the rewards contracts is a justified appraoch. | November 30, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | By adding wUSDM as a new collateral asset, users can leverage arbitrage opportunities utilizing its 5% annual yield, enabling efficient asset management even in low borrow rate environments. Furthermore, as a stable collateral asset with minimal price volatility, wUSDM allows users to manage their positions efficiently while reducing risks. | November 29, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We are in support of this activity, which is expected to strengthen the community and accelerate the de-centralization of the ENS DAO. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We understand that the substantial contents of EP5.25 are already approved, and there is no practical change. We support the continued and stable activities by the established working groups. | November 27, 2024 | |||
Yes | On-chain | 1. Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC We support this proposal as having flexibility in budget limits is reasonable. That being said, we feel the scope of approval may be overly generous compared to current operational requirements. 2. TMC-4: Increase Stonks execution limits The proposed change appears to be a reasonable decision to improve operational efficiency, especially given that no issues have arisen with Stonks so far. 3. Simply Staking Node Operator Reward Address change We have reviewed this proposal and found no issues, including any discrepancies with the specified address. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | With a high degree of operational maturity, it is reasonable to improve efficiency through the introduction of an optimistic governance process. As a participant in governance, we support this proposal and will carefully monitor it to ensure that the committee functions correctly within this framework. | November 27, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We voted for sunsetting Lido on Polygon, because - The future direction of the Polygon POS chain, especially its position within Polygon's AggLayer, is unclear. - Growth is difficult due to factors beyond the control of Shard Labs and Lido DAO. - Instead, the entire Lido DAO could focus on businesses that leverage stETH, which has some huge advantages in the market. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We voted for this proposal, because - Even when an incident has occurred, it is proper to take corrective measures and gradually resume operations. - This principle remains universal, even in the case of acquisition. - By thoroughly testing through a trial run on the testnet, a certain level of safety can be ensured. That being said, we believe it's worth regularly reviewing and discussing the possibility of replacing curated NOs — not just those with prior incidents — to neutrally consider if there are other NOs more suitable for the curated set. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Similar to Bware Labs' case, we do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Its operational structure after the acquisition was announced to remain the same as before the acquisition. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We do not see any reason to discontinue their operation because - As communicated by LNOSG, they have evaluated that the transition will be smooth and without issues. - Bware Labs itself announced the continuity of its operational structure after acquisition. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We generally agree with the overall direction of Hasu's proposal, and thus voted for this proposal. However, we still have a concern regarding the main focus of the goal #1, Strengthen LDO’s Role in Governance. We acknowledge the importance of strengthening alignment across the DAO through revisions to the LDO token design. But given the presence of other challenges and the likelihood that implementing changes to the LDO token design will take considerable time, we do not believe it should be prioritized as the most critical theme in governance at this stage. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Clear guidelines ensures solvers conduct transactions appropriately, protecting user interests, the protocol and this DAO. This will be safeguards for potential damages in exceptional cases. | November 27, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | During its trial period, the GWG achieved clear results, such as improving voter participation and resolving quorum issues. This proposal offers practical ideas to solve important challenges in Compound governance, such as a new delegate reward program and better transparency in fund management. | November 26, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This action strengthens the community’s commitment to user protection and increases trust in the protocol. While the return involves a 10% penalty and a reduction in reserves, it follows a transparent and fair process. This ensures that accidental transfers are handled clearly, improving the protocol’s reputation as user-friendly while balancing user protection and protocol sustainability. | November 26, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Since LINK and UNI exhibit high volatility, the revision of the Liquidation Factor and Collateral Factor enables faster liquidations, reducing the platform's loss risk. Additionally, raising the liquidation penalty incentivizes liquidators, making the process more efficient and improving risk management. Furthermore, as the utilization rates of the supply caps are significantly low, reducing the supply caps is unlikely to negatively impact market liquidity or borrowing demand. The impact on positions with increased liquidation risk is also limited, making this proposal reasonable. | November 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe establishing a proper treasury management function in the DAO is critical as the presented key issues should be addressed sooner rather than later. We also appreciate the updated proposal that have incorporated various feedback from the other delegates including the milestone-based compensation scheme. Ultimately, the program success depends on upcoming suggestions from the TMC and GMC and we believe the selected members are capable of providing them along the way. We will closely review them and make sure they are managed in an appropriate manner via their regular reporting. In the future, as @gauntlet suggested, the DAO should explore a less manual approach to manage the treasury with minimized operations (and operating members to be elected by the DAO if needed) and we would encourage the to-be-established OpCo to propose a revised plan after the 6-months v1.2 initiative. | November 22, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The current APR for stablecoins on Compound is lower compared to Sky Protocol. However, deploying the USDS market and listing sUSDS can address this issue. The upgrade of Dai has the potential to attract more users and increase liquidity. Deploying the USDS market presents an opportunity for Compound to benefit from these advantages. | November 20, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound. | November 20, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our opinions made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the new term of the ARDC. The funding amount was lower than the one we voted for, but with the recent price appreciation, it’s matched what we believe is the best. | November 19, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our position made at the Snapshot phase and continue to support the idea of establishing the 2025 events budget for the smooth budgeting process with a clear framework. | November 19, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary. | November 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | It’s critical program to grow the ZKsync ecosystem at this stage. | November 13, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal offers advantages based on the high liquidity and reliability of FRAX, as well as the opportunity for users to leverage their assets for greater returns. Since the APY of $sFRAX is linked to the U.S. IORB rate, it is expected to provide a stable yield aligned with economic conditions, making it an attractive source of income for users. Additionally, it adds more options for collateral on Compound, helping users diversify their portfolios. | November 12, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Using wUSDM as collateral allows users on Compound to secure a stable yield through arbitrage, even when borrowing rates are low. While the current circulating supply is limited, the Optimism Yield-bearing assets incentive program is expected to promote ecosystem growth, which would also bring grant funds to Compound. | November 12, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | In some assets, a small number of addresses hold most of the supply cap, so increasing the caps could affect large suppliers and potentially increase concentration risk. However, it is clear that demand is very high, and the current supply caps are likely insufficient to meet this demand. From this point and a liquidity perspective, raising the supply caps seems necessary. | November 9, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | By listing ETHx before competing DeFi protocols, Compound is expected to enhance its competitive edge. ETHx also seems low-risk because of its careful initial settings, strong decentralization, and sufficient liquidity. However, if demand changes, these settings might need to be adjusted in the future. | November 9, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The USDC and DAI reserves are high enough, so even if the market changes, funds can be taken from the Aera vault to cover it. This proposal shows careful risk management that stays within safe limits. | November 8, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The user bases of both Compound and Mantle are expected to expand. Also, Mantle Treasury holds substantial assets and it is expected to benefit from the growth of the Mantle ecosystem. | November 6, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | It’s been great to see the well-crafted and detailed CoC for delegates to uphold and hold each other accountable for the social layer of the governance. We also like the approach that having it as a pilot for 6.5 months and then incorporate them into the constitution. | November 6, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Using wUSDM as collateral allows users to arbitrage yields even when borrow rates are low. Additionally, since USDM is available on multiple chains, Compound can expand its user base, increase liquidity, and improve risk diversification. | November 5, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We support this proposal. Our questions regarding the budget and the proposal’s objectives have been addressed by @dennisonb. Tally is an essential service for Uniswap’s DAO governance, and we are in favor of providing this funding. | November 4, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Adjusting the IR curve is a flexible approach in response to market demand. Additionally, reducing excessive incentive spending would ease the financial burden on the protocol. Through these adjustments, it could reduce the risk of excessive utilization, balancing ease of use for users with the protocol’s profitability. | November 3, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | This proposal is expected to meet the incressing market demand, enhance protocol stability, and improving user experience. | November 3, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | On-chain | Compared to other promising candidates, they are on the border of being chosen. With a limited amount of the VP we have, we use our 100% VP to support them. We would also vote for gzeon, Emiliano Bonassi, Immunefi and Dennison Bertram. | November 1, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | The charter has clarified criteria that the Standard Rollups should adhere to. | October 30, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We believe it's an important step to more decentralization of the governance. The next big step would be to allow DAO members to permissionlessly create proposals and we should discuss how to achieve them. | October 30, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council. | October 25, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We vote to “Reconfirm Tim Chang and John Kennedy for the GCP Council”. Their expertises and experiences are valuable for continuous explorations of the GCP and we support them to serve the council. | October 25, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and acknowledge two concerns are appropriately addressed after the Snapshot. We believe Stylus is the key innovation that the Arbitrum ecosystem should push forward and are looking forward to the success of this program. | October 24, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We vote FOR the proposal on Tally. We maintain our decision made on Snapshot as below and continue to support the effort done by the SEED Gov team. | October 24, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | While there were some challenges reported by L2BEAT in this report 1, we believe that the ARDC members have provided valuable deliverables for the DAO. We acknowledge that it’s difficult to quantify the value provided by them and hope it would be something the new program can address. Having an oversight council makes sense as well, and we’re looking for Entropy to take its role as it feels one of their responsibilities. For the budget, considering the quotes provided by the actual members that have done the works, and according to the author’s recommendation, we believe the Option B is the most balanced one to experiment with. | October 24, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | While we acknowledge various concerns related to this program, we support the experimental nature of it and rely on the judgement and evaluations done by the selected program members. As GFX mentioned, the budget wouldn’t be used if the token swap doesn’t make sense. We see similar programs done by other DAOs while they are not necessarily proven successful yet. Many pointed out the risks, but there will be potential upsides that the DAO can take from this program and we believe it’s worth looking into. We would request changes if it goes to the onchain though: 1) as other delegates suggested, the lock-in period should be longer like 2-years for Arbitrum and target protocols to be aligned for the long term. 2) considering the experimental nature of the program, the compensations should be somehow split into an advance as the minimum base, and retroactive rewards based on successful token swap cases, otherwise, the program would pay out much expense without any success case (or lead to unnecessary pressure to the members to make some token swap happen.) | October 24, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain the support made on Snapshot as below and continue to monitor the progress of the program. | October 24, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We strongly support this proposal, especially since we believe that accommodating more than four chains approved by its Snapshot one is essential, even more so than during the previous vote. | October 24, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | Preconfirmation has been a hot topic around Ethereum staking and was also the initial scope in reGOOSE, so this kind of initiative makes sense. However, it is still unclear to what extent Lido DAO should support preconfirmation, and this should become clear after thorough research such as Nethermind's research on preconf's economic viability. | October 23, 2024 | |||
Yes | Off-chain | Currently, we want to grow both SDVT and CSM, and this seems like a very fair decision because the point incentives provided for SDVT's growth can also be utilized to incentivize deposits to CSM. In the future, it would make sense to have a separate vault for CSM, following the roadmap of Staking Router development, and let the market decide which staking module to be in favor. | October 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We voted to recognize this bridge as canonical after checking the audits were done for these implementations. This should lead to the further expansion of stETH.Since the safety and effectiveness of code audits can vary depending on factors such as the auditor, reviews and checks like those performed by @TheDZhon are extremely helpful in enhancing security. | October 23, 2024 | |||
Yes | On-chain | We supported all three of the proposals listed above. Especially, approving CSM is an important step toward enhancing the decentralization of Lido and Ethereum, and we didn’t find any issues with supporting them. We also acknowledge that the audits have been done by Ackee Blockchain and MixBytes. Everything seems on track, so we support this proposal as we have before. | October 23, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | By establishing a program like this, the DAO can effectively communicate with projects interested in collaborating with Uniswap and execute the initiatives for users, which we believe will impact Uniswap’s market share. Additionally, we believe that incorporating a trial period is crucial for forming a new organization. We acknowledge that the objectives for business development and marketing are clearly defined, and we feel that our previous concerns regarding the KPIs have been addressed. | October 21, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | While we have some concerns about the quality of the executions and outcome from this initiative, we consider it worth a try to focus on aligning the DAO’s key members with the strategic directions that the DAO needs to tackle going forward. | October 18, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain the support at the Snapshot stage and look forward to the transition of the RARI DAO governance onto Arbitrum with additional treatments like offsetting the cost of bridging and potential incentives for the transition. | October 17, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain the support made in the Snapshot phase and acknowledge that lack of transparency is largely due to the nature of partnership discussions and the protection for the competitive edge. We will review the special section dedicated to this partnership funds in the future transparency reports. | October 17, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We value the consistent financial support to the whole Ethereum ecosystem by ENS DAO given that ENS's future is tightly knitted to the development of the ecosystem and that ENS DAO is highly profitable when compared with other major DAOs. This is a contribution that few DAOs can afford to, and thus very meaningful. | October 14, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This is also where continuity matters as this will give reliability to the ENS as a platform to build something upon from builders' perspective. We see some unique and exciting projects that received grants such as 3DNS. It seems that grants are distributed in a desirable way. | October 14, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | This is necessary, just like for other working groups, and should be approved without question unless there are significant changes or significant needs for changes. We believe there's no problem with approving it this time. | October 14, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | We are opposed to this proposal. Our reason is that, compared to other chains, and considering that Lisk’s TVL is mostly composed of the LSK token, even when taking into account the promised $1 million in POL and the $250,000 Lisk incentive matching, we believe that the $375,000 incentive is too large. Gnosis Chain, which had a TVL of $300 million at the time of its proposal, was allocated $250,000 in the Onboarding Package via Snapshot. We also believe that Lisk Chain’s TVL is smaller compared to Linea and Scroll, which received $250,000 in incentives through the Onboarding Package. We think it would be better to reconsider this proposal on a smaller scale. | October 12, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain our stance made in the Snapshot phase and continue to support the change after having reviewed the report by the ARDC. | October 11, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain our support from the Snapshot voting for the “Panda Partners” tier sponsorship of the event. We believe in the direct mission alignment between the Arbitrum ecosystem and the Attackathon and the donation amount is reasonable. | October 11, 2024 | |||
Yes | On-chain | 1. stETH on L2 We support this proposal as it enhances the accessibility of stETH across L2 networks, leveraging existing wstETH infrastructure. This expansion will provide users with a consistent experience across both L1 and L2. 2. Organize the Lido Alliance Program as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent BORG We support setting up an EasyTrack for the Lido Alliance Operational Multisig to simplify operations. The approved BORG entity provides a legal framework for agreements without exposing Lido DAO to legal risks. This structure keeps Lido DAO decentralized while supporting the Alliance’s needs, with EasyTrack improving fund management. | October 11, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We maintain our decision made at its Snapshot voting phase and appreciate the additional information added to the proposal. We also appreciate the future effort to make sure that there will be elections before the next phase of the committee with potential collaborations with Entropy and/or other suitable entities. | October 11, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Worth trying to attract applications to tackle this request | October 7, 2024 | |||
Weighted Choices | Off-chain | We voted for these three individuals in equal proportions because we felt they are the most capable of providing value to this committee, considering their existing contributions to the Uniswap DAO and their achievements in other DAOs. Doo has had a long tenure with the Uniswap DAO and has been active in various other DAOs. Alice, as a member of Karpatkey, has been active in multiple DAOs besides Uniswap. JoJo is engaged in delegate activities in DAOs like us on Arbitrum, and we believe their contributions make them suitable for this committee. | October 7, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We vote for Use ENS txt records on Snapshot. This change leads to a better accessibility of the metadata for the toolings in the ecosystem, without additional cost. We believe it’s acceptable to utilize the ENS records for the information. | October 2, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We appreciate the potential value to be provided by the research from TogetherCrew team without cost from the DAO treasury. However, we are not certain that the DAO is the one to decide whether the API access to Discord is allowed, while most of the Discourse data is public and much related to discussions around the DAO. Either way, we support the concept and its modified implementation that addresses the concerns from the delegates and related parties. | October 2, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We consider this as a simple oversight during the process and it’s natural to allow the provider with great track record to properly operate the validator as a Nova validator. | October 2, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | Eth.link has been used by various projects to provide access to ENS and IPFS sites. It has been utilized by some of the largest projects in the space, including Uniswap. It is important for ENS to responsibly maintain such a highly public domain, which is crucial not only for ENS but also for the Ethereum ecosystem as a whole. | September 30, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support the proposal to secure a budget for analyzing the URGP using Forse. We feel that the concerns—such as including more than four chains at the Snapshot stage and that Arbitrum is not included in the URGP—have been resolved through efforts to eliminate budget issues and avoid overlap with Gauntlet. The URGP is a very important project for Uniswap, and we believe that measuring its effectiveness is essential. Initially, we thought that the UAC itself should investigate the feasibility of this project, but we feel that using Forse will allow for a detailed measurement of its effectiveness. We look forward to the detailed analysis results for the DAO to further improve the URGP. | September 30, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We believe adding (rather than changing) the functionality in proposing executable ENS proposals with a required bond mechanism is the right approach and the proposed initial values are reasonable. As Kent pointed out, we assume the frontends can utilize the additional changes provided by this proposal for the onchain tools to be supported by multiple platforms while the development is approved by the DAO to go ahead. | September 30, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | If you think about the Foundation as a service provider, they have done tremendous work so far including bringing strategic partnerships, to the Arbitrum ecosystem. Expanding more partnerships to compete other networks with more budget from the party with great track record makes total sense. However, as already pointed out, the transparency of the program and its reporting should be treated as the important deliverables to be promised by the Foundation. We also suggest the proposal to provide more break-downs of the budget with detailed objectives and plans before its onchain voting. | September 25, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We appreciate all the work so far and effort to improve the program even further with a new system and established structure that apparently works for the objective. While there is an increase in spending from the DAO perspective, we believe the new V1.5 system has been designed well and ready to be experimented with administration support from the SEED team. The program lasts for 12 months but we like the fact that the details of the program can be modified based on the results that we will see. | September 25, 2024 | |||
For | On-chain | We support this proposal because it addresses the critical operational needs of the Uniswap DAO by renewing the Uniswap Accountability Committee (UAC) for Season 3 with expanded capacity and funding, rebalancing the budgets for Season 2 to account for UNI token price fluctuations, and supporting an extra 16th delegate slot for the Delegate Reward Initiative Cycle 2 to promote broader participation within the DAO; these measures strengthen the DAO’s operational capacity, enhance governance, and support its long-term objectives. | September 20, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | As discussed separately with Klaus, this is a great update at this moment, and you can prepare for the 2025 event planning with other initiatives ahead into 2025. Looking forward to the GovHack Devcon! | September 19, 2024 | |||
Ranked Choices | Off-chain | We believe the GovHack will cover what this program has to provide in part and the only possible format to differentiate from the other offline event form is online events, but they have to be clearly designed, focused, promoted and executed with a much lower budget, which is challenging. | September 19, 2024 | |||
Ranked Choices | Off-chain | While the DAO needs to address the issue around the conversation between the fiat and ARB token, we agree that the initial promise and contract with service providers should be respected and followed through with funds compensated by the treasury. Now, it’s more critical to execute the program than delaying the operations. | September 19, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | Off-chain | We maintain our stance in the comment posted before and continue to support the progress of the development of Timeboost. We have also support the adjustments around a few parameters to be adjustable by Offchain Labs to fine-tune the design and achieve the stability, user experience and economics for the Arbitrum DAO. Also, interested in the future improvement partnering with the Espresso team. | September 19, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. | September 18, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | On-chain | We believe all the options ranked high by the council deserve to accept applications within this cycle's budget | September 16, 2024 | |||
Abstain | On-chain | Abstain due to our role as a Grants Council member | September 16, 2024 | |||
Selected Choices | On-chain | We believe the selection is a great mix of members who has relevant experiences and expertises to serve as the Security Council | September 16, 2024 | |||
Ranked Choices | Off-chain | We would have voted abstain if it’s an option because we are one of the options to be chosen, but vote for Both as it’s closest to abstain. As expressed in the comment to the relevant thread, we would like to respect what the DAO decides and the outcome to be ratified on Snapshot. | September 14, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | While the request itself seems totally valid, we respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. | September 12, 2024 | |||
Against | Off-chain | While the request itself seems totally valid and we expressed the support, we have resolved to respect the decision made with the Incentives Detox period (which hasn’t started yet but in effect soon) and we believe all the extension requests should be treated the same. We apologize for the wrong signal made before realizing the Detox is in effect for the extension. | September 12, 2024 | |||
For | Off-chain | We appreciate all the work and comprehensive report provided for the Phase I and continuous effort to be made by the experienced actors in the area. However, we echo the concerns by other delegates on bigger scopes and higher compensations to each party (2.5x from the one in Phase I). Also, the detailed breakdown of the budget, especially the below part should be explicitly clarified in the proposal. | September 12, 2024 | |||
For |